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Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan Samuel Beckettin läpimurtonäytelmää Waiting for Godot (suom. 
Huomenna hän tulee), ja pyritään osoittamaan näytelmän sisältävän merkittävästi hienovaraisia 
groteskeja piirteitä, joita ei aiemmassa tutkimuksessa ole huomioitu juurikaan. Näytelmän groteskit 
piirteet nousevat siis ikään kuin sekä tekstin itsensä että aiemman tutkimuksen marginaaleista. 
Näihin tutkielma pyrkii pureutumaan ja joita se aikoo aukoa ja paljastaa. 
Tutkielmaan on valittu groteskin teorian lisäksi kaksi muuta aiempaa teoreettista kehystä, 
joiden puitteissa näytelmää on usein tutkittu ja analysoitu: absurdius sekä merkityksettömyys. 
Jokaista kolmea viitekehystä tutkitaan kolmelta näkökannalta: niiden konstruoimasta paikasta, 
ajasta, ja itsestä (tai identiteetistä) käsin. Tutkielma lähtee liikkeelle ensimmäisessä osassa absurdin 
teatterista ja absurdin (eritoten Albert Camus’n) teoriasta laajemmin osoittamaan, millaisia 
absurdeja piirteitä ja merkityksiä näytelmään on luettu, näitä samalla kyseenalaistaen ja kritisoiden.
Toisessa osassa siirrytään merkityksettömyyden teoriaan, Maurice Blanchot keskeisimpänä 
kriitikkona, ja tarkastellaan, millaisia merkityksettömiä merkityksiä ensimmäisessä osassa havaitut 
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Kayserin kirjoituksia, groteskin kautta kahdessa aiemmassa osassa tutkittuja ja ongelmallisiksi 
havaittuja ilmiöitä, ja pyritään osoittamaan, miten ne eivät pelkästään koodaudu auki groteskin 
linssin läpi luettuna, vaan suorastaan kutsuvat groteskeja tulkintoja itsestään.
Tutkielman kolmiportaisuudesta muotoutuu eräänlainen oma metodinsa: eri viitekehyksiä 
teokseen sovittamalla voidaan teoksesta ikään kuin suodattaa esiin tekstimassan seasta keskeiset 
ilmiöt ja merkitykset tutkimuksen kohteeksi.
Lopputuloksena nähdään, kuinka Beckettin tyylille ominainen groteskin muoto sijaitsee 
toisaalta näytelmän itsensä, toisaalta aiemman tutkimuksen marginaalissa, ja kuinka nämä kaksi 
tasoa ovat analogisessa suhteessa.
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11. Introduction
Whatever could be said of such a seminal work of twentieth century literature as Samuel Beckett’s
Waiting for Godot that has not already been said? Surely this is a piece that is analysed to the death
it so ambivalently seeks and fears. Yet meaning changes with time and readers, and the statement,
so often made of Beckett’s works, that a text construes meaninglessness, is especially compelling
for a student of literature. Bearing this in mind, we begin.
Firstly,  looking at  the table of contents, the focus of this thesis may not be immediately
apparent. The reason there are three seemingly distinct sections on three seemingly distinct topics is
that we are to demonstrate their interconnectedness, and furthermore, that the frameworks of the
absurd and the meaningless—which are among the most discussed topics in conjunction with both
Beckett’s  work  in  general  and  Waiting  for  Godot in  particular—are  in  a  mutually  supportive
relationship  with  the  framework  of  the  grotesque,  which  has  so  far  been  rather  contingent  in
criticism (though not completely neglected, and this is an interesting discussion to take part in).
The  aim of  this  thesis  is  to  show how the  grotesque  grows  out  of  the  absurd  and  the
meaningless,  or  emerges  from the margins  of  silence,  the gaps,  that  remain in  the discussions,
relating specifically to  Godot, as the influential critic Martin Esslin argues that while the play is
analysable,  “any endeavour to arrive at a clear and certain interpretation” of the play would be
foolish (1985, 45). We will, therefore, endeavour to seek an analytical framework that refuses clear
and certain meanings, and for this purpose, the theory of the grotesque is not only appropriate, but
very insightful.
To tease out the grotesque from the margins of earlier criticism and from the margins of the
play itself, a kind of filtration method has been devised, if such a loan from the natural sciences may
be permitted: by imposing several theories onto the text, we filter out what is irrelevant to us. This
gives  us  a  number  of  critical  strata,  layers  of  the  text  which  take  on  different  meanings  and
significances in different theoretical contexts. It is presumed that, after such a process, we are left
with something new. A meaning that emerges from meaninglessness. For this reason, this thesis is
as much about the theories as it is about the play, and this is reflected in the way the theories are
2discussed quite deeply and comprehensively.
In the context of all three theories, on each strata, as it were, there are a number of concepts
or themes that suggest themselves over and over again. These run through the thesis as the red
thread of the analysis: those of world, time, and self are picked out as the main ones, and they serve
the function of nodes or interstices for the rest. This division is kept as absolute as possible, but
during the  writing process  it  became clear  their  interconnectedness  renders  such  an  endeavour
nearly futile. The division is held to a reasonable extent nonetheless. The minor concepts or themes,
which may not all be present in all three frameworks, are: language, void, tragicomedy, realism, the
aura, consciousness, paradox, contradiction, and night. Granted, most of these are such sweeping,
general terms as to encompass whole areas of life, and have in themselves limited expressive, let
alone analytic, capacity. However, the individual contexts in which they are discussed demarcate
and shape them. The breadth of their scope makes them adaptable, plastic, and the contours of each
theory are marked on their adaptive surfaces.
The individual critical discussion for which this thesis has the most to offer, and towards
which it  builds,  is  the grotesque. It  is  strangely underrepresented especially in the criticism on
Waiting for Godot, considering how relatively often the grotesque is identified and discussed for
example in Beckett’s prose work. Yet it  is not somehow outside or alien to the play:  a notable
theorist of the grotesque, Geoffrey Galt Harpham argues that the grotesque reveals the presence of
meaning within apparent meaninglessness; it  does not stay in the margin—these directionalities,
Harpham argues, are unravelled in and by the grotesque, for on one hand, the grotesque compresses
forms  into  meaningful  ambivalence,  and  on  the  other,  it  proliferates  them  into  meaningless
ambivalence (1982; 31, 44-45, 65-68, 184). It appears as a glimpse throughout both the play and, as
importantly, the criticism. For example, Esslin already states that the plays of the Theatre of the
Absurd are grotesque, and Neil Cornwell notes the parallels between the grotesque and the absurd,
but neither elaborates on this—it is  argued that the absurd and the grotesque both are “quickly
cheapened” that is, especially susceptible to dismissive and approximate use (Blau 1961, 137-139;
Kayser  1981,  17;  Thomson  1971,  10-13).  On  the  other  hand,  theorists  of  grotesque  such  as
3Wolfgang Kayser, Philip Thomson, and Arthur Clayborough mention Beckett in passing, but never
really focus on the kind of  grotesque that  is  found in his works.  The connection that  is  made
between the grotesque and Beckett is in its contingency a perfect example of just such cheapening
use. It is mentioned in passing, treated like an off-handed remark, and David Musgrave, one of the
few who actually do consider the connection worth closer inspection, notes that most of Beckett
study has  “tended  to  dwell  on  established  theories  of  the  grotesque  and  has  not  attempted  to
determine how the grotesque in Beckett’s works differs from other representatives of the mode”
(2003).
Furthermore, our chosen play,  Waiting for Godot, gets minimal attention in this respect as
was noted. This may be due to its nature as a relatively straightforward theatrical piece. We view
this not as a hindrance but a strength: the play does not self-evidently invite grotesque readings, but,
as will be apparent, the grotesque permeates it, making the findings more revealing. The grotesque
exists  in  the  play like  a  palimpsest  text:  it  hides  behind  the  lines  of  dialogue,  and  given  the
opportunity, bursts forth with force and effortlessness. The tradition of the grotesque has a similar
relationship to Beckett studies generally as well, as it “hides” behind the lines of query. We wish to
study the kind of grotesque that specifically emerges from the play, for it is certainly not a very
typical  one.  Musgrave  argues  it  represents  a  new era  or  generation  of  the  grotesque,  but  the
problematics  brought  forth  by  the  absurd  and  the  meaningless  help  us  understand  that  his
formulation, while evincing great insight, partly focuses on aspects which may not be central to
Beckett’s work.
Before  we begin,  let  us  first  introduce  the object  of  this  thesis  and  the  structure of  its
argument briefly. In his very influential book, Esslin posits Beckett into a group of playwrights
loosely collected under a common rubric which he calls the Theatre of the Absurd. The group does
not form an actual movement as they lack solid connections between them; the denomination has
been assigned to their type of drama ex post facto. Waiting for Godot is one of Beckett’s earliest and
most  recognised plays,  originally in French,  and first  performed in  Paris  in 1953.  The English
translation is by Beckett himself, and it was first staged in the English language in London in 1955.
4The play is divided into two acts, and features two main characters, Vladimir and Estragon,
who await a third character, Mr. Godot, never to be seen in the play, on a country road near a single
tree. The stage-setting is very bare, only the tree and a stone or a mound are explicitly mentioned.
There are three other recurring characters:  a master and his servant,  Pozzo and Lucky,  and the
messenger boy from Mr. Godot. Pozzo and Lucky are passing by, and the messenger boy appears
only  at  the  end  of  each  act.  While  waiting,  Vladimir  and  Estragon  pass  the  time  by  talking,
participating in what can only be described as a variety of physical and linguistic games. Though
we shall discuss it not in terms of a theatrical production but as a text (experienced as a textual
rather than a multimodal entity), it is fruitful to consider on a general level what is said about the
characteristics of the Theatre of the Absurd.
About the structure of this thesis, we will begin our analysis with the absurd: It is the first
and foundational theory to be applied to Beckett’s works, and thus appears in a variety of forms,
since most critics have of it a version of their own, though all versions have in common the sense of
loss of  meaning and value.  We will  be using as  our  starting point  Albert Camus’s formulation.
However, we will notice that the absurd as a theoretical framework is unable to really grasp the play
in terms of meaninglessness and what it  entails.  Its  discussion is  also centred on the play as a
theatrical, physical and visual work. This gives rise to the need to look at meaninglessness as a
subject and a tradition of Beckett criticism independent of the absurd.
In the second section we move on to the meaningless: The theory is more textually-oriented
in its approach, it  discusses the play from a completely different  viewpoint, and thus addresses
some  problematic,  seemingly  unsolvable,  issues  that  arise  from  absurdist  criticism.  Yet  the
framework of the meaningless is not enough in itself, as it leads to an untenable paradox. This leads
to a need for a still new framework, one that encompasses both traditions, and, more importantly,
which legitimises paradoxical meanings. This leads us to the grotesque.
In the third  and last  section we move onto the grotesque:  The palimpsest  nature of  the
grotesque in  Waiting for Godot, the vague assertion that some grotesque elements can indeed be
found in Beckett's works, on both Beckett studies and grotesque theories, was mentioned. But the
5ties are even deeper: the history of the Theatre of the Absurd is closely if obliquely linked to the
history of the tradition of the grotesque, as the two manifest similarly in relation to different phases
of the history of Western culture. The superficial and incidental role of the grotesque in the Theatre
is therefore an unfortunate oversight.
Our analysis does not focus on the history of the grotesque and the Theatre, and therefore
this  subject,  which  would  certainly  warrant  a  study  of  its  own,  is  but  a  minor  point.  More
importantly the grotesque helps us overcome many problems with the interpretation of our main
object,  Waiting for Godot: On one hand, the critical tradition of the absurd tries too hard to fix a
definite meaning for the play, and the physicality of the play as a play invites readings that may be
objectionable—and in direct contradiction to the explicitly stated general consensus that there can
be no meaning fixed to the play (for example, Esslin himself argues that the identity of Godot is
unimportant yet cannot resist speculating on it anyway). On the other hand, the critical tradition of
the meaningless is better suited for understanding the textuality of the play but cannot fully grasp
the relationship between meaning and meaninglessness, silence and materiality,  in the play. The
grotesque that  emerges from the text  combines these as the strange,  clashing existence of both
nothingness and embodiment. The combination of traditions is also reflected back to the grotesque
in the way the play combines the two main traditions of the grotesque, here called the carnival-
grotesque and the subjective grotesque.
As a final  note,  this thesis in itself is  something of a hybrid,  its  ingredients sought and
fumbled upon in many different places and thinkers’ works. It may seem (hopefully merely initially)
to the reader even a grotesque one, as Harpham argues that grotesque analysis is the application of a
method and expression to an unsuitable object (1982, 12). Hopefully at the end of this thesis the
method has proven itself worthwhile.
2. Reading the Absurd
Let us begin by considering the foundation and inspiration of the Theatre of the Absurd and the
putative inspiration for Waiting for Godot, the concept of the absurd. Though there is a number of
6works dedicated to the analysis of the absurd, we will rely mainly on the definition presented by the
essay The Myth of Sisyphus by Albert Camus (originally published in 1942), as this “fundamental
treatise” (Cornwell 2006; 3, 114) is treated as the main authority of the absurd by Esslin, and is
surely, if not the most, at least among the most influential texts on the absurd. The essay centres on
the figure of Sisyphus from ancient Greek mythology: he displeased the gods, and as punishment in
the afterlife must roll a large boulder up a hill, only for the boulder to roll back down, thus renewing
his labour indefinitely. Camus argues that instead of being tortured by his punishment, Sisyphus is
the happiest of all men: “The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One
must  imagine  Sisyphus  happy.”  (Camus  1991,  123)  Sisyphus  lives  his  (after)life  freed  of
disappointments  and  uncertainty,  and  Beckett’s  works  have  been  read  as  just  such  an  infinite
ceaseless  task—indeed,  Beckett  is  recorded  to  view writing  as  such  a  task (Brater  1975,  197;
Cornwell 2006; 20, 241; Krieger 1977, 988-991). We will see how these ideas have been interpreted
in  the  works  of  the  Theatre  of  the  Absurd,  for  like  Manuel  Grossman argues,  the  meaning is
specialised (1967, 473-474).
2.1 What is the Absurd?
The  word  absurd,  according  to  Camus,  denotes  something  impossible,  and  more  importantly,
something  that  is  contradictory.  The  absurd  is  not  a  single  entity,  but  a  relation  between  two
extremes; it,  as Camus lyrically puts it, “bursts from the comparison between a bare fact and a
certain reality, between an action and the world that transcends it.” (1991, 30) The absurd is a clash,
an unceasing struggle, in the experience of an individual when faced with the familiar world made
strange, a world void of reason and explanation, in short, world without meaning. (1991; 6, 14, 29.)
The absurd, therefore, is an experience rather than a physical phenomenon. Camus argues that the
absurd is felt when the human need for coherence and unity is encountered by the incoherence and
strangeness of the world. As the only bond between the mind and the world the absurd it is a “divine
equivalence which springs from anarchy” (Camus 1991, 51), it is restless and oppositional. (1991;
28-31, 35, 51.) The absurd can only be denied or accepted completely, as the clash that creates the
7absurd  cannot  be  reconciled  (1991,  48).  A relationship  can  only  exist  between  two  distinct
components, not their indistinct fusion.
Camus describes the denial of the absurd as being asleep, the similarities between being
wilfully ignorant  and unconscious being somewhat  obvious and as  the denial  of  the  absurd is,
necessarily, the denial of a part of the human mind as well. The acceptance of the absurd situation
is,  conversely,  described as  awakening,  consciousness,  and lucidity,  and the encounter  with the
absurd is a moment of lucidity. (1991; 6, 13, 44, 15.) Owing to its nature as consciousness (also
literally understood), and since the absurd is delimited on both sides by the extremes by whose
clash it is created, it is “lucid reason noting its limits” [Italics added.] (1991, 49). In terms of the
night/day duality which is derivative of asleep/awake, Camus describes the absurd as “light without
effulgence” (Camus 1991, 5), and committing suicide because one cannot bear the absurd is the
flight from light (1991, 5).
In a world of perpetual struggle, devoid of meaning and explanation, Camus asks: “Does the
Absurd dictate death?” We are strangers in a hostile world, exiles without memory or hope of a
homeland, divorced from our very lives. Should we commit suicide as nothing has meaning any
more? (1991; 6, 9.) As the metaphors of light and awakening imply, the experience of the absurd is
by no means negative in nature for Camus, as Neil Cornwell and Clyde Manschreck note (Cornwell
2006,  115;  Manschreck  1976,  92).  Accepting  the  absurd,  or  living  in  reconciliation  to  it,  is
empowering. The world is suddenly given a “poetry of forms and colours” (Camus 1991, 52). The
void where meaning disappears becomes suddenly eloquent, and indeed the absurd is a progression
towards this void. (Camus 1991, 12; Cornwell 2006; 12, 115.) Furthermore, even though the absurd
teaches that all experience is meaningless, it also dictates that life should be lived to the fullest and
the longest, as human life is the only necessary good in the meaningless world (Camus 1991, 62-63;
Cornwell 2006, 117). The will to live in the present moment, the will to experience the world, is the
consequence of accepting the absurd for nothing matters more than being conscious, “the purest of
joys” (Camus 1991, 63). “By the mere activity of consciousness I transform into a rule of life what
was invitation to death—and I refuse suicide.” (Camus 1991, 64) The acceptance of the absurd has
8other consequences, deeply personal, which we shall discuss more in depth later: revolt, freedom,
and passion (Camus 1991, 60).
The two facets of the absurd, or the two clashing elements, the absurdity of the world and
the human mind, will be discussed in the following section.
2.1.1 The Absurd World
What is the absurd world, the world deprived of meaning, reason, and familiarity for Camus? It is
the world the human mind cannot grasp, knowledge of it is impossible, everything seems to have
sunk into nothingness, and all explanations turn to images covering up the emptiness of uncertainty.
It is the world of “the anonymous impersonal pronoun 'one'” (Camus 1991, 52), the natural world
having  suddenly turned  strange.  It  reveals  the  inhumanity  of  the  world  which  has  been  made
comprehensible by imposing the human system of thought upon it—the absurd takes this imposed
meaning away from us. It is once more unexplainable, inhuman–divested of illusions of meaning
and false illumination. (Camus 1991; 6, 14, 19-25) The absurd world is experienced as a stranger to
it, it seems nonsensical and irrational as it cannot be grasped (1991, 27). Yet it is, by necessity, none
other than our own world and has never been anything else. The human need for coherence, or
human nostalgia (to use Camus's term), has wanted to grasp it, to bring it closer for inspection and
understanding (Camus 1991, 31, 35). Camus writes: “The world evades us because it becomes itself
again . .  .  It  withdraws at a distance from us.” (Camus 1991, 14) Walter Benjamin speaks of a
phenomenon he names the aura which exhibits such similarities that we shall discuss it here briefly.
With references notably similar to Camus's (who talks of “the soft lines of these hills, and
the hand of evening on this troubled heart” [1991, 20].) Benjamin writes: “If, while resting on a
summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which
casts its shadow over you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch.” (1936,
section III) The aura is a perceived distance that does not rely on the spatial proximity of the object,
it is an effect on the human mind of distance, reverence and sublimity. As Benjamin notes in another
essay, it is the experience of the object as opaque (2014, 137). For Benjamin, human nostalgia is
9greedy: he talks of the poverty of the human experience which turns the masses into barbarians who
hungrily consume everything in their way, only soon to be tired and bored by it (2014, 138). This
nostalgia, hunger, for bringing objects close for scrutiny strips them of substance and the aura.
As the aura is a phenomenon of the mind of the subject rather than an inherent quality of the
object,  so  too  is  the  absurd  a  phenomenon  of  the  mind:  the  birthplace  of  the  absurd  is  the
contradiction in the human mind that observes the absurd world, it is born in the realisation that the
ordinary is wholly strange. The origin of the absurd is the meet of the strange world and human
nostalgia,  the need for coherence and unity,  and it  persists  in their continuous conflict.  (Camus
1991; 12, 17, 21, 28, 31.) As this conflict, the absurd is the only bond that unites the man with the
world, as already mentioned (Camus 1991, 30-31). It  is what makes the strange, inhuman world
ours nevertheless. As the absurd world resist  unification, in its  denial  of human nostalgia,  it  is
endlessly diverse and splendid (1991; 9, 65). The feeling of the absurd is the feeling of awe and fear
inspired by the strange world, understanding that the world cannot be understood from a human
perspective. This sounds like the sublime, and indeed, perhaps the absurdity of the natural world is
an auratic, sublime experience for Camus.
To experience life fully, man cannot expect to integrate the world into his own frame of
reference, to receive the world in one's studio, as Benjamin writes (1936, section II). One must, with
humility, go out into its splendid diversity. This leads us to the absurd self that wishes to live in
reconciliation to the absurd.
2.1.2 The Absurd Self
The human mind unconscious  of  the  absurd  wishes  to  grasp  the  world,  that  is,  to  impose  the
unifying human structure of signification onto it. It is in a state of obscurity and ignorance (Camus
1991; 41, 54). But the conscious (or absurd) man1 (modelled on but not limited to the character of
Sisyphus) who lives in reconciliation to the absurd is different. Again in terms of the dualities of
awake/asleep and light/dark, the absurd man has seen the light without effulgence, the absurd, cast
1 4 For Camus, the subject is always a man. The same holds for Maurice Blanchot, who we shall discuss in section 3. 
What remains unclear is whether or not man is intended as a universal subject.
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away the inner darkness that is the love for unity (1991, 54). He is conscious of the absurdity of life
and its three consequences: revolt, freedom, passion.
Consciousness is not a state which one can choose to leave, for the conscious man is forever
bound to the absurd,  however he may wish to recover the feeling of  meaningfulness.  He feels
estranged from his life and self, as the absurd world he inhabits his identity has become absurd as
well, and will be unknowable to him: “If I try to seize this self of which I feel sure, if I try to define
and to summarize it, it is nothing but water slipping through my fingers.” (Camus 1991, 19-20) His
consciousness is achieved through what Camus calls a revolt; a revolt that extends his awareness to
the whole of experience and gives value to the absurd life. (Camus 1991; 6, 15, 25, 31, 54-55.)
The  revolt  is  against  future  and  hope  (Camus  1991;  14,  32-35,  54).  These  two are  so
intricately linked they are nearly identical, as Camus writes that “we live on future” (1991, 13). We
turn our hungry gaze towards tomorrow in the hope for something better than today. For the absurd
man, there is only the absence of meaning and hope. Yet without hope, the absurd man is without
death, as the absurd revolt is ultimately against death: the future brings with it our eventual death,
and in looking forward to it, one is slave to it (Camus 1991; 13, 58; Cornwell 2006, 117). The
absurd man simultaneously recognizes and rejects his death, and this will give him the freedom of
action in this life (Camus 1991, 54-57). Instead of rejecting time, in the hope for eternity after life,
the absurd man embraces the temporal limitedness of his life. In this way death grants the absurd
man strength and justification in his actions. (Camus 1991; 66, 86-90.) However, this does not mean
the absurd man is liberated (1991, 67). He is bound forever to the absurd itself (as already noted), to
this earth, and to the consequences of his own deeds—the absurd does not license crime,  unlike
Manschreck argues. It enables the impartial calculation of the worth of all actions. As Oliver says, it
is ironic that absurdity is the only solid foundation for reason to rest  securely on. (Manschreck
1976; 86, 96; Oliver 1963, 234.) But that, too, is only in the nature of the absurd.
Consequently, the absurd man is characterized by calmness and logicality, without favouring
neither logic nor absurdity over the other (Camus 1991; 37, 66). He believes in rationality without
reservations or limits, that is, whatever the conclusion, it is to be accepted—this is what Camus
11
calls absurd reasoning (1991, 9).  It  is for the absurd man alone to carry the implications of his
actions (Camus 1991, 55). When confronted with an illogical world, the rationality of the absurd
man freely admits to knowing nothing, not even himself, except for one thing: his own rationality,
or lucidity. The absurd man wishes to live with only what is certain, and in an uncertain world, that
is nothing. (Camus 1991; 53, 68, 90.) Therefore he settles for living with nothing. In addition to
knowing nothing, the absurd man wishes to mask nothing, for the mask hides the inhumanity of the
absurd world: Camus mentions priests holding painted masks before the faces of prisoners to be
executed, to hide the scaffold that is their demise (1991, 90-91). The absurd man is this condemned
man, yet he chooses to view his inevitable end.
The absurd man recognizes the mechanism of his mind for what is truly is: contradiction and
multiplicity.  In  the  very  act  of  the  asserting  a  unifying  proposition,  the  mind  proves  its  own
inconsistency— his is insufferable for the unconscious man, and he creates a simulated ignorance to
ameliorate the dissonance (Camus 1991; 18, 87-88). When the simulated ignorance is rejected, it
shatters, and “an infinite number of shimmering fragments is offered to the understanding.” (1991,
18)  So the absurd man multiplies  what  he cannot unify,  he rejoices  in  the unrest  of  the heart,
embraces the passions that burn the heart while exalting it. Thus the absurd man feels passion by
living in a constant state of clash. This is the state of harmony with the absurd world as the absurd
world, too, is characterised by clash. (Camus 1991; 18, 22, 74, 90.)
Camus argues that the most absurd character is the creator (1991, 92). We shall look at the
character of the creator in more detail in conjunction with our discussion of Maurice Blanchot and
the nature of the literary author in section 3.1.3. Next we will, however, focus on the “leading
exponents of the absurd” (Cornwell 2006, 3), the Theatre of the Absurd in general  and Samuel
Beckett's play Waiting for Godot in particular.
2.1.3 The Theatre of the Absurd
Let us now consider the way in which Camus's conception of the absurd has been applied to the
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practice of art by the writers of the Theatre of the Absurd—it is naturally a nearly impossible task to
ascertain that Camus's work has been a conscious source and inspiration, but Schevill argues that
the  absurdity  of  Godot bears  a  specifically  Camusian  aspect  (Schevill  1977,  236).  As  already
mentioned, the authors involved do not constitute  a  literary movement per  se;  they are loosely
collected under a common title as their plays seem to reflect the same attitude, an attitude that was
central, fundamental even, to the twentieth century (Esslin 1985, 23). The similarities that constitute
the movement are mainly accidental, and mostly due to the Zeitgeist they capture acutely, since
each of the writers of the Theatre is “an individual who regards himself as a lone outsider, cut off
and isolated in his private world” (Esslin 1985, 22). Alongside Beckett, according to Esslin, such
authors as Arthur Adamov, Eugène Ionesco, Jean Genet, and Harold Pinter belong to the Theatre.
Esslin defines the absurd of the Theatre of the Absurd as something which is devoid of
purpose, senseless and useless. The absurd is the world become devoid of meaning, and the reaction
to this, which the Theatre aspires to depict, is, to borrow Esslin's words, a “sense of metaphysical
anguish at the absurdity of the human condition”. (Esslin 1985; 23-24, 409.) This, as Grossman
argues, is a specialised version of the absurd Camus proposed in his essay (1967, 473-474); it is still
important  and useful  to compare this with Camus's  concept,  especially as  it  is  wider  in scope,
foundational for all thought on the absurd in general, and, as already noted, explicitly connected to
Waiting for Godot.
 The Theatre presents its audience with an absurd universe, one which has lost its centre of
unity,  its  purpose,  and  most  importantly,  its  meaning  (Esslin  1985,  411).  Senselessness  and
uselessness, the devaluation of ideals and purpose, and, foremost of all, the meaninglessness of the
human condition that result from the experience of the absurd are somewhat removed from Camus's
own conception of the consequences of the absurd, as we have seen: for him, the absurd man is a
rational creature in an irrational world, and the consequences of accepting the absurd as one's own
reality  are  the  personally  engaging  revolt,  freedom,  and  passion  (Camus  1991;  64,  85).  The
helplessness and dejection Esslin sees following the acceptance of the absurd stand in conspicuous
contrast to Camus's attitude, who calls the absurd sweet wine (1991, 52). Though all things are
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equally  indifferent  in  the  absurd  world,  the  absurd  man  feels  privileged  in  knowing  his  own
limitations (Camus 1991, 91).
Perhaps owing in part to the absurd nature of the Theatre of the Absurd, the absurd is, after
all, impossible and contradictory, it features characteristics which oppose those of traditional theatre
(Camus 1991, 29; Esslin 1985, 28; Knight 1971,184-185). These characteristics are easy to see as
neither harmonious nor acceptable for a proper theatrical  piece to have: it  features no linear or
sensible  plot  instead  relying  on  disconnected  farcical  situations,  no  relatable  or  rational
characterisation,  radical  undermining of language usually in the form of nonsense dialogue and
unusual or incoherent symbolism (Esslin 1985, 398; Hurley 1965, 634-637). However, there is no
argument that these features are unique; indeed, it is only the combination of pre-existing attitudes
and literary modes which is unique to the Theatre, and that it is their subject, the philosophy of the
absurd, and not the works of art themselves which distinguishes them (Esslin 1985, 398; Oliver
1963, 224). We will discuss the history of the Theatre of the Absurd in more detail later.
The  rejection  of  a  sensible  plot,  narrativity  even,  is  compared  to  Cubism and  abstract
painting (Cavell 2002, 131; Esslin 1985; 26, 392). It is connected to what Esslin calls “the open
abandonment of rational devices and coherent discourse” (1985, 24). The comparison of the Theatre
of the Absurd and abstract painting seems appropriate: both search for means to show concretely the
sense that the epistemology of the subject breaks down, that is, how the deforming of temporal and
logical  structures  are experienced.  The message  and the  form approach a  unified  whole in  the
Theatre as the experience of the destruction of logic is represented in a way that destroys textual
logic. Instead of presenting a linear sequence of events, the Theatre is interested more in presenting
basic life situations which are static—and especially situations that arise from the author's personal
subjective consciousness. (Esslin 1985; 403.) Therefore the Theatre does not discuss the absurdity
of the world and the human condition, but simply presents them, and asking how the problem of
absurdity should be solved seems naïve and superfluous to the absurdist creator (Esslin 1985, 25;
Hurley 1965, 636-640).  For Esslin this is a truer, more accurate, formulation of the absurd than
Camus's, as Camus states the irrationality of the absurd in a neatly structured manner (Esslin 1985,
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24). However, it could be argued that Camus uses concrete Beckettian language to illustrate his
theory, and that even the absurdists' abandonment of rationality is not as pervasive or open as Esslin
wants to see it (Brater 1975, 198; Cornwell 2006, 7-8).
Keeping this in mind, and that the relationship between irrationality and the absurd is rather
more complex for Camus than Esslin makes it out to be, we may well question the acuity of Esslin's
arguments. Camus himself argues that existentialist philosophers, such as Sartre, prefer escaping to
accepting  the  absurd,  in  this  way  distancing  himself  from  the  tradition  of  well-structured
argumentation  (1991, 32).  The  absurd  is  something  that  appears  amenable  to  reason  but  is
ultimately beyond its reach, and so we may question the importance of the  open abandonment of
rationality,  as  even for  Camus, the absurd is  at  the limit  of rational  thought  (Camus 1991, 49;
Cornwell 2006, 2). The tendency of the Theatre to make use of grotesque imagery and dream-like
images and thought patterns in rejecting coherent discourse may seem a vehicle for rather escaping
the  absurd  than  confronting  it,  as  we  have  noted  Camus  calling  being  unaware  of  the  absurd
sleeping (Esslin 1985; 22, 25, 349-350; Cornwell 2006, 15; Knight 1971, 184-185). However, we
will soon see that the absurd is not incompatible with sleep or dreaming.
The  inconsistency, if not irrationality, of characters and characterisation reflects the sense
that the modern human condition is senseless and irrational, and that human nature is not coherent.
The characters of the Theatre thus resemble mechanical puppets, and even the actors may be turned
into puppets by the playwright's  rigorous stage directions. (Esslin 1985; 21-22, 24, 377; Hurley
1965, 634-635; Oliver 1963, 228.) This is analogous to the series of static events arising from the
author's  experience,  as  Esslin  argues  that  the  Theatre  is  not  interested  in  characters  who  are
independently motivated and “objectively valid” outside of the author's inner world (1985, 403).
The characters of the Theatre are designed to not resemble actual human beings. Furthermore, the
puppetry of the Theatre of the Absurd, the apparent incomprehensibility of the character's actions
and motivations, serve to alienate the observer. The consequence of this negation of identification
with the characters is twofold.
On one  hand,  humour  arises  from comical  predicaments  we cannot  empathise  with,  as
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William Oliver talks of the “comedy-coated pill of absurdity” (Oliver 1963, 229), meaning that the
pessimistic message of the absurd is easier for the audience to accept when it is presented in a
humorous guise (Esslin 1985; 411-412, 415). This leads  to the aforementioned grotesque, as the
Theatre combines horror with laughter, that is, the laughter of humour with the horror of the lack of
meaning. Furthermore, Cornwell argues that there is something comic about the experience of the
absurd itself.  It  is, indeed, laughter  which links  the grotesque to the absurd,  since the comic is
experienced as incongruity, exactly like the absurd and the grotesque. (Cornwell 2006, 15-18; Esslin
1985, 411.) Therefore the grotesque dream realities and the absurd are not mutually exclusive but
may even be co-articulated.
On  the  other  hand,  the  senselessness  of  the  characters  presents  a concrete  image,  an
instantiation rather than a theory, of the senseless and disintegrating absurd world, which is a form
of  social  criticism,  albeit  mostly  unintended,  as  William Haney argues  that  the  Theatre  of  the
Absurd is part of a tradition that focuses on basic individual circumstances, the inner world of the
mind in contact with the material world, rather than social realities (Brater 1975, 198; Esslin 1985,
410-411; Haney 2001, 39-40). We may compare this to what Camus says of the birthplace of the
absurd—the human mind. However, Paul Hurley argues that the American side of the Theatre does
have an overt political agenda, whereas the French (Beckett's side) is more focused on the inner
experience of the characters (1965, 636-638).
The use of the concrete image is part of the devaluation of language in the Theatre of the
Absurd. This may sound strange, especially considering our explicit task of studying  Waiting for
Godot as  a  text.  However,  it  is  argued  that  the  absurdity  of  the  human  condition  unravels
meaningful language into contradictions and nonsense, as the impassable rift between the absurd
world  and  the  human  mind  can  only  be  explored  by  “forcing”  language  into  nonsense.  A
meaningless world is seen to produce meaningless, unrecognisable language. (Cornwell 2006, 13;
Esslin 1985, 84-5; Oliver 1963, 228.) In keeping with this, Esslin states: “Theatre is always more
than  mere language.  Language alone can be read, but  true theatre can become manifest only in
performance.”  (Italics  added)  (1985,  329)  The  implication  is  clear:  language  is  deficient  or
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inadequate. The Theatre of the Absurd tends towards poetics which emerges from the action set as
image on the stage, and what happens is a clash between words and images when the image exceeds
or  contradicts  the  words  of  the  characters  (Esslin  1985,  26).  Indeed,  the  absurd  playwrights
endeavour to awaken the audience to the absurd only by indirect means, using complex images and
unusual symbolism to convey their ideas (Oliver 1963; 227, 229, 234).
The Theatre is, according to Esslin, anti-literary, as words are eschewed as banal. This is
especially seen in the dialogue of the characters, which often consists of “incoherent babblings”
(Esslin 1985, 22), which fit the meaninglessness of the world. The Theatre aspires to relegate the
function  of  communication  from  speech  to  gesture.  (Esslin  1985;  26,  384.)  The  Theatre  is
concerned with expressing supraindividual psychological states by objectifying them into concrete
and complex stage or poetic images, whose gradual completion or unfolding is the main source of
suspense and drama in the play. The images are complex so as not to scare the audience away from
the heavy themes of the play, and the only reason they appear sequential: it makes it impossible to
represent them instantaneously, they must be broken down into separate elements which then build
up the unified images as temporal progression. (Esslin 1985; 361, 405, 416; Haney 2001, 39-40;
Oliver 1963, 229.)
Why is the devaluation of speech of such importance to the Theatre, and how can we in our
present study benefit from looking at it? For the authors of the Theatre the problem of language is
central—how to put into words the lack of words? How to speak the silence? Esslin notes Beckett's
statement, “the attempt to communicate where no communication is possible is . . . horribly comic”.
(Esslin 1985; 32, 381) We may note again the conjunction of the horrible and the comic. Here lies
the question of the meaninglessness, for the limitations of language that result from the absurd can
be subverted by silence (or by madness), but art such as literature, and, to some extent, theatre, can
only be realised through language, in the “authentic spirit of gratuitousness” (Cornwell 2006, 8).
The concrete poetic images Esslin discusses are instantiations of experience, of the experience of
simply  being,  existing,  which  are  essentially  non-linguistic  entities  presented  in  language:
conceptual thought robs them of their “pristine complexity and poetic truth” (Esslin 1985, 406-407).
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To put such entities into words, to try to speak the silence of experience, is a horribly comic act of
violence. This does not, of course,  imply that  experience in and of itself is meaningless; in the
Theatre of the Absurd, the meaningless is found in the world and in the human condition that serve
as  the  foundation  of  the  concrete  poetic  image  qua the  experience.  There  is  silence  in  the
experience,  and  not  only  because  it  is  by  nature  extra-  or  pre-linguistic,  but  also,  and  more
importantly, because it is the reflection of a silent, meaningless, absurd world. However, at the end,
Esslin argues that this is the Theatre's dedication: to show the audience the meaninglessness of the
world, to face it without fear or illusion, and to laugh at it (1985, 429).
Perhaps this endeavour to show the absurdity of the world, and seeing the Theatre as anti-
literary, is what has prompted Esslin to posit that the Theatre of Absurd is fundamentally realistic.
Esslin argues that the Theatre presents to us a world that is more real than real: it is the world, the
absurd world, reflected into the consciousness of an individual as an inner reality, and Oliver agrees
that absurd dramatists tend to create the drama of physical and sensory experience, that is, not naïve
imitation but a deeper kind of realism (Esslin 1985, 353; Oliver 1963, 227-228). Esslin follows the
professional growth of James Joyce from the depiction of the surface of things, what could be called
classical realism, to how the world appears in the individual experience, which Esslin calls “an
even more total reality”. The Theatre does, in its own way, present an attempt to give a truer picture
of reality. (Esslin 1985; 353, 404.)
On the other hand, the realism of the Theatre,  and Esslin's  insistence on the creation of
concrete stage images whence realism is derived, is perhaps placed under suspicion if we return to
what Camus says of images: the image is a cover over the inexplicability of the world, a fiction of
understandability offered when the world cannot be grasped by the intellect: “the intelligence that
covers with images what has no reason.” (Camus 1991; 98, 20.) The image is the antithesis of
consciousness and therefore the antithesis of reality—or realism. Whichever the case, the question
inarguably still remains: are realism and meaninglessness incommensurable?
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2.2 Reading the Absurd in Beckett: A Beginning
It has been established that the authors of the Theatre of the Absurd depict the absurdity of life and
the human condition—that Samuel Beckett, and his play Waiting for Godot, is a leading advocate of
the absurd, and that he presents a view on modernity that is unquestionably absurd (Cornwell 2006,
3; Dubois 2011, 113). We will now study what kinds of forms the absurd features discussed in the
previous section take in the play  Waiting for Godot (or simply Godot). Esslin calls it a “strange,
tragic farce” (1985, 39), and which, in the spirit of the Camusian absurd, may be seen to be seeking
the answer to the question of suicide in the absurd world posited by Camus (McLuckie 1993, 423-
430). (Let us here note again the emerging conjunction of comedy and tragedy.)
Esslin sees that trying to fix the play with any one certain interpretation is foolish, though it
still is analysable owing to its use of polyphonic images that can be grasped. Alain Robbe-Grillet
goes as far as to argue that trying to explain the play is entirely pointless.  (Esslin 1985, 45; Robbe-
Grillet 1965, 110.) Yet, as Craig McLuckie points out, the play is still an act of communication, “a
dramatic utterance” (1993, 423-430), and therefore it is certainly not pointless to try to understand
it.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  even  be  useful  to  try  understand  something  that  eludes  rational
explanation—we may ask if  there  can ever  be an  act  of  communication that  has  no  meaning.
Moreover, for Camus, the absurd is the opposite of irrationality.
In making an interpretation of the play, it is generally considered best to avoid biographical
readings, as that is seen to trivialize the play. This is so even though Esslin argues that the concrete
poetic  images  are  born  in  the  author's  personal  experience,  and  furthermore,  that  personal
experience cannot be recognized as a “universal truth” as it stems from the constant change of the
author’s unstable identity.  There is  no universal meaning that  can be retrieved from his works.
(Esslin 1965, 2; Esslin 1985, 68-69; McLuckie 1993, 423-430.) The demands for personality (or
particularity) on one hand and universality on the other exist simultaneously.
Interestingly, Esslin's image of Beckett as a person and author is startlingly similar to the
absurd man Camus presents to us. Esslin writes: “[Beckett has an] uncompromising determination
to face the stark reality of the human situation, [he will not yield] to superficial consolations that
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have 'clouded  man's  self-awareness',  [he  is]  a  lone  figure  without  hope or  comfort,  in  dignity,
resolved to fulfil its obligation to express its own predicament” (Esslin 1965, 14). In Esslin’s vision,
Beckett heroically struggles to create in a world void of meaning, to express when there is nothing
to express but the obligation to, and there is “the ultimate void in its grotesque derision” (Esslin
1965; 2) in his work. For Camus as well, the position of the absurd man is a heroic one (Cornwell
2006, 3).  However, let us now move to consider the individual features of the Theatre, and how
they manifest in  Godot. The features are the lack of linear or sensible plot, rational or relatable
characters, and the devaluation of language.
The subheading of  the play,  “a tragicomedy in  two acts”,  affords us with a  clue to  the
ambiguity of the play: The “tragi-” part makes clear that the loss of meaningfulness that is absurd
constitutes a tragedy of some kind. However, as indicated by the “-comedy” part, the play is also
humorous, which was demonstrated to be an integral element of absurdity as well. The humorous
elements in the play emerge often in surprising, even improper, contexts. For exampe, the main
characters Vladimir and Estragon contemplate the name of another character, Pozzo: “VLADIMIR:
[Conciliating.] I once knew a family called Gozzo. The mother had the clap.” (Beckett 2006, 15)
Humour arises from the completely unrelated, and unexpected, mention of the venereal disease, an
interjection supposed to reconcile Pozzo to their ignorance. 
Critics agree that  Godot is a difficult play. Esslin notes that the more Beckett refused to
explain his play, the more urgently the critics wanted to (Esslin 1985; 1). Yet it is in the nature of the
absurd that the more we strive for a fixed explanation, the more absurd we become, and therefore
there is reason to argue that there exists no single “key” to unlock the meaning of the play (Esslin
1985, 44; Oliver 1963, 225). It may even be the case that the play should not be analysed in the
critical tradition of conventional drama, as that reduces it to old conventions which Esslin thinks it
clearly transcends. It  also invites a great number of analytical contexts. (Esslin 1985; 44-45; 62;
McLuckie 1993, 423-430.) Surely contributing to this is the lack of spatial or temporal markers to
fix its time, location, and thus eventual meaning. However, there does exist a number of deictic
markers, such as 'now' and 'here', but these have ultimately no definite meaning as they lack stable
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points of comparison. (Ionescu 2013, 73; Suciu, 16.) Place and time are deeply intertwined in the
play in their absence, as Vladimir and Estragon try to ascertain the date: “ESTRAGON: [Looking
wildly about him, as though the date was inscribed in the landscape.]2 It's not possible!” (Beckett
2006,  7)  Estragon relies  on  the  spatial  to  reveal  the  temporal,  but  both  elude  fixed  points  of
reference and thus secure meaning.
There is a general consensus among critics that Godot is a play in which nothing happens,
that is, it has no traditional linear plot (see eg. Esslin 1985; 22, 45-46; Kern 1954, 41; Cornwell
1973, 41). In the play, Estragon complains: “Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it's
awful!” (Beckett 2006, 34) This can be read as a meta-fictional comment on the play itself, and
certainly has been read as such. The lack of action is viewed as a symptom of the absurd world
depicted in the play: it is a half-lived life, in a “twilight world” (to use Metman’s words), pared
down to the barest essential, which the strangeness of the characters and the bleakness of the stage-
setting make concrete (Manschreck 1976, 93; Metman 1965, 122).
The stripping away of meaning takes the concrete form of the stripping away of the material
world,  and  with it,  the  desire  that  guides  our  actions  in  the  world appears  only as  a  demonic
absence; therefore the play is “below” realism in the spareness of its stage-setting, and it seeks to
find  reality,  but  instead  only finds  the  void  of  death.  (Esslin  1965,  7;  Dubois  2011;  25,  118;
Manschreck 1976, 93.)
This polarises the opposition between the world and the human, and in such a world, time
will never cease, Esslin argues (1965, 7). However, as Vladimir complains, time in the play has, in
fact, stopped (Beckett 2006, 29). The cessation of time takes the form of circularity or circular time
in the play,  as  nothing can begin or  end in the absence of linear  time, including a linear plot.
Interestingly enough, Esslin fails to discuss the circular form of the play. The lack of time's linear
progression is  apparent when we look at  the beginnings of acts I  and II:  Both begin with only
Estragon on stage, fiddling with boots (though in act I Estragon wears them, and in II they are on
the ground), Vladimir entering, and the characters talking about staying together (Beckett 2006; 1-2,
2 All stage directions are in Italics, and will be cited accordingly.
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48). The endings, however, are even more revealing: both show Estragon and Vladimir discussing
parting ways (without actually doing it), and end with exactly same three lines: “Well, shall we go?”
“Yes, let's go.” and the stage directions indicating, “[They do not move.]” (Beckett 2006; 47, 87)
As critics note, we could well imagine more acts, as the end of act II does not conclude the
events. Esslin notes that minor changes across the acts, such as the tree having grown leaves, or
Estragon being rid of his boots, only serve to emphasize the essential identity of the situation. Suciu
argues that almost perfectly repetitious structures are used to create the impression of the circularity
of time. (Esslin 1985, 46, Ionescu 2013; 82, 1; Suciu, 5-6.) Even though the most striking difference
between the beginnings of the acts, the boots being stuck in Estragon’s feet in I and in II, “front
centre,  heels together,  toes splayed” (Beckett  2006, 48),  suggests a development  in the plot, as
Estragon has finally manage to strip off the boots, but the similarity and complementary nature of
the topics discussed by Estragon and Vladimir emphasise the negation of any progress, as they
during beginnings discuss staying together and being perhaps glad over it, and during the endings
separating  and  committing  suicide  (Beckett  2006;  1-3,  46-51,  86-87).  The  reversibility  of  the
themes  and  situations  create  an  atmosphere  of  aimlessness,  as  the  beginning  sets  a  mood  of
solidarity  which  the  ending  negates,  and  which  the  break  between  the  acts  negates  again,  re-
establishing the earlier situation.
In addition to this, the non-movement of time can also be seen in Vladimir and Estragon's
waiting. Vladimir and Estragon are sure that their wait is not without object: “We're waiting for
Godot” recurs throughout the play as if they need to re-establish the reason for their existence. But
to establish the meaning of Godot finally arriving, they need to establish temporality in a world
where there  is  none.  They are  “in  a  state  of  twilight”  (Metman 1965;  124,  128)  that  is,  half-
unconscious of the horror of their situation. Suciu argues that the characters wait for Godot to wake
them up  to  living,  and  they do  talk  about  finding  something  to  “give  [them]  the  impression”
(Beckett 2006, 61) they exist (Ionescu 2013, 72; Suciu, 15-16).
Stanley Cavell and Manschreck argue that Vladimir and Estragon wait for, in fact, nothing.
The goal of their waiting becomes total meaninglessness in the form of the waiting itself (Cavell
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2002, 150-151; Haney 2001, 43; Manschreck 1976, 93). That is, to make it cancel itself, to “wear
waiting out” (Cavell 2002, 151). And indeed, Vladimir notes they are waiting for the night, Godot,
but ultimately, only waiting itself (Beckett 2006, 69). The character of Godot is often interpreted as
death, and total meaninglessness would be just that, but death is absent, both in the form of Godot,
and a real ending (Cornwell 2006, 230; Cronkhite 1969, 48; Haney 2001, 44; Ionescu 2013, 75-76;
Manschreck 1976, 93). The resulting deathlessness, the eternal life in the now, is a curse for the
characters. It is an absurd cycle from nothingness to nothingness. (Cornwell 1973, 41; Dubois 2011,
118; Metman 1965, 120.)
 The temporality from where the characters are excluded would wake them to their objective
presence,  their  concrete  existence  in  the  world.  However,  the  only temporal  landmark  in  their
situation is the perpetual now, and Haney argues that waiting is a beginningless moment “beyond
the flux of time”. (Haney 2001, 44; Ionescu 2013, 72.) There are no temporal markers, as they exist
outside  of  time.  (Here  we  may  note  the  almost  Camusian  use  of  expressions  such  as
“unconsciousness” and “waking up”.)
Esslin argues that in the absence of time, language has no meaning, and Günther Anders
argues that in the absence of time, there can be no memory, as memory is both language and time as
history: verbalisations of lived experience and feelings makes it language, and the experience of
something  that  has  been  but  is  not  any more  makes  it  time  as  history.  The  absence  of  time,
therefore,  leads  to  the  previously  mentioned  perpetual  now,  ever-recurring  present  moment,  a
succession of nows. Cavell argues that for Beckett, the isolated present moment, the eternal now, is
a way of escaping the logic of language. (Anders 1965, 150; Esslin 1985, 87; Cavell 2002, 120;
Suciu,  6.)  The  stage  directions  destroy  the  memory  of  the  play  as  they  implicitly  deny  the
possibility of assigning the events some definite date (Ionescu 2013, 78). Instead they show the
characters as pastless and futureless, that is “in a dilated present moment” (Suciu, 12). The location
and time of the play are left vague, only that act II begins with the words “Next day. Same time.
Same place” (Beckett 2006, 48) which in itself is already something of a paradox: the next day is
fundamentally a different time. The temporal and spatial location of the play is truly a “here and
23
now”. But even the eternal now, in the absence of death and the reference points of past and future,
cannot hold (Miskinis 1996, 1050).
As the past is driven by memories, the present by will, and the future by desire, each of
which denied from the characters, they live a time which is not measured by clock, but by their
endurance (Dubois 2011, 116; Suciu, 15). The lack of will is obvious in the puppet-likeness of the
characters,  and  the  lack  of  their  memory can  be  seen  when Vladimir  tries  to  recall  their  past
experiences in Macon country, in a place he cannot remember, picking grapes for a man whose
name he cannot  remember.  Estragon denies  having been there at  all.  (Beckett  2006, 53)  Diane
Dubois argues that desire can give the meaninglessness world meaning and purpose, transform it
into human forms—that is, unmake its absurdity (2011, 118-119). But the inhuman, absurd world
cannot be given human forms or meanings, and thus the characters live without desire, there is no
way out of their predicament. The tension between the human and the world breaks down the only
connection,  the  absurd,  between  human and world,  resulting in  what  Cornwell  calls  “primeval
wasteland” (2006, 227): a world habitable to no human being. Anders argues that the world of the
play is an empty world, save only for the tree. Suciu argues that the destruction of place is actually
only experienced by the characters, but fundamentally there is no difference. (Anders 1965, 141-
142; Suciu, 13.)
Let us have a brief look at the tree as the only concrete object of the material world in the
play:  the  tree.  As  noted,  it  is  in  act  I  completely bare:  “ESTRAGON:  Where  are  the  leaves?
VLADIMIR: It must be dead.” (Beckett 2006; 6) But it has grown “four or five leaves” (Beckett
2006; 48) during the break between the acts, literally overnight as the stage directions specify the
time to be the next day, and Vladimir even makes note of it (Beckett 2006; 57). This may encourage
us, and it certainly has, to think that the tree is an optimistic symbol for movement—passing of
time, change, hope, even the change from tragedy to comedy (Dubois 2011, 121; Metman 1965,
132; Cronkhite 1969, 53)...  that is, a symbol for the subtle subversion of nearly all the features
Esslin argues that are integral to the Theatre of the Absurd. However, the tree is also a gallows-tree
as Vladimir and Estragon on several occasions contemplate hanging themselves from it (Beckett
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2006; 9-10, 46, 86-87). This gives it also a negative, even menacing, significance which is more in
line with the general tendencies of the Theatre.
The two meanings of the tree, one directed towards the creation of life and the other towards
ending  it,  are  mutually  exclusive,  as  Suciu  notes:  they  annul  each  other  while  existing
simultaneously, leading to the tree being devoid of meaning (13-15). While this may not completely
void the tree of all meaning, it certainly leaves it in a state of undermined existence, as even the
identity of the tree as a tree is questioned: Estragon says “Looks to me more like a bush” (Beckett
2006, 6), and the characters discuss the matter briefly,  but eventually the identity of the tree is
dropped without  conclusion, leaving it,  the only thing of the world with clear  contours,  in the
tension between meaning and meaninglessness, of uncertain identity.
This argumentation rests on the presumption that the tree is symptomatic of the world more
largely: as an index of the world, both are meaningless to the point of non-existence. Certainly it
could be argued that the characters of the play inhabit a no-place, as Anders does, and therefore the
absurd  clash  with  the  world  cannot  and  does  not  take place  (1965,  142).  This,  we have  seen,
undermines the basis of the absurd, as the clash of human nostalgia with inhuman world is at its
very root. What then is the relation between the characters and their stripped-down world? There
must be something happening, as it produces what Esslin calls a movement from action to static
pattern,  and which Haney calls  movement from activity to non-activity that  dislocates personal
identity (Esslin 1965, 12; Haney 2001, 43-44).
This leads us to the non-rational or unrelatable characterisation of the play. The expectation
of characterisation is denied in Godot: characters have no clearly defined individuality or essence,
they may change their condition suddenly, which happens to Pozzo between the acts: In act I he is
strong and proud, in act II inexplicably blinded and helpless (Beckett 2006, 69). The characters are
moved by the search for their ever-changing self, their dislocated personal identity, but one thing is
constant, alienation from themselves and the world. Thus Cavell's observation that they are like
Cubist paintings that follow the abstract logic of dreams, is interesting (Esslin 1985, 21-24; Cavell
2002, 131; Suciu 11).
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The  references  to  Cubism and  dreams,  and  the  implied  fragmentation  of  causality  and
temporal progression imply that the play constructs its characters in a way that undermines the
stability of the narrative. Padhy, like Esslin, argues that Godot is not the story of the characters but a
complex poetic image derivative of Beckett's personal experiences, and Leventhal agrees that the
workings of Beckett's psyche can be read in his characters (Leventhal 1965, 48; Padhy 2006, 47).
Indeed, it is argued that  Godot lacks proper characters because it discusses its subject at a deeper
level, where internally consistent characters do not exist—that is, in the realm of paradigm and
archetype, which makes the play a metaphor for the absurdity of existence both physically and
metaphysically (Esslin 1985, 76; McLuckie 1993, 423-430; Wolosky 1991, 221). This views the
characters as archetypes or symbols of something rather than as approximations of “real” people,
and  they  have  been  seen  as,  for  example,  embodiments  of  human  attitudes,  the  mind/body
dichotomy and universal, non-specified humanity (see Anders 1965, 143-149; Esslin 1985; 48, 76;
Kern 1954, 44; Yuan 1997, 132).  This lack of what Esslin calls objective validity outside of the
author's psyche leads to the alienation of the viewer with twofold consequences, as we have noted:
making the characters firstly puppet-like and secondly humorous. We will see that in the case of
Godot, these two effects are opposite and simultaneous.
Beckett's  characters  are  puppet-like  in  the  way  they  are  generally  physically  static,
incapacitated in some way, and suffering, but they compensate this with incessant, even delirious,
chatter expressed in the language of cold and hunger (Kern 1954, 42; Leventhal 1965, 43-46). The
play abounds with static  situations  where the characters  sit,  lay on the ground or  pace around
helplessly all  the while talking incessantly,  and sometimes the directions make their likeness to
puppets almost explicit:  “[They listen,  grotesquely rigid.]” (Beckett 2006, 12) Contrasting these
restrictions on movement, talk appears as the characters’ only activity. However, its effect is making
concrete the characters' inability for independent action. Even though the activity is minimal, the
characters still persist, as only death has the power to silence them, but the gradual reduction of all
recognizable  life  accompanies  this  physical  incapacitation,  and  Cornwell  calls  Beckett's  work
“skeletal fiction”. (Anders 1965, 143; Cornwell 2006; 222, 227; Leventhal 1965, 50; Suciu, 11.)
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In their reduced activity and physicality, the characters are exactly like puppets. The explicit
presence of the stage directions that directly contradict what they say, both equally apparent on the
page,  emphasises  this:  “VLADIMIR:  [Admiringly.]  A  ditch!  Where?  ESTRAGON:  [Without
gesture.]  Over  there.”  (Beckett  2006,  1)  The  stage  directions  manipulate  the  characters like
marionettes against their expressed wishes and intentions.  They are also like performing artists,
controlled by the stage-directions, especially Lucky, who is  forced to play the buffoon, to be a
spectacle both for the audience and for the other characters (Cohn 1962, 43-44). This is made clear
when he is forced to dance,  where he “executes the same movements” (Beckett 2006, 33) upon
twice being ordered to dance. Yet especially clear it is when he is ordered to “think”, to deliver a
nonsense speech, which has been called “word-salad” by some critics,  owing to a confusion of
elements from various discourses without a single coherent sentence (Brater 1975, 203; Metman
1965, 122). It is obvious Lucky is unwilling to perform the tasks: he must be rudely ordered many
times before he complies, and even then it seems as if the action is automatic and non-voluntary,
like that of a puppet.
Mirroring this, even the concrete actors are turned into the author's puppets, as Beckett is
said to be especially demanding both in his stage directions (which is apparent in Godot in the long
sequences of hat-changings and boot-wearings, where stage directions may take the entire page) and
in his directing. It is unconventional for actors to act with little more than their voices and small
gestures, and with the meticulous directions which at times dictate even the order of items to be
picked up and put away, for example,  when Pozzo readies himself for  his first speech in act  I
(Beckett 2006, 23). This is echoed in the textual form of the play as well: reading the highly specific
stage-directions for these scenes one, again,  wonders whether the characters are meant to move
outside of indicated action at all, or if they are supposed to stand still, like a still marionette.
The  role  and  performance  of  the  Beckett  actor  is  physically  uncomfortable,  it  is  the
presentation  of  “peculiar  'bodily'  functions”  which  create  an  experience  of  the  absurd  that  is
designed to create a new dimension of absurdity, which Brater calls the  physical absurd (Brater
1975; 199, 206). The physical absurd is not only created by the concrete conditions of the actors, as
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Brater seems to argue, but also by the physical condition of the characters and their surroundings
witnessed by the readers of the text as well; this is part of Beckett's concreteness: the absurdity of
the human condition is not merely verbalised by the characters but also witnessed in their physical
appearance—both on-stage and on-page. We may note how this is in an interesting contrast to the
reduction of materiality which we discussed previously.
Let us now bring up realism, as both Oliver and Brater see Beckett's theatrical representation
freed of imitation of life or the usual constrictions of theatrical realism (Brater 1975, 199; Oliver
1963, 228). Like the absurd man in the absurd world, the Beckettian actor cannot feel at home on
the stage, only the spectators can force the play to continue. This recalls the Benjaminian barbarian
mass hungry for consumable entertainment. Despite this, the actor is pivotal to Beckett, as the clash
of the actor with the script is what gives birth to the play, parallel to the experience of the absurd
that is born of the clash between the man and the world, the actor and his setting (Brater 1975, 206;
Cohn 1962, 48). Brater argues that Beckett subverts the actor's expectation of the play and his role
in it  like Camus's absurd man subverts reality into a stage set, and both fashion themselves for
display. Indeed, theatre was for Beckett a metaphor for the world. (Brater 1975, 198-199; Grossman
1967, 477) It could also be argued that analogously to this, the play (as a text) subverts the reader's
expectation of how a play reads—that is, appears on the page.
The second result of the inability of identification is humour, and there certainly is a great
amount of humour beneath the grim surface of the play, as Beckett evokes comedic atmosphere
using the comic techniques of the popular theatre, especially those of circus or clowning and music-
hall (Brater 1975, 204; Esslin 1985, 47; Grossman 1967, 477; Knight 1971, 184). Vladimir and
Estragon actually discuss the circus and music-hall in one of their cross-talks:
VLADIMIR: Charming evening we're having.
ESTRAGON: Unforgettable.
VLADIMIR: And it's not over.
ESTRAGON: Apparently not.
VLADIMIR: It's only beginning.
ESTRAGON: It's awful.
VLADIMIR: Worse than the pantomime.
ESTRAGON: The circus.
VLADIMIR: The music-hall.
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ESTRAGON. The circus. (Beckett 2006, 27-28)
The discussion is almost like a meta-fictional comment on the play itself, as the technique of cross-
talk is borrowed from the circus, and the play may well be deemed “worse than the pantomime”
owing to its difficult style and themes. Cavell argues that in  Godot, Beckett has discovered how
clowns would speak if they were able to, and the humour in the play does stem from both the verbal
and the  physical  elements  of  clowning:  from the dialogue in  the form of  nonsense,  repetition,
parodying and  cross-talk, and  from the cruder  physical  humour,  such  as  miming and  slapstick
(Cavell 2002, 158; Esslin 1985, 47; Knight 1971, 184; Suciu, 9). As an example on the comic cross-
talk, relying on repetition and subtle change we have this exchange, where Vladimir and Estragon
discuss whether the single tree is a tree or a bush: 
ESTRAGON: Looks to me more like a bush.
VLADIMIR: A shrub.
ESTRAGON: A bush.
VLADIMIR: A -. What are you insinuating?
That we've come to the wrong place? (Beckett 2006, 6)
In the discussion, Vladimir almost gets carried along by the spirit of the cross-talk, oblivious to how
Estragon uses the game to undermine his  certainty that  they are waiting at  the right  spot.  The
humour in the sudden realisation of “what are you insinuating?” is what breaks the game. Another
perhaps meta-fictionally oriented cross-talk sequence appears when Vladimir and Estragon insult
each other to pass the time, and Estragon wins the game: “ESTRAGON: [With finality.] Crritic!
[sic] VLADIMIR: Oh! [He wilts, vanquished, and turns away.]” (Beckett 2006, 67) Obviously the
greatest  insult  within  theatre  is  being  called  a  critic  (the  doubling  of  the  r's  may  indicate  a
pretentious accent). But the logic of the cross-talk can also be used for a melancholic effect:
ESTRAGON: All the dead voices.
VLADIMIR: They make a noise like wings.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
VLADIMIR: Like sand.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
. . . 
VLADIMIR: What do they say?
ESTRAGON: They talk about their lives.
VLADIMIR: To have lived is not enough for them.
ESTRAGON: They have to talk about it.
VLADIMIR: To be dead is not enough for them.
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. . . 
VLADIMIR: They make a noise like feathers.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
VLADIMIR: Like ashes.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves. (Beckett 2006, 54)
It  is unclear what noises Vladimir and Estragon thus discuss, but  as the section is preceded by
Estragon noting that  they cannot  keep  quiet,  so  it  could be  argued  that  they actually  describe
themselves (2006, 53). Especially revealing is the talk on being dead and alive, since as puppets
they are neither dead nor alive. They themselves through assertion reduce their talk into a “noise
like wings”, that is, indistinct, repetitive and non-human. This example is especially striking as the
technique  of  cross-talk  is  usually  used  for  comedic  effect,  and  here  this  subversion  of  pre-
established expectations makes it even sadder. This demonstrates how the play is saturated with
self-defeating mechanisms—how one vehicle  is  used  for  creating  both  a  certain  effect  and  its
opposite, but the critics sometimes fail to discuss both aspects (though this has been pointed out
about the dialogue, as we shall see).
The forms of physical humour and slapstick that the play features appear in, for example, act
II, when Vladimir and Estragon go through an elaborate hat-exchanging routine for the purpose of
Vladimir changing his hat: “ESTRAGON hands VLADIMIR's hat back to VLADIMIR who takes it
and hands it back to ESTRAGON who takes it and hands it back to VLADIMIR who takes it and
throws  it  down.”  (Beckett  2006,  63-64)  The  repetition  of  the  words  “who  takes  it”  and  the
unceremonious  “throws  it  down” at  the  end  make the  scene  strange  and  therefore  funny both
visually on-stage, and textually where the stage directions stack on top of each other in similar-
looking lines, the abruptness of the end especially standing out. There is also a number of scenes
where,  for example,  the characters themselves, or their trousers,  fall down. Various allusions to
various body parts and bodily functions (mentions of urinating, defecating, ejaculating, farting and
vomiting are made) may also be counted into the forms of physical humour.
The physical humour in the play is viewed by some critics as a substitute for the missing
real action. Slapstick, for example, is seen as infinite placeholder action that can never accomplish
anything, and is used as a strategy to avoid facing the predicament of the characters (Cornwell
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2006,  20;  Dubois  2011,  124).  Indeed,  the  aforementioned  hat-changing  sequence,  which  is  an
example of the type of slapstick found in the play, is preceded by Estragon announcing his intention
of leaving, which would certainly be a real action and accomplishment in the play. The intention is,
however, forgotten when Vladimir shoves his hat into Estragon's hands telling him to hold onto it.
Shortly enough Estragon apologises for his intention to leave: “[Calmer.] I lost my head. Forgive
me. It won't happen again. Tell me what to do.” (Beckett 2006, 63-66) Physical humour connects
the grotesque to the play, as circus and clowning imagery are staples of the carnivalesque grotesque
(Cornwell 2006, 15; Haney 2001, 39; Knight 1971, 184). Furthermore, Cornwell argues that the
extreme form of the comic is the logic of the absurd, and Suciu notes that the characters' “rigidity of
logic” (Suciu, 11) leads to absurd conclusions, and for Camus, absurd logic is logic to the point of
death (Camus 1991, 9; Cornwell 2006, 19). One question still remains, how is the physical absurd,
which is bodily in nature, related to the reduction of materiality or physical capacity? How can
those two co-exist, as they apparently do?
Turning lastly to the radical devaluation of language, which appears as nonsense dialogue,
incoherent  symbolism,  and  in  the  form of  the  concrete stage  image.  The nonsensicality of  the
dialogue is achieved by the conjunction of unexpected words and odd positions, as Robbe-Grillet
puts  it,  “thought and eloquence are conspicuous in  their  absence,  present  is  only their  corpse”
(Brater 1975, 205; Robbe-Grillet 1965, 112). Thus we may compare this with how Beckett’s works
being called “skeletal  fiction”:  the reduction of materiality is  located into the same field as the
devaluation of language, making language and body analogous.
Edith Kern argues that  the play depicts  “stark suffering” in language that  is  coarse and
lowly, without mitigating ornamental rhetoric or lofty ideals (1954, 42). The collision of the logic of
the language and higher ideals can be detected in the scene where Vladimir is upset over how Pozzo
treats Lucky: “[Stutteringly resolute.] To treat a man... [Gesture towards  LUCKY]... like that... I
think  that...  no...  a  human being...  no...  it's  a  scandal!”  (Beckett  2006,  20)  Estragon,  who has
received food because of Pozzo's arrogant behaviour, suddenly joins in: “[Not to be outdone.] A
disgrace! [He resumes his gnawing.]”(Beckett 2006, 20) Moral outrage is reduced to a game of
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language and outdoing the other. Later Estragon tells Pozzo Vladimir is eleven years old, implying
his  moral  principles  are  childish.  (Beckett  2006,  20)  The  play  employs  instant  negation  or
withdrawing as a means of emptying all positive statements of their meaning. This leads to the play
using language in  a  way that  Cronkhite  describes  as  “almost  totally unproductive”  (1969,  51).
Furthermore, Esslin argues that dialogue breaks down in the play because it is not dialectical, it is a
game to pass the time in a meaningless world (Esslin 1965, 4; Esslin 1985, 85-87). We can see this
in the following dialogue:
VLADIMIR: That prevents you from thinking.
ESTRAGON: You think all the same.
VLADIMIR: No, no, impossible.
ESTRAGON: That's the idea, let's contradict each other.
VLADIMIR: Impossible.
ESTRAGON: You think so?
VLADIMIR: We're in no danger of ever thinking any more.
ESTRAGON: Then what are we complaining about?
VLADIMIR: Thinking is not the worst.
. . . 
VLADIMIR: What is terrible is to have thought.
ESTRAGON: But did that ever happen to us?
VLADIMIR: Where are all these corpses from?
ESTRAGON: These skeletons.
VLADIMIR: Tell me that.
ESTRAGON: True.
VLADIMIR: We must have thought a little. (Beckett 2006, 55)
In the above quotation thought and speech are corpses; “Where are all these corpses from?” “We
must  have  thought  a  little”.  Speech  is  corporealised  and  killed,  indeed,  it  is  stillborn.  Yet  the
massacre  is  over,  since  the  characters  are  certain  that  they  do  not  think  any  more.  And  the
discussion does not follow the logic of dialectic as they do not arrive at a conclusion, nor does the
situation even really change. Rather it follows the logic of assertion and negation as the characters
switch to opposite opinions and positions suddenly, and in the end, communication breaks down
completely into silence:
ESTRAGON: Que voulez-vous?
VLADIMIR: I beg your pardon?
ESTRAGON: Que voulez-vous?
VLADIMIR: Ah! Que voulez-vous. Exactly.
[Silence.] (Beckett 2006, 56)
Furthermore, Kern argues that the language of suffering is offset by what she calls “human
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tenderness”,  and  Schevill  that  there  is  compassion  in  the  play,  and  the urge  to  “struggle  and
continue, to seek the necessity of companionship absurd though it may be in the face of vacancy”
(Kern  1954 42;  Schevill  1977 236).  It  should be noted  that  for  Camus,  the  absurd in  itself  is
consolation enough, and it may seem that the characters, Vladimir and Estragon especially, seek
solace in each other’s company, but it is always counteracted by such statements as “If we parted?
That might be better for us.” (Beckett 2006, 87) The joy of the absurd seems quite absent, and the
characters, though “Sisyphean” in the ceaseless recurrence of their life, appear the opposite of the
absurd man, who is heroic and decisive.
The breakdown of human connection and thus symbolism in the play is well demonstrated
by the  critics'  reaction  to  the  character  of  Godot:  who  is  he?  The  variety  of  readings,  some
contradictory if not mutually exclusive, offer no satisfactory outcome, and this problem goes back
to  Esslin's  foundational  work  where  he  firstly  argues  that  Godot's  identity  is  irrelevant,  but
speculates on it  anyway (1985, 55). A number of explanations have been offered, ranging from
abstract  concepts  like  death,  God and  salvation (eg.  Cornwell  2006,  229;  Cronkhite  1969,  48;
Dubois 2011, 117; Esslin 1985; 49-53, 75; Metman 1965, 120-125); names of actual people and
places  (Cronkhite  1969,  47-48);  phonetically  similar  words  in  other  languages  such  as  Gaelic,
German, and French (Cornwell 2006, 229; Cronkhite 1969, 47; Haney 2001, 44; Suciu 15-16). In
fact,  the number of interpretations of  Godot  is  so considerable that  drawing attention to it  has
become a rhetorical trick. Hurley sums up the question of Godot's identity very neatly by saying
that the urge to explain Godot is  created by ignoring the fact that the play simply presents the
absurdity of life, and Suciu writes that Godot has a function rather than a role (Hurley 1965, 637;
Suciu, 15-16). Perhaps the function of Godot is to be the confounding, elusive and unexplainable
absent heart of the play. An incoherent, illegible symbol.
The break down of dialogue in the form of the incongruity of speech and action creates the
concrete stage image, which is a clash between words and images (Brater 1975, 205; Esslin 1985,
26). The most notable instance of this is at the end of both acts when Vladimir and Estragon say
“Yes, let's go.” and the stage-direction says “[They do not move.]” (Beckett 2006; 47, 87) Esslin
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argues that the clash between words and action is a way of communicating beyond language, and
that the play moves from verbal to visual communication. Beckett's work is designed to devalue
language as a vehicle for conceptual thought, as an instrument of communication, and as means to
approach the reality beyond language. (Esslin 1985; 43, 85-88.) Brater argues of the realism of the
play that its physicality gives rise to a new kind of experience of absurd, the physical absurd, as the
actors are used as a vehicle for confronting a “level of absurdity never felt by the reader within the
lucid pages of Camus' argument—a level of absurdity apprehended not so much metaphysically as
it is experienced literally and . . . physically” (Brater 1975, 198-206). This also is related to the
grotesque, as we have discussed in the previous part,  the uncomfortable physical  situations the
actors are placed in make them grotesque, as they are concretely “grotesquely rigid” (Beckett 2006,
12) on-stage.
Beckett's work can be seen as avoidance of the evocation and allusion of language, to resist
the logic of the narrative, as we have seen with the readings of Godot and the tree. It endeavours to
use words to express what they are designed to cover up: the inexpressible (Esslin 1985, 38-39).
That is, the inexpressibility of the material  world and the silence of experience. The play,  as a
sequence of concrete poetic images, is rather “portrayable” than “actable” (Brater 1975, 207). The
images are incoherent and inconclusive in themselves, creating a complex whole, and they take the
mind from the “coherence and rationality of a narrative” to the “intuitive realm beyond” (Haney
2001, 40-41). Returning to Camus and image, image is a cover over the inexpressible, and we can
see that in Beckett's work, and in Godot, the image is not a cover, but in fact it takes the form of
experience itself: it is concrete, material, in contradistinction to all (verbal) explanation, and most
importantly, it in itself is inexplicable in its complexity.
However, we have yet to answer the question of realism and meaninglessness coexisting.
The image, while concrete, still does not have much meaning in the usual sense, especially when we
look at the play as a text the emergence of the image may be even less clear.
 As we analysed Waiting for Godot in the three central aspects of the Theatre of the Absurd,
we encountered paradoxical problems in all: in the lack of plot we arrived at a conclusion that the
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plot is missing because the absurd world is missing, but without the world, there can be no absurd.
On discussing the characters we ran into the problem of the reduction of the physical meeting the
emergence of the physical  absurd.  In  conjunction with the devaluation of language we noted a
problem with the concrete image in the context of the play as a text, and the contradiction between
the play being “more realistic than realism” as Esslin argued, but similarly having characters that
have no objective validity outside the author's personal experience.
We also noted the multitude of mutually exclusive and incompatible readings of the play and
its elements, notably those of the phenomenon named Godot. Furthermore, though it was explicitly
stated that reading the play biographically is reductive, many critics,  including Esslin, Padhy and
Cronkhite,  proceeded to do it  regardless.  On a larger scale,  the play was analysed very clearly
within the framework of  traditional  criticism,  though Esslin  discouraged  that.  Anders  offers  us
perhaps the least reductive reading of the play when he calls Godot a parable or negative fable that
works through inversion, unclear  of exactly what  but a “kind of existence” that  has lost  form,
principle  and the ability to  move forward (1965,  140-141).  Though the point  of  the parable is
formlessness, and part of the charm of the play is the inexhaustible amount of possibilities it offers
as  Suciu  notes  (4),  such  a  weak  conclusion  to  otherwise  solid  analysis  is  fundamentally
disappointing.
The situation then seems to be as Oliver says that “lucid” criticism on absurdist drama is
rare, and even then it is coloured by “excessive sympathy or partisanship” (1963, 224), referring
especially to Esslin. But perhaps the fault does not lie with the critics—perhaps it is the concept of
the absurd which has reduced analytical capacity: Herbert Blau argues that the critical concept of
the absurd has lost  its  capacity of expression and differentiation due to overuse or exploitation
(1961, 137). Furthermore, the physicality of the play qua play, being “more than mere language” as
Esslin says, invites the problematic need to impose a system of allegories onto it, as Reuven Tsur
argues that critics try to bring the distant images of the play nearer as they simply cannot not mean
something (1975, 780). We may here note, in passing, Benjamin's argument of the mass wishing to
grasp and bring the object close for scrutiny and consumption through understanding.
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A more textually-oriented theoretical framework and methodology may help us analyse the
play in a way that is not as reductive, and which enables us to tease out something perhaps new in
it.  Our next  section will  deal  with  meaninglessness  in  greater  detail,  and  uses  more textually-
oriented  theoretical  devices  in  its  analysis.  If  the  question  of  the  coexistence  of  realism  and
meaninglessness was here addressed with little satisfactory result from the perspective of realism,
we will next look at it from the viewpoint of privatisation, which means the destruction of meaning.
3. Reading the Meaningless
We discussed the concept of absurd and the Theatre of the Absurd, both of which are founded on a
form of meaninglessness, the sense of a loss of meaning of life. We saw that it is argued that the
feeling  of  absurdity  has  inspired  Beckett  in  his  work.  The  concept  of  the  absurd  as  a  critical
framework seems insufficient in itself to grasp the complexity of the forms of meaninglessness of
Waiting for Godot. Indeed, we may have noted how the absence of meaning in the work was if not
completely ignored in the criticism, at least treated as an embarrassing lapse to be explained away.
In this section we will turn our attention to how exactly meaning can emerge from meaninglessness.
Next  we  will  look  at  the  theory  of  literature  suggested3 by  the  French  philosopher  Maurice
Blanchot.
It seems necessary to begin with an explanation: One may ask, and not without reason, why
the notoriously obscure theory of Blanchot has been chosen for this section as the main theoretical
framework. Let us return to the character of Sisyphus: in his recurrent task, Blanchot writes, he is
“turned toward the region of infinite rebeginning” (178),  he exists in a place and a time of the
absence of time and place, where nothing ends or begins, not even his existence (1993, 178-179). In
other  words,  the  reason  for  our  decision  is  twofold:  firstly,  Blanchot's  theory  has  seemingly
absurdist  qualities—it has many surprising parallels  to Camus,  even though it  does not discuss
absurdity explicitly. This  makes it  well  suited  for  the  study of  the  absurd  in  its  literary form.
3 “Suggested” is the pivotal word here; Blanchot's text is a hybrid form of philosophy and fiction, and writing theory 
based on his philosophy is necessarily a conglomeration, a hybrid.
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Another  reason  has  to  do  with  the  ways  of  negating  meaning:  following  Päivi  Mehtonen's
description of the poetics of privation, we shall notice that not only does the theory discuss and
describe these, but they are also in its core: Blanchot’s style of writing, the very structure of his
argumentation, utilises privative tactics (this will be demonstrated by ample citations from the work
Space of Literature [1982, orig. 1955]). The theory of literature that Blanchot outlines is therefore
engaged in the act of privation on two concentric levels, one describing the nature of privative,
absurd,  literature,  and the other  where the text  itself  simultaneously writes  itself  in and out  of
existence. We shall see in 3.2 how Waiting for Godot has similar self-annihilatory structures.
3.1 What is the Meaningless?
Literature does not exist; to be specific, literature exists as non-existence.
This is a persuasive, and only a little dramatic, way of capturing the essence of Blanchot's
theory of  literary language.  Literature constitutes  a  space,  a  whole realm,  of  its  own which  is
radically different from and independent of the real world, and perhaps because of this, glorious. It
is withdrawn, turned inward, and independent unto itself. Let us note that this recalls Mehtonen's
argument that Beckett's universe is turned inward and closed off (2007, 21). Furthermore the word
realm, which, by avoiding the use of the word “world” indicates separation and radical dissimilarity
on the conceptual level to the real world, either as the physis or any original on which realist writing
is modelled. In the literary realm only literary language has reality, reality that is material in nature,
and lends its materiality to the realm as well. But it is also meaningless, annulled, and therefore
subjectivity  and  identity,  which  are  only possible  if  constituted  by language,  are  not  stable  or
continual. (Alanko 2000, 233; Blanchot 1982, 45; Holland 1995; 12, 19.) The meaninglessness of
literature comes from its severed connection with everything human and the real world, and from
the way language is structured that detaches itself from the world.
3.1.1 The Negation of the World
Why are we tempted to say that literature appears as non-existence? While Blanchot makes it
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clear that literature is  not nothing, the very nature of literary language is radically different from
everyday language, or the everyday use of language that composes the real world for us (the coarse
word) (Kauppinen, 2007, 170-171). Literature is composed of literary language, the essential word.
Let us note how the language of Beckett's works was argued to be coarse and lowly, and his writing
to be anti-literary.
Before discussing the difference between the coarse and the essential word, let us first make a
brief recourse to the general level of the poetics of privation, which we will observe in Blanchot's
writing. Mehtonen lists the five main tactics of privation or negation of meaning that involve the
strategies of understatement and exaggeration—rhetorical devices or statements are exaggerated to
a point they no longer denote anything but a language game, things are understated by giving them
names that deny their identity (such as 'Mr. Nobody'). These rhetorical structures are consistent and
universal  across  languages  and  can  be  compounded,  for  example,  an  understatement  being
exaggerated to an unusual extent leading to a paradox of meaning. The specific list is as follows:
Either implicit or explicit negative names of people,  places and times; Atypically repetitive and
oxymoronic  exaggeration  of  language;  Obscure  speech  or  frequent  use  of  ellipses  and
ungrammatical sentences; The use of the 'modesty topos', that is, exaggeration of epistemological or
narrative failure to an absurd extent; Impotence of narration and the narrator, that is, saying that
something is unsayable. These tactics are anti-realist in nature, and unsurprisingly so, as they aim to
efface  the  real  world.  (Mehtonen  2007;  10,  13-21.)  We may also note  how the  Beckett  critics
referred to  these when considering the  devaluation of  language without  explicitly stating it.  In
section 3.2 we will discuss them in more detail.
Let us now return to Blanchot and literary language. The crude word aims at unambiguous
communication and the creation of meaning. It is tied to the real world, it  gives us the illusory
presence of material  things,  Blanchot  argues.  (We argued that  for  Camus, the real  world in its
silence and materiality is unknowable to humans, who are tied to their language, and therefore
severed from the world.) The essential word on the other hand aims for the annihilation of meaning:
it is characterised by paradoxical meanings and the exaggeration of understatement, as it evokes the
38
world by distancing it. It opens up a void between itself and the world. The essential word effaces
the real world by reducing it to references; by substituting the real world with itself. Therefore the
literary realm  is  the  space  language  has  created  for  itself.  (Alanko  2000;  215-216,  219,  223;
Blanchot 1982, 39-40.) Thus the essential word does not take the real world as its referent at all—it
references the world it creates by referring to it. Literary language escapes the real world into a void
of silence, which Blanchot calls “dehors”—the outside.
 The essential  word  is  essentially non-worldly,  but  literature  seeks  to  encounter  the  pre-
linguistic silence of the world, to reach the worldliness of material objects (Alanko 2000, 224).
However, it cannot do that, as “[the essential word] alone frees us from the weight of things, [from]
the enormous natural plenitude” (Blanchot 1982, 39). It annihilates itself in this endeavour: literary
language  turns  existence  into  non-existence  by  its  capability  of  calling  forth  things  as  their
absences, and in literature this power is turned upon itself. As the nature of literary language is
absence, it follows that its complete presence is its complete absence. In its attempt to grasp the
world, literary language realises and destroys itself simultaneously, as Blanchot writes that words
proclaim  a  totality  wherein  they simultaneously  annihilate  themselves  (1982,  43-45).  Here  we
detect a strategy of privation, that of negative naming: the literary realm is called “the outside”
which can be seen as implicit negative naming, and Blanchot says that not only can words be used
to give explicit negative names (such as 'Mr. Nobody') but they are also used  as negative names.
They create an absurd space where to call a cat 'cat' is equal to calling it 'not-cat'.
All language, coarse and essential word alike, is unable to call forth the silence of the real
world. But to write is “to withdraw language from the world, to detach it from what makes it a
power according to which, when I speak, it is the world that declares itself, the clear light of day
that develops through tasks undertaken, through action and time.” [Italics added] (Blanchot 1982;
26) Literary language obliterates the real world in the act of its self-creation and substitutes it with
its strange shadow that is “the other of all possible worlds” (Blanchot 1982, 75). The force of the
writing impulse, Blanchot argues, makes the world disappear (Blanchot 1982, 52), and this effaces
what is characteristic of the real world, “the clarity of the impartial light of day” (Blanchot 1982,
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28), that is, ordered structure and distinctive details. The literary realm is chaotic and perpetually
clashing,  not  universal,  “finer  or  better  justified”  (Blanchot  1982,  28)  also  because  it  is  not
dialectical:  It  does  not  move  forward  in  harmonious  alternation  of  a  thesis  and  its  antithesis,
inevitably reaching the final apex. It is not a teleological movement towards perfection. (Blanchot
1982; 30, 226; Gregg 1994, 8-9.) Instead the contradictions create a restless union that transgresses
its own limits, where neither gains supremacy, they “do not exclude each other . . . nor are they
reconciled” (Blanchot 1982, 30). Contraries exist as “the intimacy and the violence of contrary
movements which are never reconciled and never appeased” (Blanchot 1982, 226). (The clash of
contraries was a central  aspect  of  the absurd world,  too.) This means that  the literary realm is
characterised by the suspension of negation: negation is needed to make a decision, to exclude one
of  the  conflicting  choices.  This  is  a  point  we  will  look  at  closer  further  on,  and  discuss  its
problematic relationship with privation which is, by definition, negation.
What appears  amidst  the  clash and chaos of  the  literary realm,  the eternal  cycle of  self-
annihilation and self-assertion, is the materiality of language in a form that is neither pure language
nor of the real world: the single work of art. As we noted, literature does not pursue pure ideas but
the materiality of being—it devotes itself to the concrete that precedes language and concepts, that
is, what cannot be grasped by rational thought. Because of this, the essence of literary language is
impossibility,  and its  task is  endeavouring to  refuse saying anything,  that  is,  to  retain  the pre-
linguistic, silent, materiality of the world. Therefore the work of art is situated between language
and reality,  and  it  guides  us  in  the  attempt  to  see  the  world  and  overcome the  limitations  of
language. (Alanko 2000; 231-234, 236; Blanchot 1982, 87.)
3.1.2 The Negation of Time
The time of literature is the negation or absence of time, and it is marked by repetition, one of the
aforementioned tactics of privation (and a central element in  Waiting for Godot as well). Strange
chronology  in  itself  is  a  staple  of  privative  tactics.  (Blanchot  1982,  30;  Mehtonen  2007,  19.)
Literature is circular, it begins where it ends, and endlessly returns to its point of origin, and even
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Camus writes: “the last pages of a book are already contained in the first pages. Such a link is
inevitable” (Blanchot 1982; 52, 88, 94; Camus 1991, 11-12). As literature represents only itself, it is
doomed forever to repeat itself, and because literature exists as repetition and circularity, it cannot
have historical time, that is, history or future: “The irremediable character of what has no present, of
what is not even there as having once been there, says: it never happened, never for a first time, and
yet it starts over, again, again, infinitely. It is without end, without beginning. It is without a future.”
(Blanchot 1982, 30)
The time of the work of art is outside of everyday time. As an ahistorical entity, it has no
present, no past nor future—it is their absence: artworks inhabit a temporality of their own which
has ceased being dialectical like historical time, as the conflict of the contraries cannot be solved in
the time of time's absence, but turns into an eternally self-renewing cycle (Blanchot 1982, 30; Bruns
2004;  129,  134).  As  Blanchot  argues,  “the  time  of  time's  absence  is  not  dialectical  .  .  .
Contradictions do not exclude each other in it; nor are they reconciled” (1982, 30). (Much like the
language  of  literature  is  non-dialectical  and  outside  everyday  language;  perhaps  a  correlation
exists.) The time that the art work creates is similar to its materiality that is not of the real world.
We will now turn to look at the absence of negation in negation, as mentioned earlier. Let us
begin with a question posited by Gabriel Marcel: is not absurdity, such that is found in paradoxical
and self-defeating propositions, the pure presence of negation? (1978, 201) It seems we are in the
presence of another paradox, but literature is not the pure presence of negation, it is not nothing, but
rather, in Blanchotian style, could be called negation without negation: literature exists as negation,
yet the very nature of that negation is the denial of any conclusive denial which would lead to an
ending of some nature. This works as the deferral of definite meaning through repetition, and to the
annihilation of dialectical or historical time whose vehicle the continual movement of a series of
conclusive negations is. Any accomplishment the language of negation may achieve, the language
of passivity returns to undo (Gregg 1994, 8-9).
Furthermore, the time of the literary realm is dying, as that which appears in this heart of
(time's) absence is death. Death, “the being deep within being's absence” (Blanchot 1982; 30-31), is
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the shadow of presence that occupies the place of real presence, rendering it impossible. Blanchot
says that literature is deterred death, “the eternal torments of Dying” (Blanchot 1982, 66). Literature
is the moment of dying, existing in the liminal space between life and death, incessantly vacillating
between the two extremes, never quite reaching either (Alanko 2000, 211). We note a resemblance
in  this  respect  to  the  absurd:  the  mark  of  the  absurd  man  is  the  simultaneous  rejection  and
acknowledgement of death. Though they are not entirely similar: in the absurd world death is to be
rejected, its gradual victory is nevertheless inevitable. The death of the absurd man is an active,
decisive one, as the absurd man is active and decisive in whatever he does, whereas for Blanchot
death is indecision and passivity that cannot be rendered present or personal (Camus 1991, 90;
Gregg 1994; 17, 35).
We noted earlier that the absurd world and the literary realm are markedly similar, but time, in
terms of light, seems to pose a considerable dissimilarity: the absurd is light without effulgence, and
the time of literary realm is conceptualised as the time of the night. It is not “the restful dialectical
opposite of the day” (Gregg 1994, 43), but a realm which is characterised by the loss of the self, the
abyss of the present moment of dying, and passivity. The night of literature is one which denies us
the forgetfulness of sleep or dying, and instead affixes us, permanently, to the fact of existence. The
act of writing involves a pact made with the night, and cannot be equated with any diurnal task
(Camus 1991, 11; Critchlety 1997, 32; Gregg 1994; 36.) However, the absurd world is not ordered
and structured like the day either, as Camus writes that the absurd man knows the world of night, of
unceasing existence: “There is no sun without shadow, and it is essential to know the night. The
absurd man says yes and his effort will henceforth be unceasing.” (Camus 1991, 123) For Blanchot,
literature is the presence of night and the absence of light, as the dehors of literature is a nocturnal
phenomenon  which  the  light  of  structured  thought  and  knowledge  cannot  apprehend:  when
familiarity disappears into obscurity, emptiness appears in the place of objects. That is when the
materiality of literature, which is the presence of absence felt as the thickening of being, emerges
(Alanko 2000, 226-227; Blanchot 1982; 87, 163). Furthermore, Blanchot’s conception of literature
has been read as a kind of black light: objects are lighted up by a black light which shows them
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strange, distorted, and nocturnal (Hart & Hartman 2004, 5).
Moreover,  there is  one very unique moment  of  the night:  the  midnight.  Let  us  begin  by
contrasting  it  with  the  midday:  The  midday  is  a  moment  of  the  experience  of  utmost
meaningfulness, full of joy, revelations, divine encounters, and yearning for the ideal, with the sun
as  its  symbol.  Furthermore,  the  midday sun  illuminates  and unifies  all  objects,  and  closes  the
distances  between  them,  it  is  as  if  a  concrete  substance  on  every “hard  detail”,  every distinct
boundary, when nothing can move or hide. (Kivistö 2007, 101-115.) As the polar opposite of the
midday, the midnight is the moment of vanishing meaning, of the black light cast upon objects of
the world that obscures their boundaries, and the distinctions between details and thoughts. It is the
eternal struggle of the conflicted contraries. The midday is an hour of pure presence, the presence of
universal sleeping, whereas the midnight is an hour of pure presence of restless nothingness and
absence, of being unable to lose consciousness and rest. (Alanko 2000, 227; Kivistö 2007, 107.)
The midnight is the essence of literature: “The work draws whoever devotes himself to it
toward the point where it withstands its impossibility” (Blanchot 1982, 87), and “this experience [of
withstanding the impossibility of existence] is purely nocturnal, it is the very experience of night”
(Blanchot 1982, 163), that is, the fragile moment when the cycle of assertion and annihilation is in a
perfect  balance,  vacillating between  the  opposites,  reaching  neither—wholly comparable  to  the
moment of dying. It is the moment when the materiality of language emerges. (Alanko 2000, 227;
Blanchot 1982, 44.) As the central point of the cycle, the midnight does not transition into the future
or the past, it is an eternal now, which is nothing in itself: always bounded on one side by the past
and the future on the other, each instance of now is different, yet always the same. It has no inherent
content. (Bruns 2004, 127-128.)
As the opposite of the unifying sun of midday, the midnight is a moment when being in the
world and writing are two incommensurable states of existence, and this division is the root of the
unhappiness or division of consciousness: in writing, the writing subject or author experiences the
division of the self: “I am myself and also another”. It is when the subject exists not as a unified
subject but as a question, without identity, as gratuitous, and consciousness is inescapable, it is like
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a constant murmur (Alanko 2000, 27; Bruns 2004, 122-124). “One can imagine the 'now' is the time
of unhappy consciousness” as Bruns says (2004, 128). Camus talks of  the hour of consciousness
which could be described as unhappy, as it is the hour of returning to your inevitable suffering; it is
when you are superior to your fate (1991, 121). Suffering has an element of superiority for Blanchot
as well: writing is surrendering to the passivity of death, and therefore mastery over writing, while
being suffering, is being superior to death.
We may notice that the absurd man lives in the eternal now: he has no future, not even past of
any note, yet he is a staunch ally of time (Camus 1991, 111). The time of literature, absurd time, is
self-annihilation and ceaseless consciousness. Perhaps, then, the difference between the time of the
absurd world and the time of the literary realm is not so considerable after all? It could be argued
that the black light is light without effulgence, the light that illuminates the life of the absurd man
and the literary realm. Both literature and the absurd world draw whoever devotes himself to them
toward the point where they withstand their own respective impossibilities, that is, towards their
respective centres where both are simultaneously annihilated and affirmed, glorious and unbearable.
The night of literature is the inability to lose consciousness, but being conscious is, as we have
demonstrated, at the centre of Camus's absurdity, the absurd being lucid reason noting its limits.
We have established that the literary realm bears striking resemblance to the absurd world:
both are characterised by an unmitigable clash of contraries, alienation or moving away from the
everyday  real  world,  hostility  to  human  inhabitants,  and  nocturnality;  moreover,  both  create  a
feeling of awe and fear in the inhabitant—a feeling that could well be called the sublime.
3.1.3 The Negation of the Self
Let us now turn our interest to the one who is most intimately associated with literature: the writer.
We may also compare this with what Camus says of the creator who is “the most absurd character”
(1991, 92). This section does not have as solid a connection to the tactics of privation as the two
previous ones as the discussion focuses less on literary phenomena, but it does recall many aspects
of the absurd. The reason we are interested in the writer is threefold: firstly, he is in the liminal
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space between literature and world and therefore absolutely necessary for understanding Blanchot's
conception of literature; secondly the writer is a semi-literary being, and the theory therefore can,
with certain reservations, be applied to the characters of Waiting for Godot; and thirdly, because the
absurdist criticism placed explanatory expectations on the person, life experiences, and putative
psyche of Samuel Beckett himself,  which we wish to show to be not only irrelevant,  but  more
importantly, against the spirit of meaninglessness of the work, which is also implied in the absurd.
Being between the world and literature, the writer is deprived of both. He, by participating in
the construction of the literary realm and therefore the annihilation of the real world, “does not feel
free of the world, but rather, deprived of it; he does not feel that he is master of himself, but rather
that he is absent from himself and exposed to demands which, casting him out of life and of living,
open him to that moment at which he cannot do anything and is no longer himself” (Blanchot 1982,
53). (This recalls Esslin's words: writers of the Theatre of the Absurd felt “cut off and isolated in
[their] private world[s]” [1985, 22].) He is outside the time of possibility, subject to the perpetual
now, the moment when writing and living in the world are two distinct modes of existence, and
cannot live in the real world any longer. This is experienced as a lack, he is deprived rather than
freed. His ties to the real world are irreversibly severed, he is forever bound to the literary realm
like the absurd man is forever bound to the absurd. But, surely, the writer can hope that his work
will bear witness to what he is, as Camus says? (Blanchot 1982, 92; Bruns 2004, 124; Camus 1991;
30, 67, 78.)
Unfortunately not. The language of fiction does not act as a witness, that is, the writer does
not live on in his own works. He is removed from his own work, he is not welcomed to the literary
realm where language itself takes the primary position—the text is indifferent to its creation, like
the absurd world is a “passionate world of indifference” (Alanko 2000, 216; Camus 1991, 110;
Gregg 1994, 44; Holland 2004, 44-45). After all, the writer is human and not art, and cannot be part
of a work of art. Neither does the work allow its writer to read it: “[The text] still withholds itself –
the rude and biting void of refusal  – or  excludes,  with the authority of indifference,  him who,
having written  it,  yet  wants  to  grasp  it  afresh  by reading  it”  (Blanchot  1982,  23-24).  It  turns
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suddenly away from the author like the absurd world turns away from the absurd man (Camus
1991; 14, 45). The writer “is he for whom there exists not even one world. For there exists for him
only the outside, the glistening flow of the eternal outside.” (Blanchot 1982; 23-24, 83)
The writer's identity is uncertain and in a state of constant flux: for there to be a text, the
writer needs to exist, yet “the poet exists after the poem [because] he receives his 'reality' from the
poem, but . . . he does not dispose of this reality except in order to make the poem possible . . .  The
finished poem regards the writer with indifference, it does not refer to him” (Blanchot 1982, 227).
This is what makes the writer deprived, not freed, of the world: he is unsure of his own status as a
writer,  but  also unsure of the status of literature,  because the nature and existence of literature
depends on the writer: art has to exist, as a concept, as a separate realm, a separate temporality even,
for someone to be an artist.  His work defines him at least as much as he defines it. He cannot
escape this predicament—otherwise he would cease to be a writer (Camus 1991, 117). “Creating is
living doubly”  Camus writes (1991, 94), and the writer occupies the position of the double-bind of
uncertainty. This double-life makes the writer uncertain of himself, “as if nonexistent” (Blanchot
1982, 87).
To write is to surrender the writer's own identity, of what constitutes his very nature (Blanchot
1982, 55). He becomes a neutral, empty entity: “When I am alone, I am not alone, but . . . I am
already returning to myself in the form of Someone . . . Where I am alone, I am not there; no one is
there, but the impersonal is: the outside, that which prevents, precedes, and dissolves the possibility
of  any personal  relation.”  (Blanchot  1982,  31)  Here  we detect  two of  the  tactics  of  privation:
negative  naming (the  self  becoming only Somebody)  and  the  impotence  of  the identity of  the
narrator or author (or even characters): the author knows not what he is writing, for the work of art
pushes him away even at the moment of its inception, only that he  writes and that sustains him
(Gregg  1994,  6).  Though  author  and  narrator  are  separate  concepts,  they  are  treated  here
synonymously, as Esslin argues that the power of the Theatre of the Absurd is derived from the
author's experiences and inner life. Whether a theatrical piece has a narrator or not is an interesting
question, and we are to take whatever it is that is derived from Beckett's experiences to be the object
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of our study: presumably the characters, the situations, the mood of the play.
Here there is an interesting parallel to the absurd world: it is, as mentioned, the world of the
“anonymous  impersonal  pronoun  'one'”  (Camus  1991,  52).  Perhaps  the  absurd  identity  is  the
identity of Someone, the neutral subject. This empty, absurd identity is a vessel for the emergence
of literature: the writer reduces himself so that literature can appear, irreducible and eternal—people
die but books survive (Blanchot 1982, 48; Gregg 1994, 45). To speak is to bring objects under the
“rule of identity” (Bruns 2004, 130) which destroys their singularity. Being outside the dialectical
logic  of  differentiation  that  creates  identity  literature  opposes  the  tyranny  of  identity:  literary
language cannot be used to speak, to say “I”, to refer to the self of the writer; because literature does
not bear witness to the life of its writer, the “I” of the writer turns into a multitude of “Who?”
(Blanchot 1982, 51; Holland 2004, 45). The language ceases to be the language of the self, and
becomes of the eternal literature. Thus we shall omit from our analysis authorial derivation, the
presumption that something could be derived from Beckett's experiences, and focus on the ways the
characters of the play embody the negation of the self presented here.
This means that the writer cannot survive the creation of the text, “he lives by dying in it”
(Blanchot 1982, 227). The writer writes in order to be able to die and dies in order to be able to
write—he must “kill” himself to create an independent work of art; he is like the actor who dies
every night, having given his all to his role. Every text is, then, began ex nihilo, as if from the dead.
(Alanko 2000, 209; Blanchot 1982; 66, 95; Gregg 1994, 37; Hartman 2004, 50.) (The actor also
belongs to the group of examples that Camus gives of inherently absurd characters.)  This is one
connection with the absurd, as the restless relationship between the absurd man and his own death is
a central concept to Camus. Death for the absurd man is simultaneously to be both accepted and
refused, he sees at the gallows in front of him and draws strength from the sight (Camus 1991, 91).
For Blanchot, we must see the death that lurks behind us if we are to speak, as literature supports
itself on the grave (Alanko 2000; 211, 230, 234).
The directionality here is rather fascinating: for Camus, death and meaning are in front of the
absurd man, and for Blanchot's writer, they are behind him.  Perhaps this is so because to die in
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order to be able to write indicates that death is a prerequisite of writing, therefore “behind” the
writer.  It  is the origin of  meaning and language,  as  only through death can things be grasped:
“Without  death  everything  [sinks]  into  absurdity  and  nothingness”  (Bruns  2004,  130).  The
possibility of meaning and life is tied to the possibility of dying, as the signifier kills the material
object it calls forth as its absence creating its meaning for us—we cannot grasp the object which is
voiceless materiality since we can only understand it through language. Therefore, in terms which
seem again rather paradoxical, death is the only hope for meaning.  The negation within language
cannot suspend meaning, because  literature, the moment of Dying, is passive  in  nature, negation
negates itself. Literature and death are therefore intimately linked: both are liminal experiences and
impossible to objectify. (Alanko 2000; 206-208, 222, 226.)
If literature is death, writing then is suicide: “[the artist] is linked to the work in the same
strange way in which the man who takes death for a goal is linked to death” (Blanchot 1982, 105).
The writer is under the same illusion of power as the perpetrator of suicide: he is in control of the
impossible. The writer sets out to conquer and appropriate language with the same determination
the perpetrator of suicide sets out to own death, but the endeavour fails and the opposite happens:
the act of the individual will is transformed into passive indecision—the moment when the suicider
wishes to escape life, he is bound tighter than ever to it. As literature is passive dying, the writer too
is resigned to a passive suicide through his words, he is tormented by the thought of a suicide he
cannot commit. (Alanko 2000; 211, 221-223; Critchley 1997, 32; Gregg 1994; 36, 44.)
Walter Benjamin calls suicide the foundation of modernism: living modernity takes a heroic
constitution,  for  it  requires  resignation  to  a  life  of  unbearable  burden.  Suicide,  then,  is  not  a
resignation but a heroic act of passion (Benjamin 1973; 74-76, 81;  Hartman 2004, 50). We may
compare this with the absurd man: Sisyphus is  resigned to an afterlife of burden, and Camus's
absurdity was called heroic by Cornwell, and it is a quintessentially modern condition, and though
both are resigned to their fate, the absurd man receives his courage from what drives Benjamin's
modern subject to suicide. Both rejoice in suicide, as it is an act of passion, but one rejoices in
affirmation  and  the  other  in  refusal.  Perhaps,  indeed the  power  or  vigour  of  the  absurd  man's
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identity lies in his refusal, since to refuse suicide is to refuse the power of negation (Alanko 2000,
212).
Compared to the absurd man, the writer seems passive and weak, but this is not so: “you
cannot write unless you remain your own master before death; you must have established with
death a relation of sovereign equals” (Blanchot 1982, 91). The writer cannot be the master of his
own work, but he must be superior to his fate as Camus says, the master of death (Camus 1991;
115, 211). Death is controlled through the refusal of writing, even the refusal of language itself:
“The writer's mastery is not in the hand that writes, the 'sick' hand that never lets the pencil go . . .
[it] always characterizes the other hand, the one that doesn't write and is capable of intervening at
the right moment to seize the pencil and put it aside” (Blanchot 1982, 25-27). Refusal provides the
writer the power and will to write, as he cannot know that the work has already withdrawn from his
grasp (Gregg 1994, 6).
However, the writer may not be as clueless as Blanchot suggests, for Camus writes that the
awareness of absurdity authorizes the writer to plunge into his creative work “with every excess”
(Camus 1991, 11). Indeed, it is the very sense of absurdity that keeps the writer at his task (Hartman
2004, 57). The absurd creator makes his art while knowing it will be for nothing and still persisting,
for like him, his creations have no future. He simultaneously negates and magnifies his meanings—
his work will lead to no definite conclusion, it will be gratuitous. The absurd creator must work
with the knowledge of himself being deprived of all meaning, he must as Camus writes “give the
void [where meaning disappears] its colours” (Camus 1991, 113-114; Gregg 1994, 16-17).
The power of refusal that controls writing also controls what Blanchot terms fascination, as
“to write is to let fascination rule language.” (1982, 33) Writing and fascination are, then, to some
extent analogous phenomena. However, let us approach the concept of fascination through another
theory, revisiting Walter Benjamin's concept of the aura; as fascination is the surrender to art, then
the aura is a product of the mindset of fascination.
As we saw, the aura is the “unique phenomenon of a distance, however close [the object] may
be”  (Benjamin 1936, section III). As it is a function of the mind, it can found in most anything,
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natural as well as artistic objects. (Benjamin discusses paintings, Blanchot talks of works of pure
language comparable to paintings [1982, 42]. Furthermore, Beckett's works were often compared to
paintings.) Benjamin focuses on the optical aspect in the act of receiving and perceiving art—the
aura is in fact created in and by the eye, by the distancing attitude of the gaze, in the contemplation
of and concentration on the work. Furthermore, it is a lingering gaze, and the aura of a work of art,
in contrast to natural formations, is only experienced in the temporality unique to art. (Benjamin
1936, sections XIV-XV, XII, XV; Bruns 2004, 134.)
The “distance” is purely a function of the relationship between the gaze and the work of art. It
is the lone viewer’s gaze, elation of the work onto a higher plane, which gives the work the aura of
uniqueness,  unapproachability  and  authenticity.  Blanchot  would  perhaps  call  Benjamin's
unapproachability the indifference of the work. The mediated or indirect nature of the work of art
prompts this gaze: the use of the equipment of mechanical reproduction creates a representation of
reality which paradoxically seems to be free of mediation. (Benjamin 1936; XV, XI-XII.) It creates
the illusion of there being nothing to prevent the grasping and consuming of the work of art. The
opposite of the aura is the greedy gaze of the masses: it absorbs the work of art and brings objects
closer for careful scrutiny. It wishes to grasp the object in its finest details as if it was clear like
glass.  The greedy gaze  will  not  stop  for  contemplation,  it  consumes  absent-mindedly,  devours
quickly whatever it  captures and then grows bored of it. (Benjamin 1936, XV; Benjamin 2014,
138.)
Fascination, then,  is  neither  distancing nor devouring gaze,  but  their  composite  form,  the
distancing gaze turned upon itself: it is “the power that neutralizes [the distance] . . . making of it a
neutral, directionless gleam which will not go out, yet does not clarify . . . the gaze turned back
upon itself and closed in a circle” (Blanchot 1982, 32). It is becoming engulfed by the work, the
surface of the work thick, opaque, material (Alanko 2000, 232). Therefore what the writer does not
see is the surface of the work, but a mirror within its deep, their own gaze reflected back to them in
the form of the Neutral. Yet he must resist the urge to lose his self completely in the work as the
work pushes him away, he must retain his power of refusal, as he has to be able to move between
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the work and the distance, attach to and detach from the work, as Camus writes that art is the play
of detachment and passion (Camus 1991, 102). The writer can never give in to the human nostalgia,
the need to grasp the work, otherwise he can no longer detach himself from it.
Blanchot's  theory  is  about  coping  in  a  strange  world,  the  literary  realm.  We  may  draw
parallels  between Camus's  “living without  appeal” and Blanchot's  “demand of  literature”:  both
require living without meaning or perishing, yet both reward those who choose life among death.
The main difference is,  as Blanchot himself writes of Camus, the absurd man says “I”, Camus
believes in individuality,  whereas for  Blanchot,  it  is untenable (1993,  173).  Thus we may read
Blanchot's theory as indicative of how closely linked the absurd and the meaningless are in literary
objects. This is supported by the fact that Beckett is often discussed with Blanchot, and Blanchot
has  edited  Beckett's  prose  works.  Indeed,  their  connection  seems  intimate  to  the  extent  that
Blanchot's theory seems a theory of absurd literature specifically. We may also note, with interest,
how not only parallel and complementary Blanchot and Camus seem in their thinking, but how
scarcely the two thinkers are discussed in either conjunction or in comparison—not a single such
text was, in fact, to be found.
3.2 Reading the Absurd and the Meaningless in Beckett: A Development
The absurd is, or entails, the loss of meaning, but this was inadequately dealt with, thus next we
shall  see how exactly  Waiting for Godot has no meaning,  and how this relates to our previous
discussion of its absurdist characteristics. While most likely derived from the absurdist tradition of
criticism, the idea that meaning is destroyed in Waiting for Godot goes beyond the absurdist critics:
the analysis of the loss of meaning (conceptualised variably as absence, void, negation, privation,
etc.) in itself is a current of thought in Beckett criticism. It should be noted that Blanchot, and many
other theorists we shall discuss shortly, tends toward Beckett's prose rather than his theatre, as the
image on the stage is in a natural position of domination over voice and silence, even though silence
alone is not the goal of Beckett’s work (Critchley 1997, 152-153; Sheehan 2008, 121). This is a
problem in terms of reading meaninglessness, but as stated, we are reading Waiting for Godot as a
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text, and it is argued that Beckett's techniques and themes are not always perfectly suited to the
theatrical form as they deal with things that lend themselves to a presentation in concrete form only
with difficulty (Postlewait 1978, 476-479).
According to this type of argumentation, the play is structured and dominated by absence,
which we discuss in terms of meaninglessness, and to less extent, the void. It is argued that the play
features the absence of both definitive meaning and the literary tradition, making it “echo in a void”
(Postlewait 1978, 483; Yuan 1997; 125, 129). Inadequacy, therefore, is a part of the imagery of the
meaningless and also of its rhetoric, albeit on different levels: as part of the meaningless, it is the
inadequacy of  making sense;  in the rhetoric of the meaningless,  and especially in a  theoretical
framework, it is as the inadequacy of method, for the question of how to delineate absence when
there is, in the first place,  nothing to be analysed, is deeply problematic, if not unsolvable. The
discourse must rely on figures, that is, images, which work to conceal the very structure of self-
annihilation of the language under discussion; let us remind ourselves that Camus argued that the
image is a cover over the inexplicable silence of the world, and for absurdist criticism the image in
Beckett is concrete and inexplicable or difficult to explain. The act of concealment is foregrounded
in Beckett, as we saw that the concrete image is a prominent, if problematic, feature of the play.
(Wolosky 1991, 215; Yuan 1997, 124-125.)
It  could be argued that  the self-annihilation in  Godot represents the problems inherent in
story-telling, and the modernist mistrust of communication and representation which is supported
by Esslin's argument that all the Theatre of the Absurd playwrights were shut off in their private
worlds and reflect their own era (Bruck 1982; 159, 163; Culik 2008, 130; Esslin 1985, 22; Kern
1954, 54). This reminds us of the absurd reduction of the world, and Blanchot's argument that the
author is deprived of the real world and the literary realm: when the real world and its modes of
communication appear defunct and incomprehensible, the very concept of making sense begins to
look questionable, and literary representations of this distrust begin to take form.
 Indeed, it is argued that self-annihilation in the form of presence as absence constitutes
the very centre of  Godot,  in terms of  absence of desire,  affects and emotions,  the character  of
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Godot, and, as we have argued, the world it presents (Moody 2011, 57; Wolosky 1991, 213; Yuan
1997, 129). Cavell argues that the play features the alternatives of nihilism or purposeful undoing of
all purpose, and testament to the ambivalence of this choice and the play itself, is the fact that
Beckett  has  been described as a  nihilist  (eg.  Manschreck 1976, 93; Miskinis 1996, 1047-1050;
Ionescu, 2013, 72) and incapable of nihilism (eg. Anders 1965, 150; Esslin 1965, 8; Haney 2001,
42; Cronkhite 1969, 49). However, we have seen that nihilism is absent even from Camus's theory
of the  absurd,  and the  same holds  for  Blanchot.  Furthermore,  as  Beckett  is  said  to  have  both
inspired Blanchot's theories and affirmed his ideas about language, voice, silence and death, we are
inclined to consider Beckett's work as something other than nihilist (Sheehan 2008, 114-115).
So,  if  not  nihilism,  what  then  does  Beckett's  textual  nothing signify?  Wolosky identifies
several  answers  to  this,  but  notes  that  all  take as  their  foundation the assumption that  Beckett
attempts to transcend temporal reality and language in search of an essence beyond it,  and that
language is a mask which hides true reality (Wolosky 1991, 225). This is of course quite well in line
with what was said in our section on the absurd. Yet nothingness is not to be defeated, and some
absurdist critics' urge to reach an interpretation that reconciles the ambivalences within the play, to
reduce it  to some allegory that makes negative entities into positive traits, is ultimately a futile
attempt to bring hope to the play (Price & Johnson 2012, 3; Tsur 1975, 779-780; Yuan 1997, 128).
The allegorical readings, which we noted in 2.2, are the critics' attempt to bring the distant images
of the play nearer and decipher what they “actually” are, as the idea of something lacking meaning
seems  unthinkable  (Tsur  1975,  780).  The  parallel  to  Benjamin's  consuming  mass  that  always
searches for a new object for its hunger is quite obvious, and in notable contrast to Esslin's image of
Beckett as the severe, lonely and proud absurd man. However, Beckett's work is rather characterised
by hunger  without object, conceptualised as a lack of desire (Moody 2011, 62). We discussed the
lack of desire in Godot in 2.2, and came to the conclusion that it indeed is absent. With this, let us
begin our analysis of the three aspects of meaninglessness, the negation of the world, time, and
ultimately the self in the play. Even Esslin draws attention to the last one: the subtitle of the Beckett
section in The Theatre of the Absurd is “The Search for Self”.
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To discuss the negation of the world, we begin with the tool used: language. It is argued that
Beckett's language is coarse and lowly without sublimation by rhetoric or idealism, and it depicts
suffering, the void of despair, isolation, and lack of physical necessities (Kern 1954, 42; Krieger
1977, 987). It  is similar to Blanchot's  essential word: it  paradoxically annihilates itself while it
creates itself, final meaning being forever deferred, but it also annihilates the world it creates; it
could be argued that it resists the act of creation while creating a fictional world and a fictional self
to inhabit it, but this does not make it a hermetically sealed system that is “better justified”, to use
Blanchot's words (Bruck 1982, 163; Culik 2008, 133; Miskinis 1996, 1063; Wolosky 1991; 213,
221, 228; Yuan 1997, 131). Furthermore, the goal of Beckett's language is to undermine itself as
communication, that is, to communicate paradoxical meanings (Bruck 1982, 163; Esslin 1968, 86).
In Blanchotian terms, it endeavours to stretch and break the limits of the world-building coarse
word. We may think these claims outlandish, but as we consider them more carefully, are they not
what the absurdist critics were saying, only phrased somewhat differently, with more honesty and
commitment to the repercussions of the absence of meaning?
Godot creates meaning by deferring meaning. It was already argued by the absurdist critics
that each line negates or denies the preceding line, though it could be argued now that there is a
multitude of methods the play uses to unmake meaning. It  resists creating a fictional world by
making it appear simultaneously below and above real—it could also be argued that being below
and above the real world, that is, created by the coarse word, the play pursues the reality beyond it,
the silence of experience. For the absurdists the strange realm thus created is not hermetically sealed
because it is born in Beckett's consciousness and from his experiences, but for us, the system of
language is permeable and therefore not sealed off from the real world.
We  may  wonder  why  the  theoretical  framework  and  terms  used  to  describe  the  same
phenomena are so different. Perhaps one reason is the tendency of the absurdist criticism to take
Beckett's life and putative psyche as its starting point, whereas Blanchot's theory of the meaningless
explicitly states that the writer's life and personality are, by necessity, always irrelevant to the work.
Simon Crtichley writes that “to ascribe the voice that speaks in the work with the author Samuel
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Beckett . . . is to fail to acknowledge the strangeness of the work under consideration and to read the
work  as  an  oblique  confession  or,  worse  still,  a  series  of  case  studies  in  a  reductive  psycho-
biography.” (1997, 172) This way we must abandon all enticing but ultimately cowardly means of
facing the  meaninglessness  within the language of  Godot without  the  promise  of  an escape  to
meaning through allegory.
Godot is an example of the problem of creating through language the reality beyond the real
world, that is, the silence as the limit of representability, as it appears as meaningless.  Textually
oriented theories thus offer us insight into this feature which permeates the play but which the
absurdist framework was seen to be unable to grasp. Beckett sought the liminal space of silence
within language with a very Blanchotian method: by making his language simultaneously debased
or atrophied  and  excessive  or  gratuitous  (Rabaté  2012,  56).  This  creates  paradoxical  works  of
“misspeaking, unfulfilled expectation, unrealized meaning, unresolved definition, deceptive reason,
antithetical style, misjudgement, and incongruity” (Postlewait 1978, 483). This can be best seen in
the  exchanges  between  Vladimir  and  Estragon:  their  language  comprises  of  short,  often
discontinuous  sentences  and  lines,  offset  by occasional  outbursts  of  longer  and  more  complex
sentences or monologues. Especially notable is this when a dialogue is on the verge of reaching a
solution or termination the subject abruptly changes, expanding and sprouting ever new branches in
wildly different directions. In the following excerpt, Estragon has complained that his boots hurt his
feet:
VLADIMIR: Try and put it on again.
ESTRAGON: [Examining his foot.] I’ll air it for a bit.
VLADIMIR: There’s man all over for you, blaming on his boots the faults
of his feet. [He takes off his hat again, peers inside it, feels about inside it,
knocks  on  the  crown,  blows  into  it,  puts  it  on  again.]  This  is  getting
alarming. [Silence. VLADIMIR deep in thought, ESTRAGON pulling at his
toes.] One of the thieves was saved. [Pause.] It’s a reasonable percentage.
[Pause.] Gogo.
ESTRAGON: What?
VLADIMIR: Suppose we repented.
ESTRAGON: Repented what?
VLADIMIR: Oh... [He reflects.] We wouldn’t have to go into the details.
ESTRAGON: Our being born?
[VLADIMIR breaks into a hearty laugh which he immediately stifles, his
hand pressed to his pubis, his face contorted.]
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VLADIMIR: One daren’t even laugh anymore.
ESTRAGON: Dreadful privation. (Beckett 2006, 3)
The changes in subject intrude in the discussion and disrupt it, changing its direction and tone. The
tone  of  the  discussion  is  first  annoyed  and  rather  banal  (“I’ll  air  it  for  a  bit”),  then  suddenly
aphoristic  (“blaming  on  his  boots  the  faults  of  his  feet”),  then  turning  solemn  and  ponderous
(“suppose  we  repented”),  and  amused  (“our  being  born”),  and  finally  serious,  but  perhaps
experienced as funny by the reader owing to the meta-fictional mention of privation (“Dreadful
privation”).  The short  excerpt  contains components of perhaps five or six different  discussions,
none of which is either begun nor finished properly, making this not a dialectic discussion with a
goal,  a  beginning and a termination,  but  a repeatedly disrupted exchange of words which only
masquerade as meaningful. The gaps in the discussion, the silences between the lines that are the
stage-directions, may in fact be the only meaningful parts of the exchange. The words are truly
atrophied and gratuitous simultaneously. As a result of the non-dialectical nature of the exchange,
the elements of the “discussion” become clashing both in style and in content.
Another  type  of  exchange of  words  which seems pure verbal  movement,  contraction and
expansion, like batting a ball between the interlocutors with little semantic content is what was in
2.2 called music-hall dialogue: 
VLADIMIR: We could do our exercises.
ESTRAGON: Our movements.
VLADIMIR: Our elevations.
ESTRAGON: Our relaxations.
VLADIMIR: Our elongations.
ESTRAGON: Our relaxations. (Beckett 2006, 68)
It may seem that the discussion aims to refine the specific nature of their activity, exercising while
waiting, but the accumulating, variably synonymous expressions hardly succeed in this—in fact,
what Estragon ends up repeating, “relaxation”, is the very opposite of exercise. Thus a term and its
opposite are asserted simultaneously,  presented as parallel rather than opposite. It  is a recurrent
pattern that Estragon starts repeating the same word while Vladimir varies his vocabulary.  This
especially contributes to the sense that the dialogue never reaches, and may even be completely
unable to reach, any termination point, synthesis or compromise; the back-and-forths seem to serve
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a function opposite of the narrowing focus of reaching the final word, that of the proliferation of
meanings. And if the previous two excerpts do provoke mirth, as the music-hall dialogue and the
meta-fictional commentary were argued to do, it is according to Critchley because laughter is “the
sound of language trying to commit suicide but being unable to do so, which is what is so tragically
comic” (1997, 157). Laughter returns us to the limitations of our language and bodies (Critchley
1997, 159).
Another  way  of  portraying  the  coexistence  of  silence  and  image  is  by  subverting  the
implications of conventional uses of language by using language as literally as possible (Yuan 1997,
130):
VLADIMIR: You must be happy, too, deep down, if you only knew it. 
ESTRAGON: Happy about what?
VLADIMIR: To be back with me again.
ESTRAGON: Would you say so?
VLADIMIR: Say you are, even if it’s not true.
ESTRAGON: What am I to say?
VLADIMIR: Say, I am happy.
ESTRAGON: I am happy.
VLADIMIR: So am I.
ESTRAGON: So am I.
VLADIMIR: We are happy.
ESTRAGON: We are happy. [Silence.] What do we do now, now that we are
happy?
VLADIMIR: Wait for Godot [. . .] (Beckett 2006, 51)
Here Estragon takes Vladimir’s insistence on him being happy literally as an order to be happy, and
continues in this vein, as if under obligation, to say what Vladimir (whose words, “say you are,
even if  it’s  not  true” sound conventionally understood more pleading than demanding)  asks or
instructs him to say. In the end, as if having by the act of speech established their shared happiness,
the discussion reverts back to beginning, back to waiting for Godot, bringing no development.
Another, perhaps more light-hearted in tone but equally grim in content, example (specific to
the text  of the play.) of the literality of Beckett's language occurs when Vladimir and Estragon
consider hanging themselves Vladimir does not understand why the issue of hanging is problematic:
“ESTRAGON: Use your intelligence, can't you? [VLADIMIR uses his intelligence.] VLADIMIR:
[Finally.] I remain in the dark.” (Beckett 2006, 10.) It is not Vladimir who takes Estragon's words
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literally,  but  the text  itself in the form of the stage-direction: the act  of  using one's  intellect  is
presented to readers  as  if  it  could be portrayed  or  even visualised literally as  an unambiguous
external action. The ambiguity of the statement, however, again leads to a multitude of possible
interpretations for the words “uses his intelligence”.  It seems, therefore, that the meaninglessness
that  is  silence  as  the  limit  of  representation  cannot  be  presented  in  language:  it  leads  to  the
paradoxical play of infinitely proliferating but disrupted meanings.
As any final, fixed meaning of Godot cannot, or will not, be reached, the piece is subject to
the  infinite  play of  a  multitude  of  meanings—and perhaps  this  is  inescapable,  as  the  logic  of
language overtakes every text and always succeeds in bringing some meaning to it (Cavell 2002,
117-126). This inescapability of meaning in Beckett's texts, which are characterised by lack (of
desire and meaning), is experienced as disgusting “force-feeding”: language and narrativity disrupt
what  Moody  calls  Beckett's  art  of  hunger,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  embrace  the  rejection  of
expression, the failure to express, and the conscious annihilation of objects; in the art of hunger,
hunger is the lack, not craving, of something, and in Beckett's writing it is the process of divesting
itself of all objects and failing in it, resulting in an oscillation between being with and without an
object,  rather  than  the  static  situation  of  being  completely without  them.  The  state  of  lack  is
repeatedly disrupted by language and the obligation to express, creating a pattern contrary to earlier
claims: not shift from movement to static image but alternation between the two. (Esslin 1965, 12;
Moody 2011; 56, 59-63,  67,  71.)  We may compare this  with  Blanchot’s  essential  word,  which
ceaselessly oscillates between being with and without its object, meaning. We may also compare it
with Benjamin: Moody argues that beauty, the goal of art, is born of the erasure of the distance that
separates nature and art, and the art of hunger subverts this erasure by lacking object and expression
(2011, 70). The eye, by beholding the work of art and recognising its natural counterpart, recognises
the work as beautiful and begins the creation of the aura (the connection to nature or the natural is
made very clear by Benjamin’s examples). But the art of hunger is not beautiful, it is disgusting,
because it separates nature and art—it endeavours to depict things which are unnatural in a way that
subverts the expressive power of language, and thus, meaning. But meaning is  inescapable:  the
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work of art  cannot remain hungry and objectless, and therefore the art of hunger is “force-fed”
meaning.
When meaning is  force-feeding,  speaking is  vomiting:  “word-vomit  assumes  expression's
form, while recasting it as literally and figuratively tasteless, and divorcing it from the authentic
connection to the speaking subject that is integral to the proper operation of expression” (Moody
2011, 69-70). The best example of the word-vomit in Godot is Lucky's speech—we noted in 2.2 it
being called “word-salad”, but word-vomit perhaps better describes the way language and bits of
discourse are ejected out of Lucky's mouth, like chewed and half digested texts:
Given  the  existence as  uttered forth  in  the  public  works  of  Puncher  and
Wattman of a personal God quaquaquaqua with white beard quaquaquaqua
outside time without extension who from the heights of divine apathia divine
athambia divine aphasia loves us dearly with some exceptions for reasons
unknown but time will tell are plunged in torment . . . it is established as
hereinafter but not so fast for reasons unknown that as a result of the public
works  of  Puncher  and  Wattman  it  is  established  beyond  all  doubt  .  .  .
concurrently simultaneously what is more for reasons unknown in spite of
the strides of physical culture the practice of sports . . . in a word for reasons
unknown . . . namely concurrently simultaneously what is more for reasons
unknown but time will tell (2006, 36-37)
The speech seems to parody formal discourses of knowledge and argumentation. The same semi-
academic phrases  and conventional  argumentative markers  such as  “for  reasons unknown” and
“what is more”, keep repeating themselves in varied environments, following a very associative
logic. The speech reads like a parody of a learned monologue—in perhaps contrast to this, it also
sounds like a puppet’s broken speech-synthesizer in its automaton-like quality, with spontaneous
lists and repeated words (Kern 1954, 44; Reid 1993):
such  as  tennis  football  running  cycling  swimming flying  floating  riding
gliding conating camogie skating tennis of all kinds dying flying sports of
all sorts autumn summer winter winter tennis of all kinds hockey of all sorts
. . . in Feckman Peckham Fulham Clapham . . . in spite of the tennis on on
the beard the flames the tears the stones so blue so calm alas alas on on the
skull  the  skull  the  skull  the  skull  .  .  .  tennis...  the  stones...  so  calm...
Cunard... unfinished...4 (Beckett 2006, 37-38)
Perhaps  significantly  the  speech  ends,  almost  exhausted,  with  the  word  ‘unfinished’ and  the
typographical sign of the utterance being unfinished, three full stops.  The torrent of association
4 “. . .” marks an omission from the original text, and “...” is quoted directly from the play.
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which characterises the beginning of the monologue dies down to a laboured trickle, as if the verbal
stomach is being emptied. It should be noted that there is something shocking or outrageous in the
speech, as the stage-directions read:
[During LUCKY’s tirade the others react as follows: [1] VLADIMIR and
ESTRAGON all attention, POZZO dejected and disgusted. [2] VLADIMIR
and  ESTRAGON begin  to  protest,  POZZO’s sufferings  increase.  [3]
VLADIMIR and  ESTRAGON attentive  again,  POZZO more  and  more
agitated and groaning. [4] VLADIMIR and ESTRAGON protest violently.
POZZO jumps up, pulls on the rope. General outcry. LUCKY pulls on the
rope, staggers, shouts his text. All three throw themselves on LUCKY who
struggles and shouts his text.] (Beckett 2006, 35-36)
The speech, while making absolutely no sense, provokes a fierce reaction from the hearers. The
speech seems almost like a script for reader reactions, Pozzo as the owner (perhaps akin to the
author or the narrator) of the text pulling the rope to stop the violent cascade of nonsense, and
Lucky as the text pulling against it and persisting through struggle, not yielding to the wishes of the
owner. Yet the process of signification begins automatically: The names sound like dirty words,
they are there to contrast the seemingly learned text; the logic behind the association is not one of
content but one of phonetic similarity. The interpretation process excavates meanings from under
the surface  of the monologue.  The language cannot  not mean anything,  despite  the effort,  and
perhaps  this  is  what  makes  it  absurd:  not  only  is  “the  attempt  to  communicate  when  it  is
impossible” (1985, 32) horribly comic, as Esslin quotes Beckett, but also the attempt not to when it
is, in fact, unavoidable. We cannot uncover the void underlying the image, as the very effort to
efface meaning gives birth to a new meaning in a vicious cycle of signification. The two aspects,
void and image, can only exist together, not harmoniously but in a restless union.
Moving on to the world created by this strange language, as already argued, the structure of
self-annihilation is  related to the way literary language destroys  the real world in search of the
silence of experience beyond it, creating a strange, literary realm that is the other (or shadow) of the
real world. We have made the conscious choice of situating ourselves in the context of the modern
of the twentieth century. However, Beckett is a liminal character in terms of his artistic career: he
wrote his main works around the time it is generally agreed that modernism was turning into post-
60
modernism (1940-1970) and so is analysed in both traditions—we have chosen the earlier, modern
one, as the absurd as a condition essentially predates the post-modern. Therefore it is worthwhile to
have a brief look at what is (or was) modernity's vision of the world.
According to Anthony Cascardi, the quintessentially modern view of the world tends towards
abstraction, it subordinates nature to reason, that is, it seeks to make the material world into an
abstract representation for the rational subject to grasp and control with his intellect and avoid a
concrete, experiential  approach; it seeks to reject auratic presences and turn natural objects into
“objective”  representations,  in  other  words,  abstractions  (1992;  37-38,  127,  152,  171).  We can
detect some themes in common with Camus's theory of the absurd, but they are valued differently,
most notable being the controlling of  the natural  world,  turning it  into a  representation: this  is
sought in Cascardi's argumentation, and refused in Camus's. Moreover, Camus's argument that the
absurd is “reason noting its limits” becomes clearer now, as reason is the tendency to see the world
and human actions as representations or abstractions, and the absurd is the refusal to control the
world (Cascardi 1992, 37). Absurd reason is, then, reason noting the limits of its capability to make
the world controllable.  Furthermore,  Benjamin argued that  the aura of  objects  started decaying
during the modern period: it was a time when the world was increasingly viewed only as something
to be grasped, thus it is no wonder the work of art started losing its integrity as well. The auratic
presences rejected by the modern subject  are found by the absurd man in specifically what the
modern subject wishes to escape: the absurdity and inhumanity of the world.
We can observe the echoes of these sentiments in Beckett as well. The world of  Godot is
ungraspable  by  human  language,  it  refuses  abstraction:  “VLADIMIR:  [Looking  around.]  It’s
indescribable. It’s like nothing. There’s nothing. There’s a tree.” (Beckett 2006, 79) This is also a
way of negating the existence of the world, through the explicit statement that “there is nothing”.
Moreover, when the artist is without the power or desire to express, he is denied both himself and
the world. The annihilation of language is analogous to the annihilation of the world, for if we
cannot  associate  plot  and  characters  onto  what  we  are  writing  or  reading,  the  text  loses  its
specificity, and the negative valuation of the creative powers of language is spilled over to the world
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that is created and represented by that language, binding the artist to failure and paradox (Moody
2011, 59; Krieger 1977, 991; Wolosky 1991, 226). But like the language of absence cannot not be
made to mean nothing, so is  the abstraction and destruction of the world is  interrupted by the
materialisation of language: language is not prior or outside to the material world, and through self-
negation, it may reach the world beyond material embodiment. Indeed, reaching (at least in the
imagination) the silent and material world is a prerequisite of shared experience, and thus art. (Price
& Johnson 2002, 3; Spanos 1971, 360; Wolosky 1991, 219-226.)
Language and  the  material  world  are inextricably linked,  especially so  in  the ambivalent
language  of  the  absence  of  meaning.  Similarly  to  the  creation  of  meaningless  statements,  the
endeavour to create a world that does not exist is a self-defeating paradox: the literary world, in
strict terms, does not exist as such—it is a product of the imagination, but the process of writing it
brings it into existence, as it becomes a literary object. Blanchot's point is that it simultaneously
exists and does not exist, the two poles cannot be rent apart. To “unmake” this world is as difficult
as making a meaningless statement, yet this is exactly what has been argued: the world of Waiting
for Godot is a “no-place” (Anders 1965, 142). The argument is that it is by its assertion unmade,
erased from existence, it is not just a “twilight world” but a place which does not exist.  It cannot be
a  no-place,  for  there  is  something,  though,  granted,  not  a  lot:  a  tree,  a  stone;  surely  the
embodiedness  of  Pozzo,  Lucky and the messenger  boy is  proof that  they do not  emerge from
ontological nothingness?
The play resists abstraction by turning temporal paradigms into spatial ones using repeated
and “petrified” words (containing as little metaphorical meaning as possible), and automaton-like
actions—that is, time does not progress but the material world and the characters as bodies do. This
can be seen in the way the setting never changes, but the characters wander around aimlessly and
anxiously. This imprisons the characters, actors and spectators within the concrete space of the stage
and into the concrete images that Esslin speaks of. Furthermore, by this imprisonment, physical
restriction, or incapacitation of the characters the play creates the feeling of the world being beyond
human control. (Harvey 2001; 109, 114; Postlewait 1978, 477; Reid 1993.)
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It  can be argued  that  Godot has  elements  of  a  play within a  play (Kern  1962,  49;
Postlewait 1978, 476-479). One such mise-en-abyme can be identified, which expands through the
action of speech: the dog song in the beginning of act II. Estragon sings to himself a song about a
dog who was killed by a  baker  as  he  stole  a  crust  of  bread.  The song continues  in  infinitely
recurring loops as the other dogs write the story on the dead dog's tombstone, thus renewing the
cycle potentially indefinitely (Beckett 2006, 48-49). While the song can loop indefinitely, it can also
quite concretely multiply indefinitely: the more it is sung, the more space it concretely takes on the
page (or time on the stage) exactly like the play which simply loops back to start at the end of the
act.
However, the dog song also seems to constrict with each new verse: it seems to go faster with
every iteration, giving an impression of an ever narrowing spiral. The second act of the play itself,
too, seems faster, as the basic structure is already familiar to the reader. Therefore it could be argued
that Beckett's  art  is  constricting and expanding at the same time: he constricts  existence in the
physical world, but expands it through speech (Postlewait 1978, 489; Sheehan 2008, 118). 
Thus the reduction of the physical  world discussed in 2.2,  unlike argued earlier, does  not
constitute  an  irrevocable  loss,  but  a  potent,  textual  and  material  space  which  enables  textual
creation: the stage as a space of designification is interrupted by the comic elements of the music-
hall (Yuan 1997; 127, 130; Reid 1993). From there, textual creation abounds almost uncontrollably,
since  Kern  and  Postlewait  argue  that  Godot transposes  onto  stage,  onto  concrete  terms,  the
bodilessness of Beckett's novelistic characters and shows the internal world reflected in the external
world in the form of the mind seeking itself in the concrete world (Kern 1962, 49; Postlewait 1978,
476-479): for Beckett the physical landscape is a reflection of the characters' inner world, which
expands through their speech. To conclude, absurdist criticism argues that the image is a way to try
to overcome the limitations of language and reach a materiality beyond it, but the theory of the
meaningless applied to the play makes it clear that silence is better at this (since images are like
covers  over  silence,  as  Camus argues);  the world of  Godot is  not  an abstract  no-place but the
material,  concrete  projection  of  the  materiality  beyond  the  world  which  is  the  characters'
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consciousness.
This brings us to the temporal aspects of the play, as it was argued that consciousness and
identity are dislocated in the non-dialectical, repetitive and cyclical temporality specific to art—the
time in the absence of time. It could be argued that the play features two kinds of temporality, the
time of the work of art, and the time of Dying.
Beginning  with  the  temporality  of  the  artwork,  the  contradistinction  between  ordered,
teleological historical time and the time of the work of art, which is random, absurd, without an end,
and therefore superfluous and absent, is a characteristic of the modern literary sensibility according
to William Spanos (1971; 345-347, 352). In Godot, the temporal structure, the cyclicality of the two
nearly identical acts and the repetition of elements such as scenes and individual lines, is the main
method  of  rejecting  the  teleological,  linear  movement  of  historical  time,  and  laying  open  the
structure of the absurd time. In contrast to the absurd play, traditional well-made drama objectifies
the individual to make them feel at home in the strange world. (Cascardi 1992, 22; Postlewait 1978,
484; Reid 1993; Spanos 1971; 345-347, 349, 371.)
Spanos argues that the spatialisation of time is a function of scientific time, being measurable
and independent of human experience, it becomes a means of escaping absurdity, resulting in the
solidification of consciousness that leads to negation of individuality (1971; 347-348, 358-360).
However, we have seen that Godot features the solidification of consciousness and the negation of
individuality specifically in the absence of scientific time, and that they certainly are used as tools,
not of communication, but exactly of confronting absurdity, as Ionescu argues that the play refuses
measurable time (2013; 8, 73). The randomly flowing absurd time that negates any progress by
turning into a cyclical, non-dialectic movement solidifies identity and negates individuality as the
literary realm is wholly directed toward materiality. Waiting, which was in the absurdist criticism
seen as  a  placeholder  action,  is  arguably the most  concrete example of  the  circularity and  the
spatialisation of time,  as  waiting is  like space,  equal  in all  points,  and Ionescu argues  that  the
characters  are unable to  “objectify their  waiting temporally” (Blanchot 1995,  272-274; Ionescu
2013, 74). Waiting presents to us the time of the artwork: logic of the negation without negation of
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time.
According to Blanchot, waiting is essentially waiting for nothing (which was argued to be the
case  in  2.2),  for  it  surpasses  its  object,  and  becomes  a  circular  and  self-contained  movement
(Blanchot 1995, 274); in the play, Vladimir notes that they are “waiting for the night, waiting for
Godot, waiting for... waiting” (Beckett 2006, 69). Finally waiting surpasses its object—Godot, the
night,  anything—and  serves  not  the  function  of  self-destruction  but  that  of  self-perpetuation.
Waiting signifies the anticipation and the deferral of meaning, the indecision between the mutually
exclusive opposites of going and staying, living and dying: the characters end up living a half-life,
perpetuating empty hope which is  ultimately indistinguishable from despair.  The time of  time's
absence is experienced as heavy like some concrete material, through which the body and mind of
Vladimir and Estragon laboriously move. This is concretely manifested in the bare stage-setting.
(Metman 1965, 124; Miskinis 1996, 1061; Postlewait 1978, 475; Yuan 1997, 130.) The nature of
waiting as circular and equal in all points is attested to by the continual recurrence of the lines,
“Let's  go.” “We can't.” “Why not?” “We're waiting for Godot.”,  whatever preceding discussion
always leading to Estragon questioning and Vladimir affirming their task of waiting. These lines
appear in the play six times, each one exactly the same. In waiting, the characters experience the
absence of time, time that surely progresses with games and other distractions, but never reaches
anything, always looping back to beginning.
Not  even  death can put an end to  their  existence,  as  it  is  dissolved in  the uniformity of
waiting, the negation that is death is itself negated.  Oblivion could be the only remedy, yet  for
Beckett’s characters forgetting is cyclical as well, both impossible and inevitable, as Estragon says,
“Either I forget immediately or I never forget” (Beckett 2006, 52). (Blanchot 1995, 276; Ionescu
2013, 81; Postlewait 1978, 476.) As noted, the end of the play does not conclude the waiting, it will
go on indefinitely, negation of the ending again negated, and the characters of the play, Vladimir
and Estragon especially, are turned into subjects of lack, without identities, memory or purpose—
without past of future (Haney 2001, 43; Ionescu 2013, 82; Postlewait 1978; 475-476, 480; Yuan
1997,  131-132).  Vladimir  notes,  “Hope  deferred  maketh  the  something  sick,  who  said  that?”
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(Beckett 2006, 2) This is a reference to the Proverbs in the Bible, where the “something” is the
heart, perhaps reminding us of the aspect of unhappy consciousness of the now, when hope turns
into despair. 
It was argued in 2.2 that waiting was the image of the time which is not measured by clock
but by the endurance of the characters. The time of the artwork is characterised by enduring as well,
yet in Beckett's works, enduring is not a continuum but an eternal returning, that is, the eternal now.
The  now is the absent centre of waiting:  bounded by the past  and the future,  it  does not have
independent substance; rather it is a state of discontinuity and returning–each present moment is
different yet same, as Bruns argued, and never really there. This movement of returning takes away
the certainty of identity and meaning in the literary realm. (Ionescu 2013, 72; Miskinis 1996; 1050-
1051, 1060; Postlewait 1978, 474-475; Price & Johnson 2002, 5; Spanos 1971, 347.) The now, in
the form of eternal  returning, permeates the play on both thematic and structural levels:  on the
thematic level, waiting is constant but uncertain as the present moment—the past is recalled like a
dream (”Do you not remember?” ”You dreamt it.” [Beckett 2006, 52]) and the future only half-
heartedly dreamed of. On the level of structure, the characters' lines that are repeated with only
minor variations, and the essential identity of the acts contribute to the atmosphere that nothing
continues uninterrupted or grows in the play, but instead returns to its beginning. As a side note,
dialectics as the opposite of recurrence could be seen as a form of duration: the principle of goal-
oriented movement illustrates how superficial changes obscure the way the system itself essentially
moves  forward  and  endures.  This  connection  is  supported  by  how duration  and  dialectics  are
missing from Godot, and directly contraposed in Blanchot's theory.
Turning next to the time of Dying, the now is its central figure: Critchley argues the time of
Dying is created by a voice ceaselessly telling unfinished and unfinishable stories (1997; 161, 164-
65).  The  telling  of  the  stories  takes  place  always  in  the  present  moment,  always  in  the  now,
especially since the stories are most often of  either  the poorly-remembered past  or  the almost-
imagined  future.  The voice  that  tells  these  stories  is  like  a  “vast,  continuous  buzzing  .  .  .  an
unqualifiable murmur at the back of our words” (Critchley 1997, 174-175). This reminds us of the
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discussion we quoted in 2.2, this:
ESTRAGON: All the dead voices.
VLADIMIR: They make a noise like wings.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
VLADIMIR: Like sand.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
. . . 
VLADIMIR: Rather they whisper.
ESTRAGON: They rustle.
VLADIMIR: They murmur.
ESTRAGON: They rustle.
. . . 
VLADIMIR: They make a noise like feathers.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
VLADIMIR: Like ashes.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves. (Beckett 2006, 54)
It was argued that the excerpt illuminates how the identities of the characters become annulled. It
indeed is an example of the loss of identity, but that of the Blanchotian Neutral, for the time Dying
is the time of the impersonal voice of the “Not I” (Critchley 1997, 172-175). The “dead voices” are
the voices of stories—it was noted in 2.2 how speaking is present only as its corpse. Vladimir and
Estragon hear their murmur behind their own words, behind the sound of their own voices, making
a noise like ashes. The unfinished, dead stories arrest the movement of time and the movement of
death into an eternal disrupted moment which exists along and within the time of the artwork.
Furthermore, the time of Dying is the night: Literature is nocturnal in nature as we noted in
3.1.2,  and  Beckett  “writes  for  the  dark”  (Blau  1961,  147;  Critchley 1997,  174).  The  night  of
literature is the time of unceasing consciousness, clash, vanishing meaning and division between
world and writing. Furthermore, it is the time of diversity of identities, uncertainty, release from
reality, and lack of desire (Cornwell 1973, 43; Krieger 1977, 991; Postlewait 1978, 478).
The night is ambivalently absent from Godot. The play seems to take place in a temporally
uncertain  eternal  twilight,  as  Metman  argues  (1965,  122):  Vladimir  judges  it  to  be  evening,
Estragon morning: the sun sits low on the horizon, is it setting or rising? Vladimir finally wins the
argument, and it is settled to be evening. The characters are waiting specifically for nightfall, as
Godot is to come only then. (Beckett 2006; 63, 78.) However, the nightfall, unlike night itself, never
comes,  as Pozzo describes  how the  night  works  in  the world of  the play:  “behind this  veil  of
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gentleness and peace night is charging [Vibrantly] and will burst upon us [Snaps his fingers] pop!
like that! [His inspiration leaves him] just when we least expect it. [Silence. Gloomily.] That's how
it is on this bitch of an earth.” (Beckett 2006, 31) At first it seems to approach gently and lingerigly,
hidden from those who wait, until it unexpectedly arrives with almost violent suddenness but not
violently (for the sound it makes is only a harmless “pop”),  alternately lyrical  and prosaic, and
finally listless—Pozzo notes that he “weakened a little towards the end”, which Estragon assures he
thought was intentional (2006, 31). The nightfall so awaited by Vladimir and Estragon is however
deferred by the suddenness of the night: “The light suddenly fails. In a moment it is night. The moon
rises at back, mounts into the sky, stands still, shedding a pale light on the scene.” (Beckett 2006,
45.) The arrival of night signals the renewal of the cycle of waiting: after night there will be day
once more, and after that, evening, and the promise of the arrival of Godot, who will not arrive.
Indeed, the night falls right after it is announced that Godot will surely come tomorrow, but not
today.
It becomes apparent that in the play, the midnight—the time of self-annihilation, unceasing
consciousness and finally the materiality of language as the clash of contraries finds a momentary,
careful balance—is the nightfall. Only then will waiting and the clash of contraries cease. Waiting
as a self-perpetuating action and time, does it require the subjects to be conscious? Metman argues
that waiting keeps the characters, Vladimir and Estragon especially, unconscious and unwitnessed
(1965; 128, 134). They may not be totally unconscious, but neither are they fully conscious: they do
not realise the futility of their existence and actions but neither are they completely oblivious of it.
The characters of the play exist in a twilight state where nightfall will never come, as they are
always “waiting for the night” (Beckett 2006, 69). It never comes, for it might bring change in the
form of Godot, and the awaiting turns into a listless twilight. Neither full unconsciousness nor full
consciousness prevails, no joy nor misery, no activity nor rest; the nocturnal time of the play is the
eternal time of Dying which the force of waiting, circular and always returning to start, prevents
from ever finishing. The time of the artwork in the form of waiting coils around its absent centre,
the time of Dying. Godot will never come because Vladimir and Estragon await him.
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Lastly we shall move onto the final section, the annihilated self. The characters construct and
reconstruct  fleeting  identities  within  their  material  and  mental  space,  damning  life  as  a  body,
oscillating between desire for and fear of death (death being seen as something of a new or reversed
birth).  The  central  problem in Beckett's  works  is  that  of  living with dying (comparable to  the
experience of the Blanchotian writer), the burdensome and frightening project of simultaneous self-
creation and self-destruction (Bruck 1982, 161; Cornwell 1973, 41-47; Kern 1962, 49). This is not
as easily observable in his theatrical pieces as in his prose works, for the physical presence of the
actors on stage creates the illusion of personal, individual presence—though Esslin already stresses
the uncertainty of the self. As Estragon observes: “We always find something, eh Didi, to give us
the impression we exist?” to which Vladimir answers: “[Impatiently.] Yes yes, we’re magicians”
(Beckett 2006, 61). The characters convince themselves of their own existence through their speech
(which has the power to conjure anything into existence, like a magician), and the reader and viewer
are convinced, too.
Let  us take the modern subject  as a point  of comparison for  our closer  analysis of  these
characteristics. The modern subject is at the intersection of different discourses, empty, contradicted
and divided into irreconcilable oppositions. He is turned towards an inward subjective reality, his
relationship to the real world reduced to arbitrariness. This makes living in the real world a heroic
feat.  However,  the  inconsistencies  of  his  personality  are  glossed  over  by a  unifying  narrative.
(Cascardi 1992; 2-7, 56-58, 61, 67, 99, 176.) (Let us note the similarity to Benjamin’s argument,
and that Camus's absurd is heroic.) It  appears that there is something very modern in Beckett's
heroes, since turning away from the world, mask-like identity over the emptiness of their person,
and contradictions are their defining characteristics as well. They are also internally inconsistent
and  unstable  (Cavell  2002,  156;  Critchley  1997,  148;  Figlerowicz  2011,  77-78).  Like  the
Blanchotian writer, the Beckett hero cuts his ties to the real world and recedes into his solitary,
private subjective reality. This leads to the atrophying of the experience of the self, and, eventually,
the destruction of the speaking “I” (Bruck 1982, 165; Cornwell 1973; 42, 47-48; Figlerowicz 2011,
90; Krieger 1977, 987). (In the discussion on temporality, we saw that the speaking “I” has been
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destroyed and turned into the neutral “Not I”.) It is not surprising that the characters of Godot have
many features in common with the modern subject (as they did with the absured man), as the absurd
which they embody is a quintessentially modern condition—however, the heroism of the characters
seems dubious at best: they are weak and indecisive, and as the midnight, the moment of being
superior to one’s fate, is missing, how could they be otherwise? This raises an interesting question
as to the exact nature of the absurdity they embody.
The inconsistency and instability of the characters reminds us of the Blanchotian writer: his
self is in a constant flux,  and always on the verge of being completely changed or erased. His
identity is dependent on and depended by literature similarly to the way the characters mutually
define and are defined by their surrounding: they are at once cut away from and indifferent to the
material world and to their own bodies, yet also inextricably linked to them; indeed, they have no
fixed self beyond the name-body-association, and in a world where names never fit the characters,
they are in constant flux and on the verge of becoming someone else (Figlerowicz 2011; 77, 91;
Kern  1962,  43-46;  Wolosky  1991;  223,  227).  The  characters  have  so  little  consistency  and
individuality  so  as  to  be  interchangeable,  and  thus  names  are  a  constant  topic  for  discussion,
especially searching and forgetting them:
ESTRAGON: [Pretending to search.] Bozzo... Bozzo....
VLADIMIR: [Ditto.] Pozzo... Pozzo...
. . .
ESTRAGON: Pozzo... no...  I’m afraid I... no... I don’t seem to...
(Beckett 2006, 15)
And “what happens in that case to your appointment with this... Godet... Godot... Godin... anyhow
you see  who  I  mean” (Beckett  2006,  22).  The  contours  of  the  characters  are  thus  erased  and
renegotiated each time; each time he could be anything, anyone, in the atmosphere of uncertain
amnesia.  Interestingly,  the search always falls  into upholding the established identities—no one
changes conditions completely, the name-body-association finally resists unravelling.
However, the uncertainty of names exists on the structural  level as well, as the two main
characters have two names: Vladimir/Didi and Estragon/Gogo. One pair, ‘Vladimir’ and ‘Estragon’,
is  prevalent  in  the text  version,  appearing always  as  indication of  speaker,  and  the nicknames
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disappear into the confusion of ceaseless talk. However, if the play was to be viewed instead of
read, it is likely only the shortened nicknames, Didi and Gogo, would be learned, as the proper
names are both mentioned only once by the characters during the whole play. It could be argued,
then,  that  in  different  versions  the  characters  actually  have  different  names,  or  that  they exist
between names, as the struggling contrary of two identities. Furthermore, a more stable identity is
searched for by trying on different identities through talk and games, Vladimir and Estragon even
play at  being Pozzo and Lucky (Beckett  2006,  64).  It  could be argued that  they are empty or
conflicted subjects, like the modern subject, but they lack the mitigating inner narrative that unifies
them and reconciles them to the outside world.
The irreconcilability to the world leads to turning away from it; the characters are deprived (or
freed) of the real world. This was anticipated earlier, when it was argued that Beckett explores the
subjective mind’s reality and its experience of the real world through concrete projections: the turn
away from the world is seen in the way the real world turns into a representation (or reflection) of
the inner world. This gives rise to a tension in the name-body-association, that is, in the relationship
between  the  material  and  the  mental,  and  in  Godot,  it  is  the  contradistinction  between  the
disintegrating body and the babbling mind.  This  is  most  apparent  in  the long,  meandering and
sometimes almost manic monologues or the pseudo-dialogue which contrast the characters' inability
or hesitancy to move physically. Especially striking it is at the end of each act (Beckett 2006; 48,
87), when Vladimir and Estragon sit alone on the stage, and one asks the other, “Well, shall we
go?”, the other answering “Yes, let's go”, not to even stir afterwards. The roles-reversal that takes
place between the acts emphasises this inability to move, as in I it is Estragon who asks Vladimir,
and in II it is Vladimir who asks, and Estragon who affirms. Sometimes they even try to leave, only
to realise they cannot.
In Godot, human nostalgia is undermined by the malfunctioning corporeality of the body that
is  isolated from the progress  of  historical  time. The characters are depersonalised,  denied even
purposeful  language,  and  their  selves  are  materialised  into  concrete  projections  (reminiscent
perhaps of the puppets in 2.2) but their bodies are not in a prosthetic relation to their minds; they are
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rather  ambiguously  and  mutably  contoured,  and  therefore  their  boundaries  are  extended  and
contracted  by  their  speech  rather  than  their  body  or  physical  actions.  (Postlewait  1978,  482;
Figlerowicz  2011;  78-86-88;  Ionescu  2013,  72.)  The  mind  is  concretely  projected  onto  the
surrounding world, and the focus on structures of language is a paradoxical way of representing the
reality of the mind more concretely (Figlerowicz, 2011, 90). But what a dreary, grim sight it is: a
stone, a tree, a country road, everything else covered in an ontological fog. Surely a self that finds
such a manifestation is quite empty, filled only with the continuous buzzing of the Neutral “Not I”.
Vladimir and Estragon are stripped of nearly everything that identifies the modern individual
as the subject and master of world, such as unified identity, property, conventional rationality (it
was argued in 2.2 that they have a rationality of their own: the absurd logic), and desire which
directs them toward the world and toward changing it from within a social framework (Bruck 1982,
1609; Cascardi 1992; 231-240, 260-261). Desire is part of what makes up the individuality of the
individual, and lacking it, the characters are turned inwards, away from the world and sociality.
Vladimir and Estragon are “subjects of lack”, in their waiting they lack stable identity, stable body,
stable meaning, and desire. According to Moody, the lack of desire, specifically for food in the form
of hunger and starvation, permeates Beckett's works (Moody 2011, 55; Yuan 1997, 132). The eating
that takes place in the play is minimal: a carrot, a radish, some chicken bones, but it still seems to be
more than enough, as Estragon is first very hungry, but then will not even finish one carrot, noting:
“Funny, the more you eat the worse it gets” (Beckett 2006, 12), to which Vladimir says: “With me
it’s just the opposite . . . I get used to the muck as I go along” (Beckett 2006, 14). It is apparent,
from the way Estragon begs for the chicken bones that Pozzo has already picked clean, that hunger
is ever present, but food inexplicably seems not to satisfy the characters—except for Pozzo.
Hunger as the image of the absence of desire is cognate with the annihilation of meaning, as
both are characterised by absence, and like Critchley argues that Beckett’s self-annulling language
is  “physically  articulated  by  feebleness,  a  dwindling,  stiffening  corporeality”  (1997,  168-169).
Indeed, hunger is a fully bodily experience (and function), and lends the work an atmosphere of
banality  and  immanence,  making  it  stylistically  lowly—as  evidenced  by  Beckett's  frequent  if
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sometimes oblique references to excrement (Moody 2011, 56-57; Figlerowicz 2011, 90). Thus the
corporeality of hunger is in an ambivalent relation to the argument that Beckett's characters are
disembodied voices that damn the life of the body. However, the one thing in common with the
modern subject that the characters do have is the body, and as has been argued, its life is transposed
rather  than  completely  denied.  If  taste  offers  a  way from abstraction  into  “robust  sensibility”
(Moody 2011, 60), then surely tastelessness and hunger offer an emaciated sensibility—one that is
fitting for  Beckett’s  “skeletal  fiction”  (Cornwell  2006,  222),  and  not  so  incompatible  with  the
damning of the life of the body that nevertheless resiliently persists. As a side note, Moody argues
that the aesthetic of hunger is where theatrical Beckett and Blanchot meet (2011, 58-60).
The art of hunger offers a reduced and deteriorating version of corporeality, and the classical,
modern individual with clear and robust boundaries is missing. In its stead, the characters’ selves
are materialisations, the combinations of bodies and externalised objects  (Figlerowicz 2011; 90, 93;
Moody 2011, 60). Pozzo seems to be an exception to this as well: he is far from emaciated and
lacking in earthly goods (for  the standards of  the play).  However,  he is  not  outside the bodily
ambivalence that is tied to eating and hunger, health and sickness, either. In fact, in the character of
Pozzo the dynamic of corporeality and lack find their most tangible manifestation: He is proud and
healthy, a conqueror of the world, strong in his selfhood, in act I: “I am Pozzo! [Silence.] Pozzo!
[Silence.]  Does  that  name  mean  nothing  to  you?”  (Beckett  2006,  15)  But  in  act  II  he  has
inexplicably become blind and helpless, offering two hundred francs just to be helped up from the
ground. Furthermore, Estragon notes: “He’s all humanity” (Beckett 2006, 76), that is, he has lost his
individual name, now all names are his—until later, when his identity as Pozzo is established again
(Beckett  2006;  69-76,  81).  The very sudden  change in  Pozzo’s  condition,  happened  overnight,
concretises the unstable and deteriorating condition of the characters’ bodies.
Individuality is untenable in Godot as the characters are continually mutable. Their mode of
being through materialisation, however, becomes available only against a background of dying, that
is, through their willingness of going beyond enduring into nothingness. The life of the body is
needed for the character to die, even if it is damned in the endeavour to escape identity. Suicide, in
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itself a form of indifference and a direct consequence of the absurd, would be an excellent way to
escape  into  nothingness,  as  it  gathers  the  absurdly flowing  time  into  a  tranquil  now moment.
(Cornwell 1973, 45; Ionescu 2013, 82; Manschreck 1976, 86; Miskinis 1996, 1060-1061.) As we
saw, the now is an empty moment, when the eternal struggle of contraries ceases for a moment, and
pure nothingness can be attained. However, Kern argues that suicide is impossible for the characters
as long as there is someone to bear witness to their existence (Kern 1962, 55-56). Estragon asks,
“Do you think God sees me?” (Beckett  2006, 45),  as if  asking for a heavenly outside witness.
Vladimir says to the boy who may be Mr. Godot’s messenger, “tell [Godot] you saw us. [Pause.]
You did see us, didn’t you?” (Beckett 2006, 69), asking the boy to witness, to verify, their existence
in historical time. But God is dead, and the messenger boy will arrive the next day having forgotten
all about them. The literature of privation is not a witness to anything but its own impossibility, and
Vladimir and Estragon plead in vain.
Suicide therefore does feature in the play quite prominently, especially in the putative mode of
contemplating  it:  Estragon  suggests  hanging  themselves  at  the  end  of  both  acts:  “What  about
hanging ourselves?” (Beckett 2006, 9) and “Why don’t we hang ourselves?” (Beckett 2006, 86),
and Wolosky argues that erasing the self is also a form of suicide (Wolosky 1991, 220). However,
though they wish to commit a shared suicide, they cannot, as it was argued that death evades the
suicider like meaning evades the writer, and, furthermore, absurd logic is against suicide. Even the
destruction of their self is never finished. (Cornwell 2006, 117; Ionescu 2013, 77.) Death is the
prerequisite of meaning, and the very point of the play is its loss, and so there is always something
preventing suicide: either the tree is judged to not carry both, or that they have no rope from which
to hang (Beckett 2006; 10, 86). They cannot die, but neither are they really alive, so they live in the
liminal state of Dying between the poles of life and death.
The state of Dying actually negates the division between mind and body, as the elimination of
death in the literary realm exposes the constructedness of this mind/body divide (Miskinis 1996,
1060-1063). Lucky is a great example of this: His physical condition coincides with his speech, as it
takes all three, Pozzo, Vladimir and Estragon, to subdue him during his speech, but when he is
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mute, he is meek and appears to be “at his last gasp” (Beckett 2006, 19). The mind/body dichotomy
is replaced by the ambivalent relationship between the emaciated corporeality and the eternal cycle
of self-affirmation and self-annihilation of the materialised mind—the poles ceasing to be fixed
opposites and becoming fluid categories with mutable boundaries. This cycle of self-affirmation and
self-annihilation serves as the ontological basis of the structure of the play for all three aspects: the
world is the concrete projection of the characters’ consciousness, and their waiting arrests the flow
of the time.
It could be argued that the ambivalence and the cycle of self-destruction and self-creation in
Godot are a representation of the crisis of story-telling and the decline of the cultural authority of art
that  followed  from  the  destruction  of  the  Benjaminian  aura.  Yet  by  bringing  the  concept  of
fascination, of being absorbed by the work of art, Blanchot perhaps unintentionally brings about the
harbinger of a new kind of aura: one that is in a new form of essential word, of shared language that
is not communication, where the audience collaborates on the creation of the meaning for the work,
for as was argued, through imagination the silence of experience and shared experience in the form
of art can be reached. Perhaps this is what Cohn and Krieger mean by saying only the viewer or
reader can force the text to continue (Bruck 1982, 163; Cascardi 1992, 106; Cohn 1962, 48; Krieger
1977, 988-991). This kind of collaborative creation of meaning, indeed, a collaborative creation of
the aura, could be argued to take place when reading or watching the play: by being difficult to
understand,  the  play refuses  to  be  absent-mindedly consumed;  by displaying  insatiable  hunger
without object it refuses being turned into fodder for the hungry mass. Instead, it invites the viewer
and reader to build it from a position of active surrender.
We have now solved a number of the problems the absurdist criticism brought up in 2.2. First
of all, meaning is inescapable: the meaningless can only appear as the paradoxical negation without
negation,  privation  that  creates  meaning.  Secondly,  the  absurd  world  is  not  missing,  it  is  the
reflection of an inner, absurd, world. Thirdly, the physicality of the characters is reduced in itself,
but its contours are transposed onto the mind that can transgress its limits in the form of speech.
And lastly, the problem of the image and realism was countered by focus on the silence of the real
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world beyond literature.
However, we are still left with one profound problem: materiality, not of the real world but of
literature itself, on which all three aspects, world, time and self, hang, only emerges in the midnight,
when the ambivalent cycle of struggling contradictions ceases. We have seen how the play actively
defers  the  midnight  and  leaves  the  struggle  of  contraries  unmitigated.  Yet  the  materiality  of
language is, as we have just at length discussed, present in the play. How can this be? Even the
Blanchotian  meaningless  leads  to  an  untenable,  though  refined,  paradox.  We need  one  further
framework for our refining analysis, one which legitimises the simultaneous presence meaning and
meaninglessness, of nothingness and materiality: the grotesque.
4.  Reading the Grotesque
We have discussed the absurd and the meaningless,  and noticed that  the problems “filtered” or
brought out by the absurdist framework could be solved in the framework of meaningless, but this
still left us with the problem of meaning and materiality. In our next section we wish to address
these  issues,  hopefully  bringing  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the  question  of  how  meaning  and
meaninglessness, and nothingness and materiality can co-exist. Moreover, the questions of realism
and identity are of special interest here, as the answers found in the previous sections have been
inconclusive. However, let us return, again, to the character is Sisyphus: his existence is defined by
his  task  which  both  gives  and  takes  away his  meaning—in this,  he  is  very grotesque for  the
grotesque, too, is the simultaneous task of making and unmaking. Moreover, Sisyphus resides in the
underworld (or the Hellenic Hell), which Bakhtin argues is a grotesque place (1984, 370).
Again the  section is  divided into three  sub-chapters—world,  time and self—in which we
discuss the theme, and how the two main traditions of the grotesque, here called the subjective and
the carnival-grotesque, parallel and interrogate one another. But first, let us start with some general
observations.
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4.1 What is the Grotesque?
The grotesque, while prevalent and easy to recognise, is notoriously difficult to grasp and analyse; it
is, in fact, so nebulous that Geoffrey Galt Harpham concludes that it may not form an independent
field of study at all, that it is more of an “intruder element”, only inhabiting other genres (1982, xv-
xvii). Even if this may be rather radical a view, it is more generally agreed that the grotesque can
take a multitude of forms, and therefore categorising it is not a straightforward task. Perhaps, then, a
more accurate description is that of a continually shifting continuum to which works can belong
even only partially, or a stylistic structure which can be featured in a number of genres and styles, as
Kayser argues that it appears in individual scenes or episodes rather than as the structural basis of
an entire narrative. This would collapse the problematical distinction between “pure” and “applied”
grotesque. (Clayborough 1965, 66; Harpham 1982, 44-45; Kayser 1981; 68, 180; Perttula 2011, 18-
19.)  Perhaps  this  confusion of  categorisation is  one  effect  of  the  grotesque,  a  defining feature
instead of faulty analysis.
It is something of an established tradition to begin the introduction of the grotesque with a
genealogical and historical overview of the phenomenon, but we shall refrain from that here. It will
be postponed to section 4.2, where it will play more than a mere perfunctory role. Yet something of
the history of the term itself could be said: it was established in the field of literary studies in the
1950’s,  denoting  something  abnormal,  inherently  ambivalent  and  divided,  contradictory  and
clashing, and characterised in terms of the intention of the artist, the effect it has on the audience,
and  the  traits  or  characteristics  of  the  work  itself  (Clayborough  1965,  22;  Kayser  1981,  180;
Thomson 1972; 11, 20-27).
The general outlines are interpreted differently by the two main traditions of the grotesque:
the subjective grotesque which is essentially grim and directed towards individual experience, and
the carnival-grotesque which is essentially joyful and characterised by folk humour and physicality.
Wolfgang  Kayser  is  the  main  theorist  of  the  subjective  school  and  Mikhail  Bakhtin  of  the
carnivalistic school (Perttula 2011, 23). They create a historical continuum: the carnival-grotesque
describes rituals and traditions found primarily in the folk culture of the Middle Ages and in the
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literature of the Renaissance, whereas the subjective grotesque developed during Romanticism and
early twentieth century modernism. The carnival-grotesque is therefore a precursor to the subjective
grotesque, and the change from one to another is linked to the emergence of the modern subject.
(Bakhtin 1984; 5-17, 36-38, 46, 274; Perttula 2011, 24.) This division is not absolute: we will see
how the same concepts are developed and emphasised differently under both traditions. Perttula
argues that the balance of laughter and horror is carefully maintained in both traditions even though
both favour one  or  the other  (2011,  24).  Therefore the grotesque found in  more  contemporary
fiction, Beckett included, does not fall completely under either category, but borrows features from
both.  Indeed,  as  an  example  of  their  interconnectedness,  Bakhtin  argues  that  the  folk  culture
carnival spirit which permeates the carnival-grotesque is joyfully cynical in nature, and even in the
later evolution of the grotesque it was not completely absent, albeit weakened (1984; 146, 276).
Bakhtin argues that the subjective grotesque does not grasp the true nature of the grotesque
which “cannot be separated from the culture of folk humour and the carnival spirit” (1984, 46-47),
and that  the problem of  the  grotesque (whatever  that  is)  can only be solved in  relation to  the
carnival spirit of the middle ages and the Renaissance (1984, 51). However, Bakhtin’s vision of the
carnival-grotesque is  notably coloured by nostalgia for the past,  and like he himself  noted,  the
difference  between  the  subjective  and  the  carnivalistic  grotesque  is  created  by  historical
development. As such, it seems natural that the differences in their appearance and emphasis are
caused by the natural, historical change in the phenomenon they reflect in their own time—not by
the decay of some true mirror. Furthermore, Bakhtin ignores the aspects of Kayser’s theory which
do suggest renewal and joy, and the place he reserves for the experience of horror in his own theory
is minimal as the carnival-grotesque is “absolutely fearless” (Bakhtin 1984, 38-39). Let  us now
endeavour to create a composite view of the grotesque world, time, and self, that encompasses both
traditions, the subjective and the carnival-grotesque.
4.1.1 The Grotesque World
We will begin our discussion with the ways the grotesque creates the world through its language.
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The language of the grotesque paradoxical in form: it turns itself against itself by simultaneously
asserting both sides of a contradiction, becoming unstable. This makes the grotesque not easy to
contain in linguistic categories: it is “just out of focus, just beyond the reach of language” (Harpham
1982, 3), and gives voice and concrete form to the experience that defies satisfactory verbalisation,
especially so in  the subjective tradition,  which deals  with  subjective experience.  (Clayborough,
1965, 67; Harpham 1982; 3-4, 19-20; Kayser 1981; 11, 53.) It eludes rigorously structured thought
by  taking  a  multitude  of  forms  and  always  inviting  new  interpretations;  it  has  a  surplus  of
significance.  The  grotesque  is  the  essence  of  the  surplus  of  meaning  that  arises  from  the
contradiction inherent in all art. (Harpham 1982; xxi, 80, 178; Kayser 1981, 10.) (We may detect a
similarity to Blanchot here.) The grotesque is found in the extremities and margins of art, both in
exaltation and debasement—especially in the paradoxical process of exaltation through debasement
(Harpham 1982, 185; Bakhtin 1984, 370).
As the combination of incompatible elements, the grotesque is characterised by ambivalence.
As such, it is a liminal phenomenon and experience: it is on the threshold between two different
categories (such as horror and laughter). It is never finished or fully formed. It is rather half-formed
or  re-formed,  arrested  movement  from  one  form  to  another,  or  destroyed  and  made  new
(Clayborough, 1965, 17; Bakhtin 1984, 370). Its combination of horror and laughter, that is, tragic
and comic elements, creates ambivalent reader reaction by undermining expectations. Tragicomedy,
therefore,  is  an  optimal  genre  for  the  grotesque  (Kayser  1981,  11).  The  ambivalence  of  the
grotesque combines with abnormality,  which seems often to focus on the human body, creating
physical abnormality (Thomson 1972; 8-9, 27). This makes the grotesque visual and physical, either
in  the  sense  of  actual  norm-breaking  hybrids  of  humans,  plants,  animals,  and  others,  physical
abnormalities such as  deformations,  as  well  as  the animalisation and objectification of  humans
(Perttula 2011, 18).
The grotesque can be detected on two levels: content and narration. It is a textual or stylistic
structure and a subject-matter, and the dynamic between these levels is an inappropriate or shocking
clash. On the level of content (or story) it is in the shape of grotesque characters and situations.
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Though there  is  no inherently grotesque topic,  theme,  or  motif,  the grotesque often deals  with
“shameful” human body topics such as secretions  and functions,  madness,  strange dreams, and
animalistic  behaviour.  It  also  features  creatures  that  are  strange,  disgusting,  ominous,  and
disfigured, such as monsters, vermin, bats, and puppets. (Kayser 1981; 10, 22, 53, 181-184; Perttula
2011, 32-36; Thomson 1972, 2-7.) On the level of narration it can be seen as a clash which remains
unmitigated and unexplained. The tension between these two levels,  horrifying content narrated
comically, in the co-presence of opposed phenomena contained within a single presentation, is the
root  of  the  grotesque  effect:  the  clash  of  horror  and  laughter  in  the  reader.  Exaggeration  and
debasement  are  staples  of  the  narrative  tone.  (Bakhtin  1984,  19-20;  Clayborough  1965,  12;
Harpham 1982; 7, 14, 36, 23; Kayser 1981, 79; Thomson 1972, 27-28.)
Furthermore,  we will  benefit  from introducing a  third  level,  the level  of  the text  itself.
Grotesque language is elusive, that is, its familiarity as a tool of communication can suddenly turn
strange,  push the reader away from familiar  meanings and words into something inhuman and
meaningless. Kayser mentions “verbal grotesque”, where word formations and structures such as
neologisms, ellipses and non-grammatical forms, reflect the spirit of the grotesque. (Kayser 1981,
154-157.) (We may note that neologisms, ellipses, and non-grammatical forms also form a part of
privative tactics.)
The grotesque is borne of the simultaneous presence of elements that cannot co-exist, that
repel each other: incomprehensible juxtapositions, horrifying content and humorous presentation,
perhaps even different styles that traditionally are not combinable, with their unifying component
somehow  interrupted  or  not  completely  present.  The  grotesque  legitimises  multiple,  mutually
incompatible  meanings,  often  in  relation  to  dichotomies  such  as  high/low,  human/animal,
normal/abnormal,  light/dark,  and  life/death.  (eg.  Clayborough 1965;  3,  73;  Harpham 1982,  14;
Perttula 2011; 25, 32-36; Thomson 1972; 2-3, 7, 14.) We may be reminded of the absurd and the
meaninglessness: how the world and language become suddenly strange. Clash and alienation are,
indeed, central concepts in all three theories.
Though the basic feature of grotesque is the clash of incompatible parts and lack of
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proportion, this incongruity is presented in what seems like a hybrid whole, once-separate parts
strangely fused together (Harpham 1982; 106, 111, 178; Kayser 1981; 79, 116, 185; Perttula 2001;
26, 34). The clash is counterbalanced by a kind of dissolution of boundaries. The grotesque exists at
the intersection between these two opposite tendencies: the unifiable separation of elements on the
one hand and the impossible fusion of separate elements.  There is  therefore in the grotesque a
simultaneous expansion and constriction of meaning and form: it on one hand compresses forms
into meaningful ambivalence while on the other proliferates them into meaningless ambivalence,
therefore creating not only play with forms but also with the act of representation: it invites the
reader to search for meaning while presenting to us the simultaneous presence of meaning and
meaninglessness (Harpham 1982; 38-40, 65). Play or playfulness is thus an important element of
the grotesque: it features the free play of creation and experimental innovation, especially games
with words which “release from the shackles of sense” (Bakhtin 1984, 423) are a staple of the
carnival-grotesque; however, even the playful grotesque can have a serious, if not ominous element
to it (Bakhtin 1984, 423-426; Kayser 1981; 21, 154-155; Thomson 1972; 15, 58).
This dynamic creates in the carnival-grotesque tradition an image that  is  ambivalent,  and
always  shifting  and  moving.  In  the  carnival-grotesque  tradition  this  is  manifest  firstly  in  the
language which is excessive, overly abundant, endlessly enumerating synonyms, and transgressing
all  limits,  like  Bakhtin  says,  or  combinatory,  degrading,  distorting,  inverting,  exaggerating and
multiplying, as per Perttula, The image thus created is one of unfinished or arrested transformation
or metamorphosis, which while being neither end of the transformation, nevertheless encompasses
both.  (Bakhtin 1984;  24,   432, 306; Perttula 2011,  35.)  Secondly this  is  “a  game of  negation”
(Bakhtin 1984, 412): as the movement of transformation in the carnival-grotesque image is from
duality into unity and from meaningless into meaningful, the grotesque playfully negates official
negations and restrictions, revealing their superficiality (Bakhtin 1984, 412-415; Harpham 1982, 47;
Kayser 1981, 60-61).
In the subjective tradition, on the other hand, this leads to the creation of horrible monsters, as
the transgression of natural boundaries creates impurity and filth, and as the low, abnormal and
81
degenerate  invade  the  high,  normal  and  fully  formed,  creating  mutilated  hybrids  that  have  no
proportions, names, or counterparts in reality (Hall 1993, 6-8; Harpham 1982, 9-10; Kayser 1981;
24, 30, 187-188; Perttula 2011, 26).  These hybrids pervert  natural law and order, and therefore
represent  something  between  natural  and  unnatural—they  are  non-things  which  Kayser  calls
demons (Harpham 1982, 4-8; Kayser 1981, 6; Perttula 2011; 20, 30). These non-things are, already
by virtue of name, related to the negation of meaning. For Kayser, the grotesque does not and even
can not suggest a meaning for itself as it is opposed to rational and systematic thought, it is a “play
with the absurd” (Kayser 1981, 187): a playful way of invoking the “demonic aspects of the world”
(Kayser 1981, 188), that is, showing the absurdity, ultimate meaninglessness of the world. (Kayser
1981; 36, 184-185.) Familiar objects begin to look strange, and their meaningfulness is revealed to
be  only  illusory.  The  subjective  grotesque  goes  beyond  negating  official  order,  it  negates  the
meaningfulness of that order, of the whole world. The paradox of the simultaneous lack and fullness
of meaning is inherent in both traditions of the grotesque; Harpham argues that the real scandal of
the grotesque is the ambivalent meaning within the apparently meaningless, as the lack of meaning
is a solid basis for the abundance of meaning that is the grotesque (Harpham 1982, 3; Kayser 1981,
63).
Let us now turn to the world that the grotesque creates or reflects. The two traditions diverge
dramatically: the subjective grotesque sees the world as nocturnal, absurd, inhuman and abysmal,
whereas the carnival-grotesque shows it as light,  fruitful  and joyous (Bakhtin 1984, 41; Kayser
1981, 58). The views of the world in the traditions are parallel but diametrically opposed, yet they
have similarities: both defy order and rationality in favour of heterogeneity, turmoil and disorder,
and even the carnival-grotesque does have elements of alienation, as the prevailing order is exposed
as false and oppressive, and in the subjective grotesque our familiar world view becomes suddenly
defunct (Bakhtin 1984, 48; Kayser 1981, 184; Perttula 2011, 37). Furthermore, both conceptualise
this in terms of the world having been turned upside down.
In  the  subjective  tradition,  the  grotesque can  be  used  to  show the  world  as  alienated  or
satirised, to shock the reader with showing familiar things as strange and hostile; it “pushes one into
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the void” (Kayser 1981, 72; Thomson 1965; 18, 58). The world of the subjective grotesque both is
and is not our familiar world: it stems from understanding that our world is absurd, what seemed
familiar  is  turned upside down,  alienated and invaded by what  Kayser  calls  abysmal  forces,  it
creates fear as our world suddenly breaks apart and becomes inaccessible, inhuman—yet it is not
completely alien,  there is  a measure of reality to it  (Bakhtin 1984,  38; Clayborough 1965, 71;
Kayser 1981; 31-37, 52, 184).  It  should be emphasised that  the estrangement of the world is  a
suddenly occurring process, an ominously tense state of action (Kayser 1981; 43, 163, 184-185).
This may be compared with the dynamic image of change in the carnival-grotesque tradition, and
with the Camusian absurd world—Kayser explicitly states that the grotesque world is absurd.
On the other hand, in the carnival-grotesque, the world is turned upside down in the sense that
hierarchical order is reversed, the high or lofty degraded and debased, invaded by the low or earthy
(Bakhtin 1984; 10, 20-21; Hall 1993, 6-8). Everything that is alien and terrifying is turned familiar
and laughable: the carnival-grotesque language aims at materialising and bringing the world closer
through what Bakhtin calls coarse words, that turn fearfulness into joy by transforming terrifying
images  into  scenes  of  eating,  drinking  and  defecating,  and  the  alienated  world  into  a  fruitful,
renewing earth (Bakhtin 1984; 21, 38-39, 174-176, 187, 394). Its function is to liberate people from
dominant ideologies and to create the world anew; indeed, absurdity is a characteristic of the “old
world” which is to be fearlessly killed in order to bring about a new, better one (Bakhtin 1984; 34,
394).  This is  in notable contrast  to views expressed by Camus and Blanchot,  who respectively
argued that the absurd world is our only world, and that the literary realm is not finer or better than
the old world.
The main figure of the grotesque world and language is the mask: Kayser argues that in the
twentieth century the inner and outer worlds are separated, and the mask is the concrete image of
the alienated self: it hides and solidifies identity, eventually destroying it. In the carnival-grotesque
tradition  the  mask  is  the  image  of  metamorphosis,  non-conformity  and  violation  of  natural
boundaries, it reveals the deeper reality of archetypes. (Bakhtin 1984, 39-40; Harpham 1982, 109;
Kayser 1981; 61-62, 137, 146-147.) Notably, Camus and Blanchot discuss the mask as well: For
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Blanchot, writing literature is conceptualised as looking at the naked mask, it is seeing literature
when it appears as disappearance (Blanchot 1982, 171-172); for Camus, the mask is the mask of
meaning that covers the absurdity of the human condition, and the absurd man wishes to tear it
away. It is quite obvious that Camus, Blanchot and Kayser attach similar connotations to the mask,
that it distorts what it covers, and, most importantly, what it covers is nothingness. For Bakhtin the
idea of distorting natural boundaries may come close to this, but, as with most everything, the mood
he gives the mask is completely opposite to Kayser.
Though the grotesque is unnatural and estranged, it is not antithetical to realism or nature: the
alienated world must be,  as already mentioned, our  world.  It  cannot be a  fantastical  nightmare
realm, but it cannot be accepted as undistorted and real either; things are not presented in the work
itself as incongruous with the norm, but recognised by the reader as such. When readers cease to
experience  the  grotesque  as  incongruous,  or  when  it  is  mitigated  by  offering  some  rational
explanation, it  ceases to exist (eg. Clayborough 1965; 15-16, 56-60; Kayser 1981, 138; Perttula
2011;  3,  20-22,  38).  Of  course,  the  work  of  art  has  qualities  that  are  not  found in  reality,  its
constructedness  comes  from selecting  and  directing  what  is  real,  and  the  unnaturalness  of  the
grotesque is to be found only in the work of art (Kayser 1981; 90, 100).
Therefore the relationship between the grotesque and realism is a complicated one, as both
Kayser and Bakhtin argue that the grotesque can be used to reveal the truth about something or
deeper reality (Bakhtin 1984; 208-212, 369; Kayser 1981, 159). The grotesque may be situated in
the liminal space between art and something beyond of outside it, and derives part of its strength
from its realistic framework (Harpham 1982; xxii, 50, 189-190; Thomson 1972, 8). Even Kayser
agrees  that  the  grotesque  has  a  place  in  realism,  though  according  to  him,  the  carnivalesque
emphasis on comical elements detracts from it (1981, 123); Bakhtin goes so far as to directly link
them, as he argue that realism receives vitality from the grotesque. Perhaps to underscore this, he
calls Renaissance grotesque literature “grotesque realism” (1984, 52). The grotesque may, naturally,
as a label be attached to natural objects as well, as Clayborough notes (1965, 7). But this meaning is
very different, and therefore not of interest to us.
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However, the grotesque may also be used to blur the boundary between what is real and what
is not: the grotesque is “the art of disgust”, and, Harpham argues, disgusting works evoke the same
emotion as disgusting objects, and thus annihilates the distinction between art and world (1982,
181). The grotesque is characterised by familiar objects becoming “possessed” or malicious, as if
having  a  life  of  their  own,  undermining  reality,  and  some elements  are  grotesque  specifically
because they are used for this effect, like the puppet-play and the mise-en-abyme (Kayser 1981; 91,
111, 119, 137). The dissolution of reality gives the subjective grotesque a dream-like quality, it is a
nocturnal  realm of  “participation in  a  different  kind  of  existence”  (Kayser  1981,  22),  between
waking and dreaming (Kayser 1981; 79, 176). For Bakhtin, too, the grotesque creates a “second
life” (1984, 5) but this life is not dream-like, it is on the level of deeper reality. To conclude, it
seems safe to say that  the image of the world,  and the link to reality and the natural,  that  the
grotesque presents to us is highly ambivalent.
4.1.2 The Grotesque Time
Let us now turn towards the view of time that can be read from the theories of the grotesque. This
section will be somewhat shorter than the other two, primarily for the reason that the temporality of
the grotesque is mostly implied in its world view, and thus has not been discussed as much. What
can be retrieved, however, from implicit and explicit statements will be opened up and studied.
There is something about the grotesque that is simultaneously ageless or ancient and very
contemporary: Perttula argues that it features mythic or primitive elements in otherwise modern
content; Harpham argues that it embodies the tension between the ancient and the modern, pushing
both to the fore, making them interrogate and deconstruct each other, thus bringing the past and the
present together,  overlaying them (Harpham 1982; 49, 56, 178; Perttula 2011, 21).  Kayser,  too,
argues that the grotesque can reveal something about the modern age (Kayser 1981, 11-12).
We, again, detect very interesting differences between the two main traditions: the carnival-
grotesque  focuses  on  the  movement  between  history  and  the  future  whereas  the  subjective
grotesque is concerned more with the deconstruction of the poles and the emerging middle point,
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the present.  The meanings given to these vary also in the same way as  with the world;  in the
carnivalesque tradition, time is merry and bright, and in the subjective, it is gloomy and dark.
The carnival-grotesque time is the time of biological life, that is, there are two phases of
development running simultaneously and in parallel: beginning and end, life and death (Bakhtin
1984; 24-26). This leads to a cyclical understanding of time where each death brings about a new
birth, new life conceived but not yet formed. The transformation never reaches its completion but
remains always in flux, always on the brink of becoming. (Bakhtin 1984, 24-26; 52-53.) Thus life
and death, the womb and the tomb, are inextricably linked: death is an indispensable part of life and
rebirth, and in this ambivalence even death is merry and regenerating (Bakhtin 1984; 49, 150). This
ceaseless cycle is, according to Bakhtin, a determining trait of the carnival-grotesque: it lightens the
burden of old age, and turns the inevitable progression of historical time into a “sequence of gay
transformations  and  renewals”  (1984,  24;  394).  Even  acts  of  violence,  such  as  beating,
dismemberment, and abuse, are all transformed into acts of creation and renewal in the temporality
of the carnival-grotesque, death becomes the giver of life (Bakhtin 1984; 211, 357, 435). Birth and
death, past and future, become fused into one, a moment of death-birth.
Furthermore,  the  temporality  of  the  carnival-grotesque  is  humanised  and  materialised,
embodied: a concrete, realistic awareness of history takes form in the shared body of the people: a
“living sense” that each person belongs to the shared corporeality of the people, and contributes to
the creation of history,  being thus relatively immortal—this immortality is  the very core of the
carnival-grotesque (Bakhtin 1984; 244, 255-256, 324, 367). This historic awareness brings a deeper
understanding of reality as the unceasing progress of time, and exposes any so-called “eternal truth”
(like Heaven) as ridiculous (Bakhtin 1984; 208, 212, 403-407). Most of all, the carnival-grotesque
orients itself towards the future, towards the victory of the new over the old, assured and made
fearless by the immortality of the shared corporeality. In this framework, the past is denigrated as
something old, corrupt, and, notably, absurd. It is a “monster” to be chased away and conquered.
(Bakhtin  1984;  256,  391-394.)  For  this  purpose  the  carnival-grotesque  employs,  among  other
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things,  games: they condense life into a miniature image,5 orient  the players toward the future,
renew time on the bodily level, and “uncrown gloomy eschatological time” (Bakhtin 1984; 235-
238). We have seen that the carnival-grotesque time is rooted in the shared corporeality, but what
happens when the carnivalesque mass is separated and turned inward in the subjective tradition?
Bakhtin argues that fear (a central feature of the subjective grotesque) can only enter an individual
that has been separated from the carnivalesque mass, and that the shared corporeality and bodily
abundance are absent from the subjective tradition (1984; 48, 256). Perhaps then it is the case that
in mind of the isolated individual the carnival spirit is transformed into the spirit of the absurd? (It is
also worth noting that  Bakhtin  himself  argues  that  the carnival  spirit  remains  in  the subjective
grotesque in a “weakened” form.)
Following this,  let us have a look at  the temporality of the subjective tradition. Bakhtin
argues that the notions of time, change and crisis are missing from Kayser's theory of the grotesque
(1984, 48). However, we will see that this does not hold true; all these concepts are present in the
theory,  but  they are,  as  mentioned, implicit  rather  than explicit.  Most obviously the notions of
change and crisis are implied in the world: the world is suddenly changed into a hostile and absurd,
unknown realm, creating a crisis of world view. In this, in the word sudden is the crux of time as
well, as Clayborough notes that Kayser emphasises the suddenness of the grotesque (1965, 65).
There is no circularity, no ambivalent change of life and death like in the carnivalesque tradition:
life and death are gravely opposed, “torn apart” to use Bakhtin's words (Bakhtin 1984; 49, 150).
The sudden moment of the world turning inhuman is an instantaneous process when temporality is
materialised into spatiality,  and narrative compressed into image—it “impales us on the present
moment,  emptying  the  past  and  forestalling  the  future”  (Harpham  1982,  16),  arresting  the
differences between epistemological subjects and objects (Harpham 1982, 11).
The suddenness of the subjective grotesque is inherently dark or nocturnal as the estranged
world is the creation of a strong imagination corrupted by an indulgence of the whims of the mind
5 The mise-en-abyme falls under this category; the contrast to its function in the subjective grotesque, that of alienating 
the world, is again not very different, but presented in a completely different mood.
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(or  of  the  subconscious?).  Kayser  writes  that  it  “appears  in  the  vision  of  the  dreamer  or  the
daydreamer or in the twilight of the transitional moments” (1981, 186). The subjective grotesque
time is the time of the night. (Bakhtin 1984, 41; Harpham 1982, 131; Kayser 1981; 22, 30-31, 49.)
It appears in the liminal time between dreaming and waking (Kayser 1981, 176). The emphasis on
meaninglessness, nocturnality and the present moment, the now, leads us to think of the nocturnal
phenomenon of our previous section, the night of literature. The midnight is a moment of utmost
meaninglessness,  fragile,  temporary  balance  between  the  struggling  contraries,  obscureness  of
details and boundaries between objects (in the grotesque framework this translates immediately into
grotesque  hybrid  combinations),  the  eternal  now,  and  the  emergence  of  the  materiality  within
immateriality. The concept of the (mid)night of literature is surprisingly similar to the temporality of
the subjective grotesque, and seems to lend itself well to parallel reading; indeed, the grotesque
emerges  in  the  twilight,  but  it  is  nocturnal  by nature—the  grotesque  effects this  change  from
twilight to night. It “pushes one into the void” (Kayser 1981, 34).
We may conclude  that  the subjective  grotesque is  not  very different  from the carnival-
grotesque even in terms of materiality and temporality: the subjective tradition finds its materialised
time in the thickening of the (mid)night when the materiality within immateriality emerges, and the
carnival-grotesque in its historical movement as the body of the people. Again the main difference
is in the mood of the phenomenon, though the cyclical thinking of the carnivalesque tradition is
inarguably missing in the subjective tradition.
4.1.3 The Grotesque Self
The last section deals with three different aspects of the self of the grotesque: the reader, the writer
and the grotesque character,  as  the grotesque is  often defined through all  three.  Especially the
subjective grotesque is very centred on the experience of the reader (Clayborough 1965, 63).
The grotesque is to be found between laughter and horror, at moral extremes, and so critics
identify three very different reactions to the feeling of discomfort it causes: it is either shrugged off
as  humour  or  nonsense,  it  is  found  distasteful,  disgusting,  and  outrageous,  or  it  is  deemed
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fascinating, significant, and suggestive of “a deeper, freer, more enduring world” as Clayborough
puts it  (Clayborough 1965, 80; Harpham 1982, 184; Thomson 1972, 3). The grotesque effect is
therefore emotional and intellectual, it requires the recognition of the element of alienation, and if
the reader were to accept the internal harmony of the grotesque hybrid, making it not a hybrid but a
unified whole, it would cease to be grotesque (Clayborough 1965; 16, 70-71; Kayser 1981, 143;
Thomson 1972,  5).  The  grotesque is  so  independent  on  the  reader's  emotional  and  intellectual
response that virtually anything may register as grotesque, depending on the reader (Clayborough
1965, 109; Thomson 1972, 58).
The grotesque is, to a large extent, a question of interpretation: being weird and incongruous
with  ordinary  experience,  understanding  it  necessitates  interpretation  which  it  also  eludes  by
defying the very possibility of categories of interpretation and understanding. In this way it turns the
reading process back to the reader. (Clayborough 1965, 12; Harpham 1982; 3, 80, 178; Perttula
2011, 27.) It suddenly appears to accuse the reader of creating monstrosities, of harbouring sordid
fantasies. Being in a state of arrested understanding—between understanding and not understanding
—is what creates the grotesque, Harpham argues (1982; 3, 15-16). In the world turned upside down,
the reader is confused, repulsed but also, strangely curious and fascinated (Clayborough 1965, 71-
73). 
The  emotions  the  grotesque  awakens  are  indeed  ambivalent  and  conflicted,  horror  and
laughter, disgust and fascination, and these conflicted emotions are in a tense balance (Clayborough
1965,  74;  Kayser  1981,  31-32;  Perttula  2011;  27,  34;  Thomson  1972;  5,  14).  The  subjective
grotesque specifically describes feelings of helplessness and disparagement as the world becomes
absurd (Kayser 1981, 78)—this could well be contrasted with what Camus says of the feeling of the
absurd before it is vanquished by determination. Yet the grotesque not only alienates the reader, it
also fascinates and pulls the reader in, and “reduces [his] distance to the work”, to use Kayser's own
words (1981, 118). This sounds familiar to us from our discussion of Benjamin and Blanchot: the
fascination of the grotesque erases the distance between the work and the reader, making the reader
surrender to the strange, inhuman world of the grotesque. The grotesque reflects the attempt to read
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it  back  to  the  reader,  as  argued  earlier,  showing  the  reader's  own  features  as  disgusting.  The
grotesque work is there to be devoured and to devour the reader also, as its fascination may be
explained, Clayborough argues, by the very structure of the human mind (1965, 110).
Perhaps the explanation to how the grotesque attracts people may reside in the fascination of
the repulsive, as the grotesque is the art of disgust: it  is non-aesthetic,  unnatural, hideous, anti-
classical, indecent, and most of all, against good taste, norms and decorum. Indeed, the grotesque is
only recognisable “in relation to the norm it exceeds” (Perttula 2011, 25), such as good taste, and
the function of all systems of decorum is to keep the low in its place. (eg. Harpham 1982; 34, 74,
111, 181; Perttula 2011; 20, 25; Thomson 1972, 27.) The grotesque upsets this hierarchy by turning
it upside down, letting the low invade the high, and by freely disintegrating and redistributing the
parts of natural wholes “to suit the taste of the artist” (Clayborough 1965, 3). This brings us to the
writer of the grotesque who brings together two familiar but so far apparently separate roles: that of
the absurd man, and that of the Blanchotian writer.
It was noted that the writer is an absurd character, but he is also a grotesque one (Kayser
1981, 175; Clayborough 1965; 22, 111; Thomson 1972, 20). The absurd man and the grotesque
creator  share  many similarities:  the  world view of  the  grotesque creator  is  unimpassioned  and
distanced, cold, and he sees the world as an empty marionette play. He rebels against what Kayser
calls “fatalism”, that is, lack of freedom, fear of dark inexplicable forces and being determined from
the outside. This outside determination is what appears as “the shackles of sense”. (Bakhtin 1984,
423-426; Clayborough 1965, 68; Kayser 1981; 91, 186.) The creator feels dread in the face of the
world turning inhuman and absurd,  like the absurd man, and the urge to show the absurdity to
others through his art—this was argued about the writers of the Theatre of the Absurd as well.
However, like the absurd, the grotesque also effects a “secret liberation” (Clayborough 1965, 67):
its playfulness frees the writer and the reader, from the abysmal horror, mitigating the fear (Kayser
1981; 132, 154, 188). Clayborough seems to consider the release from rigid logic and the liberation
of the mind from fear as somehow two different things, and, furthermore, he considers the rebellion
against fatalism as incompatible with the coldness of the world view (1965, 68). Camus shows us
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however that these are not mutually incompatible—rather they complement each other.
The Blanchotian writer must more or less willingly surrender his personal identity for the
Neutral, the inhuman force of literature itself; the grotesque writer feels the Neutral, which Kayser
calls “Es”, invade and posses the order of things—and his own soul—and beginning to control the
process of creation (Clayborough 1965, 66-67; Kayser 1981, 185). Both Clayborough and Bakhtin
interpret this “Es”, an impersonal, autonomous force, as the Freudian subconscious Id, prompting
criticism about  the lack of  creative freedom of  the  consciousness  under  the governance of  the
unconscious. Bakhtin calls for the “uncrowning” of the subconscious, and Clayborough interprets
the banishing of demons as the Freudian method of psychoanalysis (Bakhtin 1984, 49; Clayborough
1965; 67, 79).
Naturally when the “Es” is interpreted as the emergence of literature itself such problems as
the  freedom  of  creation  or  the  application  of  various  psychoanalytic  methodologies  become
redundant. The Neutral, the “Es”, is owing to the unsettling and disgusting nature of the grotesque
experienced as horrifying, and not the almost sublime feeling that  can be read from Blanchot’s
theory,  though  Bakhtin,  for  example,  argues  that  the  grotesque  and  the  sublime  are,  in  fact,
complementary (1984, 43). The dual nature of the literature in Blanchot's theory, its nature as the
simultaneous presence and absence of meaning, is perhaps reflected in the grotesque writer's dual
role: he “not only makes; he unmakes” (Clayborough 1965, 58) and cannot ascribe meaning to his
own  work  (Clayborough  1965,  65).  This,  in  its  turn,  naturally  becomes  the  ambivalent
meaning/meaninglessness of the grotesque itself which we have already discussed. As a side note, it
is quite interesting that for Camus the absurdity of the world is a (near) sublime experience, but for
Kayser the absurd world is grotesque: perhaps the grotesque and the sublime really are, like Bakhtin
argues, at least to some extent complementary.
Our third and final aspect of the grotesque self is the grotesque character, the grotesque body
being its central  aspect, especially for the carnival-grotesque. Characters are grotesque on three
levels, according to Kayser: 1) their appearance and movement are grotesquely distorted; 2) their
mental faculties are distorted to eccentricity, if not insanity; 3) they are “demonic” with grotesque
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appearance  and  uncanny  skills  (1981,  105-106).  Furthermore,  they  are  most  often  somehow
monstrous, strange and ominous—they “[rise] out of the void” (Kayser 1981, 71)—whether natural
creatures (like bats or vermin), unnatural physical combinations (like the fusion of machine and
flesh) or familiar made strange as in the case of puppets and mental anomalies: in the subjective
tradition, the madman appears grotesque because some alien force has possessed him and made him
strange,  in  the  carnivalesque tradition madness  is  a  merry “parody of  official  reason  or  truth”
(Bakhtin  1984,  39;  Kayser  1981,  68,  184).  The  puppet  relates  to  category 3  in  the  subjective
tradition it is grotesque when it is given uncanny, that is, strangely familiar or life-like skills and
features.  However,  in the carnivalesque tradition the live/dead reversibility is  not  relevant,  and
therefore the puppet is a laughable creature only, albeit grotesque. Grotesque characters can also be
like puppets: they are human beings, but their behaviour is influenced by such eternal impulses or
ideé fixes that they appear as puppets guided by an alien hand rather than their own inner life or
personality. Sometimes they can also appear almost weightless or bodiless. (Bakhtin 1984, 39-40;
Kayser 1981; 41, 92, 119-123, 183.) The focus on monstrosity shows to the reader the aspects of
human nature which are usually glossed over and glorified, like animalism, bodily functions, and
violence, which Bakhtin argues to be a form of renewal and affirmation. Grotesque characters may
indeed seem aggressive and violent toward one another. (Bakhtin 1984, 211; Kayser 1981, 119-120;
Perttula 2011; 30, 33-34.)
The central aspect and the root of the grotesque is the physicality of the human body, which is
especially essential to the carnival-grotesque. It is mal- or deformed, hideous, and it symbolically
destroys the idealisation and hierarchical control which is manifested in its opposite, the classical
body. However, physical deformity is not enough to make it grotesque, as Kayser notes: the body
also needs to have a grotesque function. (eg. Bakhtin 1984; 26-29, 315, 322; Harpham 1982, 177;
Kayser 1981, 57; Thomson 1972; 1, 8, 12.) The grotesque function of the body for the carnival-
grotesque is that of exaggeration and reversal of natural order: the grotesque body is excessively
large, (Perttula observes that it is rather more rarely excessively small), unindividualised, and the
inside/outside separation is  collapsed  through the  openings  and  protuberances  of  the  grotesque
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body: it is open to the world with emphasised organs, apertures, and appendages such as the mouth,
the genitals, belly, nose, buttocks—all the places where the outside contaminates the inside. It is
also temporal and narrative process compressed into an image. The grotesque is sinful vitality (the
classical grotesque border lures the eye away from the spiritual text by its playfulness), and Bakhtin
argues that it is from the grotesque that realism gets its vitality. (Bakhtin 1984; 18-19, 52, 303;
Harpham 1982; 11, 35-36, 107; Perttula 2011, 28-30.) This has interesting parallels to the absurd:
Manschreck argues that the absurd in the hearts of men is like a “cancerous original sin” (1976, 92),
and Camus says that the absurd is “sin without God” (1991, 40).
 The grotesque body in the carnival-grotesque is not a single person but a shared corporeality
of the carnivalesque mass, continually growing and dying, transgressing its own limits. The carnival
body is “contained not in the biological individual . . . but in the people” (Bakhtin 1984, 25). This
body, furthermore, is in a state of constant flux, simultaneously giving birth or growing and dying.
(Bakhtin  1984;  19,  24-26.)  Laughter  is  a  central  bodily aspect  of  the carnivalesque mass.  The
reversal  of  order  happens  through  laughter  that  is  directed  at  everyone  and  everything
simultaneously,  even the laughers themselves, even God, and its function is both delighting and
deriding. It destroys and revives by bringing all lofty to the material, bodily level, to bury in order
to  grow anew. This  laughter  may be borne of  our  delight  at  physical  cruelty,  abnormality and
obscenity. (Bakhtin 1984; 11, 19-20; Thomson 1972, 8-9.)
Linked to laughter and debasement as renewal are eating and defecating, as both are bodily
actions,  mediators  between  the  self  and  the  world,  and  part  of  an  organic  cycle  of  recreation
(Bakhtin 1984; 148-151, 281-283; Harpham 1982; 4, 56). In the acts of eating and defecating, the
body transgresses its own limits, outside becomes inside and vice versa. In eating, the line between
the consuming body and the consumed body is blurred, man conquers the world in his mouth by
devouring it, making it part of himself, and in the act of defecation, the world is ejected out as a
hybrid product of inside and outside, the mediator of the self and the non-self (Bakhtin 1984; 225,
278-283; Harpham 1982, 4). Fear and suffering are debased by transforming images of terror into
scenes of eating and defecating: excrement combines the womb and the tomb in the least terrifying
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way, making it nearly divine; yet in the subjective grotesque this link is severed (Bakhtin 1984, 174-
176; Harpham 1982, 56). Bakhtin does not make it explicit,  but meat is the grotesque food par
excellence.
The subjective grotesque is,  on the other hand, as indicated by the name, focused on the
individual and the life of the mind. Perttula argues that the change from the carnival-grotesque to
the  subjective  grotesque  is  linked  with  the  birth  of  the  modern  subject  (this  is  related  to  the
separation  between  the  inner  and  outer  worlds  that  Kayser  mentions),  and  Bakhtin  calls  it  the
individual carnival, saying it has a “chamber character” (1984, 37): though it may appear playful,
horror and fear run as its strongest currents, describing the sense of isolation, the life of the mind
and the psyche, experiences of subjective horror and alienation from the world. (Bakhtin 1984, 36-
37;  Clayborough  1965;  39,  63;  Kayser  1981;  37,  52;  Perttula  2011,  23-24.)  In  the  subjective
grotesque the body is individuated and isolated from the shared corporeality, the cycle of renewal
disrupted. It is rather seen as an outward projection of an inner state. However, it still cannot be
finished and closed off, like Bakhtin argues, as it still retains the element of the lower stratum,
though  losing  the  force  of  renewal  and  sanctity.  (Bakhtin  1984;  23,  321;  Harpham 1982,  56;
Perttula 2011, 31.) Instead, the subjective grotesque turned towards what Bakhtin calls the interior
infinite: the depth, complexity and the inexhaustible resources of the individual mind (1984, 44).
Let us note how the interior infinite may be analogous to the shared corporeality: as Bakhtin
argues that  the body and its  ambivalent cycle of death and rebirth lost  their  positive,  renewing
aspect, retaining only the negative aspect in the private sphere of the individual (1984, 23-24), the
focus turned inwards onto the powers of destruction and creation of the mind and the subconscious
(which Freud and Jung, among others, argue to be shared by all humanity, a shared consciousness).
We argued earlier that the materiality or corporeality of the subjective grotesque is to be found in
the nocturnal aspects of the grotesque, and this is supported by Kayser, who notes that of bodily
creatures, especially grotesque are nocturnal ones (1981, 181).
The laughter  of  the  subjective  grotesque also  changed  as  it,  too,  ceased  being  bodily:  it
became cold and almost exclusively destructive instead of destructive and regenerating, and satanic
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instead of lowering and materialising the hierarchy represented by God; instead of conquering and
grasping the world, laughter is used to annihilate and alienate it, and show the void of meaning
behind it. Arguably, though, some elements of renewal still remain, as evidenced by the liberation
from the demonic and horrifying the subjective grotesque, too, can manage. (Bakhtin 1984; 11-12,
37-38,  41-42,  51-52;  Kayser  1981,  54-59,  187-188;  Thomson  1972,  58.)  The  laughter  of  the
subjective grotesque is not, however, free like in the carnivalesque tradition, is horrifying elements
invade and turn it against itself, becoming bitter, cynical (Kayser 1981, 186; Thomson 1972, 58). 
We have  seen  how the  grotesque  legitimises  the  simultaneous  existence  of  meaning and
meaninglessness, and materiality and nothingness, as a liminally situated hybrid. It also addressed
the issues of realism and identity. Next we shall apply this theory to Waiting for Godot, and learn
how it negotiates the tradition and the division between them.
4.2. Reading the Absurd, the Meaningless, and the Grotesque in Beckett: A Resolution
Let us begin with a revisit to the Theatre of the Absurd; it is apparent that the strict definition of
'absurd'  as  'opposed  to  reason'  is  not  very accommodating  for  much further  development,  and
therefore, as was argued earlier, the meaning is narrowed (according to Grossman) or expanded
(according to Thomson) by Camus and the Theatre (Grossman 1967, 473-474; Thomson 1971, 29-
31). The changed scope of the term allows for a great deal of overlap between the absurd and the
grotesque: they may be used to describe the same texts or other phenomena, or they may be each
others'  consequences  in  the  sense  that  large-scale  grotesque  leads  to  the  notion  of  prevailing
absurdity, as grotesque forms are a favourable breeding-ground for the absurd (Clayborough 1965;
4, 18; Kayser 1981, 146-147; Stankiewicz 1972, 54; Thomson 1971, 31).
Furthermore,  Esslin  traces  the  roots  of  the  Theatre  into  history  as  far  as  the  Medieval
festivities, putatively even further (1985, 327-335). The genealogy, when viewed through the lens of
the grotesque, seems familiar. It seems, indeed, that the roots of the Theatre are firmly planted in the
tradition of the grotesque. Esslin does call the Theatre grotesque on many occasions without further
specification, but we shall see that such a vague (and especially vague in the context of Beckett's
95
works where Esslin hardly discusses the grotesque at all) reference does not quite reflect the fact
that the Theatre seems to be inextricably bound with the grotesque.
Though the traditions of the grotesque and the absurd may not have existed in any form that
resembles their current, they go hand in hand. Their pre-history begins in the cave paintings, at the
very dawn of humanity's art and capability of feeling disparagement and alienation (Cornwell 2006,
3;  Harpham 1982;  49-59,  178;  Manschreck  1976,  92;  Perttula  2011,  21).  Both  traditions  have
borrowed aspects from Greek and Roman arts: Greek tragedy and comedy, and Roman miming
theatre  mimus (with  grotesque  characters)  and  ornamental  paintings  (eg.  Bakhtin  1984,  31;
Cornwell 2006, 33-35; Esslin 1985, 330-332; Kayser 1981, 19; Oliver 1963, 225-226; Thomson
1971, 1-12). Medieval and Renaissance can be said to be the first historical time when the grotesque
(and perhaps the absurd as well) truly emerge as a cultural phenomenon: Medieval folk carnival
(especially commedia  dell'arte  and a  type  of  humorous clowning theatre  called  the sottie)  and
Renaissance literature were a golden era for the grotesque in Bakhtin's view; it was then that the
grotesque style developed dramatically—and the Theatre of the Absurd has borrowed many aspects
from the traditions (Bakhtin 1984; 15-17, 31-38, Cornwell 2006; 42, 228; Knight 1971, 183-188;
Oliver  1963,  227).  In  the  nineteenth  century both the  absurd  and  the  grotesque  experienced  a
notable increase in popularity during the Romantic period, when the grotesque acquired its gloomier
form,  and  the  kinship  between  the  traditions  grew even  closer  (Bakhtin  1984;  11,  36-38,  44;
Clayborough 1965, 11; Cornwell 2006, 43). Finally during the twentieth century both the grotesque
and the absurd came to flourish during the modern period and the time of Beckett (eg. Bakhtin
1984, 46; Cornwell 2006; 44-55, 74 Kayser 1981; 130, 136; Oliver 1963, 226; Musgrave 2003;
Thomson 1971; 11, 29-31).6
In addition to this, it is argued that drama, and tragicomedy (such as  Godot) specifically, is
especially well-suited for the showcasing of the grotesque: It is analogous in form to the grotesque,
being a hybrid of two opposites, it is itself a grotesque genre, lacking the narrating voice of prose
6 It should be emphasised that of the ten sources cited, only three (Thomson, Knight, and Cornwell) explicitly juxtapose
the grotesque and the absurd to any extent.
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which calmly dispels the ominous ambivalence of what is narrated (Harpham 1982; 68, 130; Kayser
1981; 11, 85). The question of whether or not a theatrical piece has a narrator seems answered: no,
it does not.
The  interconnectedness  of  absurdity  and  the  grotesque,  or  Beckett  and  the  grotesque,  is
supported by the fact that Beckett’s works in general (or Waiting for Godot in specific) receive
passing mentions from Thomson (1971, 1), Kayser (1981, 72), and Clayborough (1965, 61) in their
analyses of the grotesque; furthermore,  Esslin (1965, 41),  Cornwell  (2006, 221-223),  Musgrave
(2003), and Schevill (1977, 230) argue Beckett's works have (variably undefined and undiscussed)
grotesque features. Therefore in both traditions it is taken as self-evident that Beckett's work can be
read as grotesque, but Musgrave alone endeavours to study its specific form in the prose trilogy
Molloy/Malone Dies/The Nameless;  according to him, Beckett's  grotesque significantly develops
the concept further into the realm of abstraction, where “the metaphysical aspects of the traditional
grotesque are extrapolated into the nth degree” (Musgrave, 2003). We will see that his formulation,
while showing great insight, is not as informed on the various aspects of the grotesque, which is its
greatest shortcoming. We will, in our present analysis, endeavour to take into consideration a fuller
picture  of  the  grotesque,  and  found  our  analysis  on  the  absurd  and  the  meaningless  already
discussed.
Furthermore, we may hark back to 2.2 and Tsur’s argument that critics are trying to reconcile
the  uncertainty of  meaninglessness  of  Godot,  to  turn  its  absence  into  presence  by applying  a
theoretical  formula  to  it:  like  the  meaninglessness  of  the  play,  the  grotesque is  interrupted  by
offering rational or allegorical explanations that seek to interpret, to close it off (Harpham 1982, 18;
Kayser  1981;  72,  103,  138;  Tsur  1975,  779-783).  Clayborough proposes  in  his  book a certain
mindset, one that rejoices in the contradictions of meaninglessness and inexplicability, to be the
creative  well  of  the  grotesque:  it  is  dissatisfied  with  the  superficiality  of  the  real  world,  and
therefore defies common sense, depicting the real world as a stage and its inhabitants in a chaotic
manner. This mindset is an inherent tendency of the human mind, and therefore describes both the
author and the work, and contributes to the ambivalent reaction of being repulsed and fascinated by
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the grotesque. Furthermore, fairytales and allegories are not a product of this mindset, which rejects
the possibility of Godot being “a negative fable”. (Anders 1965, 140-141; Clayborough 1965; 73-
75, 81-92, 101-107, 111.) After situating the grotesque with the claims made in the frameworks of
the absurd and the meaningless, let us turn to the application of the theory to proper analysis. As
with before, we will discuss the three thematic areas of world and language, time, and self.
The grotesque can be detected on three levels: form, content, and language, and this division
is quite clear in Godot too. The discoveries made here will be studied in more detail in the coming
pages. Starting with the perhaps easiest of the three, the level of content, it was argued that the
grotesque  is  created  by a  certain  way of  handling  different  topics,  and  therefore  there  are  no
inherently grotesque themes, but there are some topics and figures that a perhaps more attractive to
the  grotesque.  Among these  there  are  “shameful”  human  body themes  such  as  excretions  and
violent, bestial behaviour, and as independent figures were listed dreams, puppets, and strange and
disgusting creatures.
It was argued already in 2.2 and 3.2 that the characters are like puppets in Godot, and we shall
return to the topic in 4.2.3, but it is perhaps worth noting here that the “shameful” body is the most
prevalent grotesque motif in the play: though it does not immediately arrest the attention, the play
actually abounds with anecdotes about genitalia, masturbation, defecation, farts and other topics
which Bakhtin identified as belonging to the lower bodily stratum. And perhaps the most notable
thing about them is the surprising and inappropriate situations they appear: in the midst of lyrical
dreaming about a better future, attention is suddenly drawn to a fart someone has let out, and while
comparing their respective suffering, attention is again suddenly drawn to the lower bodily stratum:
“ESTRAGON: [Pointing.] You might button it all the same. VLADIMIR: [Stooping.] True. [He
buttons his fly.] Never neglect the little things in life.” (Beckett 2006; 2, 74) In the latter example,
the attention to the open trouser front, and thus to the genitalia beneath, may be an implication that
the  ailment  Vladimir  suffers  is  a  venereal  disease,  which  in  itself  is,  according  to  Bakhtin,  a
grotesque topic (1984, 161). Perhaps the sudden, intrusive attention to the phenomena of the lower
bodily stratum is a symptom of the inescapable corporeality of the characters that was argued in 3.2.
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The play also features  other  typically “grotesque-friendly”  themes,  such as  dreams and violent
behaviour.
Seemingly missing are the Kayserian strange, disgusting, nocturnal creatures. However, they,
too, appear in the text as Vladimir and Estragon abuse each other verbally (Beckett 2006, 67).  They
call the other with progressively worse names such as moron, vermin, and sewer-rat, which fit the
description of grotesque creatures well enough. More interestingly, morpion, cretin, curate and critic
are on the worse end of the list. Morpion, evocative though meaningless in English, is French for
‘crab louse’, whereas cretin is a person who suffers from cretinism, that is, physical and mental
deformity.  Curate,  on the other  hand,  is  a  low-ranking  member  of  the  Catholic  clergy—insult,
perhaps,  in its  own right,  but there is also an idiom, “curate’s egg”, which indicates something
patently bad which is nevertheless euphemistically downplayed. This aspect may, naturally, only be
a contributing factor. Lastly, the final insult on the list, critic, is perhaps funny in that it stands out
from the list of more obviously insulting names, and it is declared with such finality as to truly seem
the worst one. Noteworthy is that these themes are on a purely linguistic level: the characters are not
shown masturbating, farting or defecating, the creatures are words only.
In terms of form, the text of the play features fast-paced dialogue, which often consists only
of one word of dialogue per line. This alternates with the famously dense stage-directions. This
creates  the  impression  of  the  text  alternating  between  “narrow” and  rigorous  formulation,  and
“wide” and structural chaos (the names of the characters are printed in capital  letters, intruding
dialogue in standard typeface, and the stage-directions themselves bracketed in Italics, creating a
confusion of styles). Conflict in reader response is a prerequisite for experiencing the grotesque, and
certainly  the  reading  process  of  this  text  differs  from  reading  uniform  text:  the  eye  skips
automatically over the dialogue parts, especially during episodes of repeated words and synonyms.
Encountering  the  long confusions  of  dialogue and  stage-directions  is  a  jarring experience.  The
movement of the eye slows down, and the reader must make note of who speaks, who acts, and
what happens:
POZZO: Leave him in peace! [They turn towards POZZO, who, having finished
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eating, wipes his mouth with the back of his hand.] Can’t you see he wants to
rest? Basket! [He strikes a match and begins to light his pipe. ESTRAGON sees
the chicken bones on the ground and stares at them greedily. As  LUCKY does
not move,  POZZO throws the match angrily away and jerks the rope.] Basket!
[LUCKY starts, almost falls, recovers his senses, advances, puts the bottle in the
basket, returns to his place.  ESTRAGON stares at the bones.  POZZO strikes
another match and lights his pipe.] What can you expect, it’s not his job. [He
pulls at his pipe, stretches out his legs.] Ah! That’s better. (Beckett 2006, 19)
The reader is in pains to follow the text, whereas the viewer would receive two separate processes,
one through the faculty of vision, and the other through hearing. Furthermore, sometimes even the
stage-directions become repetitive as they describe repetitive action (best example being the episode
where  Estragon  and  Vladimir  exchange  hats)  and  the  eye  grows  tired  of  following  precisely
identically repeated words, but it cannot start skimming the stage-directions, or else it may miss
something. Indeed, Harpham notes the importance of movement of the eye for the grotesque: when
the grotesque was mainly found in intricate border decorations in the Bible and other Christian
texts, it  lured the eye away from the religious content of the text to its nonsensical visual play
(1982, 35-36). How the eye is dragged across surfaces by the grotesque has been a part of the
grotesque experience from the start. It is therefore interesting to note that the eye is important to the
Benjaminian aura as well, which is created in the way the work of art is looked at. 
Moving to the level  of language,  Kayser  argues  that  the verbal  grotesque can be seen in
structures and formations such as neologisms, ellipses and non-grammatical forms, and in the way
its  familiarity  as  a  tool  of  communication  suddenly  turns  strange  and  pushes  the  reader  into
inhuman  meaninglessness  (1981,  154-157).  This  reminds  us  of  the  Blanchotian  essential  word
which annihilates the world and substitutes itself, perhaps blurring the boundary between what is
real and what is fiction—as the grotesque does. “Weird” word formations are noted already in the
absurdist  criticism,  as  Brater  argues  that  the combinations  of  strange  words  and  positions  is  a
central  factor  in  Beckett’s  effectiveness,  citing  the  word  ‘knook’  as  an  example.  Perhaps
interestingly,  Robert  Cohen  argues  that  the  word  may refer  to  an  elf,  bringing  us  back  to  the
grotesque,  malformed  human body.  (Brater  1975,  205;  Cohen  2011.)  Yet  the  grotesqueness  of
language in the play goes even deeper, as Musgrave argues that characteristic of Beckett's grotesque
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is  how  his  words  are  fused  with  silence,  making  them  a  grotesque,  hybrid  combination  in
themselves—silence is not “a passive absence but rather an active presence which contributes to the
shape of  the  work as  a  whole”  (2003).  Perhaps this  active silence  is  the “dead voices” which
Vladimir and Estragon hear (Beckett 2006, 54). It was identified in 3.2 as the voice of the Neutral:
the murmuring, whispering voice(s) ceaselessly telling stories, which Vladimir and Estragon hear
behind the sound of their own voices. Perhaps this is Beckett’s active, grotesque silence—after all,
the voices negate the difference between life and death, human and non-human, by talking about
their lives and sounding like leaves.
It  was argued that the grotesque is born of inappropriate juxtapositions, such as horrifying
content  being  narrated  funnily  or  strange  mixtures  of  genres.  Esslin’s  argument  that  Beckett
devalues language, that is, uses the clash between image and word (1985, 24-26), could be read as a
form  of  grotesque  juxtaposition,  as  the  clash  is  created  by  foregrounding  of  incommensurate
elements. The point of these juxtapositions of language and image is the attempt to communicate
when it  is  impossible,  as  Esslin  argues,  noting Beckett  himself  saying the attempt is  “horribly
comic” (1985, 32) which certainly brings to mind the two main emotions of the grotesque, horror
and  mirth.  Tragicomedy as  such is  an  example  of  a  grotesque combination of  genres,  as  it  is
characterised by these very emotions.
In the grotesque, the incommensurate juxtaposed elements are mitigated or unified, but only
to an extent: the unifying component is present but interrupted, and therefore the outcome is a
continual  struggle  of  the  elements  that  are  “forcibly”  yoked  together.  Perhaps  the  uneasy  co-
presence of word and image in Godot is a symptom of this: their mutual rhetoric is interrupted and
turned into a clash. This may be the reason also for why Esslin argues that there is catharsis in
Godot even though it is obvious there is not, and, furthermore, in grotesque there is not: according
to Esslin,  it  offers  relief  to  the viewers  by confronting them with “concrete  projections  of  the
deepest fears and anxieties” (Esslin 1985, 70), but such elements belong to a classical, “well-made”
play,  which  Godot is  not,  and  therefore  the  experience  of  catharsis  is  interrupted  before  it  is
finished, experienced fully. (Esslin 1985; 28, 70; Perttula 2011, 38; Spanos 1971, 346.)
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Devaluing language, Beckett seeks the means to express beyond language. The same function
can be attached to the grotesque: as it eludes linguistic categorisation, it gives a concrete form to
experience that cannot be verbalised. Furthermore, the simultaneous assertion of both sides of a
contradiction, the “double strategy of debasement and excess” (Rabaté 2012, 56), is a staple of
grotesque  use  of  language,  and  also  how Beckett  was  considered  to  search  for  the  means  of
expression  beyond  language—that  is,  the  means  of  devaluing  language.  (Esslin  1985,  85-86;
Harpham  1982;  3-4,  19-20;  Kayser  1981,  53.)  The  “double  strategy”  involves  silence  and
materiality, or to borrow Peter Fifield's terms, embodiment and abstraction, as its opposing poles.
They are simultaneously asserted, as Fifield argues that abstraction is a compression of physicality,
an “obsessive, distorting focus not only on appearance but on the sensation of being clothed in
flesh” (2009; 57-58, 69-70). Indeed, the poles are brought together so closely as to be almost fused
together.
Some clarification  in  the  use  of  the  terms  'embodiment'  (as  'materiality'  or  'excess')  and
'abstraction' (as 'silence' or 'debasement') is perhaps in order, as they are somewhat misleading from
our  perspective.  Musgrave  names  his  findings  the  “abstract  grotesque”  because,  in  his  view,
Beckett's grotesque is characterised by the abstraction, that is, condensation, of traditional grotesque
elements, and the conjunction of the material and the silence (2003). Yet we cannot be content with
the word 'abstract', as it erases the struggle between the image and the silence. Esslin already argues
that  Beckett  refused  to  “deal  in  abstractions”  (1965,  8)  and  Kayser  argues  that  the  grotesque
objectifies the abstract (1981, 109). We may bring Bakhtin’s idea of materialisation into this: the
abstract is materialised in the grotesque. But what, then, do the terms 'debasement' and 'excess'
mean?
First  of  all,  in  3.2,  the  word  'debasement'  was  decoded  as  'atrophied',  and  'excess'  as
'gratuitousness',  but  now the  meanings  have  flipped:  in  the grotesque framework,  we saw that
debasing means materialising, making earthly and material, and the meaning of 'excess' is shaded
towards  'excessive',  in  the sense of  'unnecessary'  or,  even  'nonexistant',  as  Beckett’s  words  are
undermined by being hybridised with active silence. The excess or unnecessariness of language is
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therefore a means of reaching beyond language, and an integral part of Beckett's work alongside
debasement as the lowering of the high and ideal onto a lower, earthly, level. Together they create
the basis of the grotesque language emblematic to Beckett's works.
As we have seen,  Godot has been interpreted in a  variety of mutually incompatible
ways,  and  this  is  one  indication  of  its  grotesqueness:  grotesque  language  is  characterised  by
legitimising  multiple,  mutually  incompatible  meanings,  and  subsequently  dissolving  clear
boundaries between categories, creating a dual tone of the continuous struggle of incommensurate
elements, and an indistinct fusion of elements that should not be fused. One feature showcases this
tendency  especially  clearly  in  Beckett's  grotesque  language:  the  incomplete  syllogism  or  the
enthymeme, which Musgrave argues  to be unique to Beckett’s grotesque. It  blurs the boundary
between premise and conclusion by omitting the clear chain of deduction, and these gaps represent
Beckett’s silence, as Musgrave argues that they are “fundamental to the architectonics and structure
of  the  work”  (2003).  The repetition  with  slight  variations  which  we  have  discussed  in  earlier
sections emphasises the enthymemes, the gaps between individual sentences and meanings, and the
leaps of logic that are required to grasp even an approximation of the whole. (Musgrave 2003.)
For example here, the second premise “cutting the air flow to the body induces blood to flow
to the penis” is omitted, and the leap of logic from hanging to erection seems arbitrary. This is used,
naturally, for its startling and humorous effect of combining dying and sexual excitement—we may
note that Estragon is “highly excited” by the very idea:
ESTRAGON: What about hanging ourselves?
VLADIMIR: Hmm. It'd give us an erection!
ESTRAGON: [Highly excited.] An erection! (Beckett 2006, 9)
The enthymeme represents, presumably, the “rigidity of logic” or the logic of the absurd from 2.2
that Cornwell and Suciu speak about, since it certainly seems like a parody of a formal deduction.
Furthermore, Cornwell argues that it is the extreme form of the comic, and Musgrave argues that
the enthymeme is a “defining character of all true humour” (2003). (Cornwell 2006, 19; Suciu 11.)
On the blurring between premise and conclusion, we may ask if getting an erection, after all, is the
conclusion here? Or is it another premise, and the chain of deduction breaks before the conclusion?
103
Moreover, in a very Bakhtinian spirit, the exchange blurs the boundary between death and life by
reversing the causality.
The dissolution of boundaries leads to a sort of “dual tone”, especially notable in a dialogue
between two characters, which manifests itself in grotesque speech as endless  enumeration and
exaggeration, abundance of figures and synonyms, transgression of limits and negation of logical
progression.  Grotesque  speech  reflects  the  general  ambivalence  of  the  grotesque  by  bringing
together  heterogeneous things  like different  registers  or  their  parodies,  simultaneous praise and
abuse, and the opposites of dualities (such as lie/truth, light/dark, life/death). It is simultaneously
malicious,  abusive,  and  familiar,  friendly.  It  is  delivered  in  a  rapid,  puppet-like  manner  which
destroys  logical  and syntactical  connections,  thus  appearing beyond human comprehension and
reason. Its tone is one of laughter—either the renewing laughter of the mass, or the satanic, satiric
laughter of a lonely madman. Furthermore, it is also finds a concrete equivalent in beatings, and
may even be a way of temporarily “reviving” the folk carnival in a “closed chamber conversation”
(Bakhtin 1984, 421). (Bakhtin 1984; 41, 160-168, 187-189, 198-203, 265, 306, 432-434; Kayser
1981; 63, 66, 71.) For Bakhtin, it was noted, this creates a shifting, dynamic image of struggling
contraries; for Kayser, this gives birth to monsters—nameless non-things that negate meaning and
identity. Indeed, it was already noted how the characters of the play are ambivalently nameless,
without identity and their speech negates meaning; perhaps they are monsters that look like humans,
in a very non-restrictive interpretation of the word?
The varieties of grotesque speech in  Godot use elements from both traditions. Unexpected
combinations  of  words,  dualistic  oppositions  (such  as  movement/stasis,  materialism/idealism,
dark/light,  human/non-human) and literalisations of curses are a staple of the dialogue between
Vladimir and Estragon. Culik argues that the fusion of these opposites is deferred, perhaps because,
as Cavell argues, the dialectic between them is suspended. Furthermore, Krieger argues that there
are no speaking human subjects which is revealed by the prevalence of the opposites. (Brater 1975,
205; Cavell  2001,  150,  Culik 200,  139; Krieger  1977,  987-991.)  The “dual  tone”  that  Bakhtin
mentions is most obvious in Vladimir and Estragon's back-and-forth dialogue. On the other hand,
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Lucky's  speech  represents  the  Kayserian  variety  of  puppet-like  automatic  speech  that  negates
logical  and  syntactic  connections.  It  is  notable  how  the  subjective  and  the  carnival-grotesque
traditions combine or run parallel in all aspects of the language of the play.
It was argued that the mask is the central image of the grotesque language and world, but we
may now refocus the statement:  it  is  the  image of  the poles  of  debasement and excess  almost
brought together. It is the concrete manifestation of both turning inwards from the world and the
materialisation of identity, and Musgrave argues that in Beckett's work it is not indicative of the
interior infinite nor of the Bakhtinian non-conformity and metamorphosis, but “abstracted”, perhaps
reminiscent of the realm of archetypes that  has been noted previously,  and by Bakhtin (Kayser
1981, 61; Musgrave 2003). While the mask is not mentioned in the play, nor is one worn by any
characters,  perhaps  it  is  still  present  in  an “abstracted”  form—perhaps the characters  wear  the
Blanchotian “naked mask”: the mask is a cover over nothingness, so the characters wear their faces,
their archetypical identities, as masks over the nothingness that is their empty identities. In this way
the mask in the play takes  on both Bakhtinian and Kayserian elements,  creating an interesting
hybrid of its own. Let us now turn to the world created by this language.
We established that the world of Godot is a projection of the characters’ inner world, mental
landscape made concrete. Its constriction is a reflection of this, as it is argued that absurd drama,
especially Beckett’s, takes place in a close, and, notably, round spaces. Bakhtin similarly argues that
the atmosphere of the (carnival-)grotesque is that of “the great belly” (1984, 221), inside of the
body being represented or projected in the world, and evoking also a closed and round space. (Blau
1961, 120; Fifield 2009, 67.) Allon White proposes the concept of the prosthetic grotesque, where
the  world  is  not  turned  upside  down  but  inside  out (1993,  169).  Indeed,  as  the  concrete
manifestation of the inner world, the world of  Godot can be viewed as having been turned inside
out. But is it a metaphor for how the characters feel or experience themselves, or can it be read as a
physical representation of their minds? Answering this, let us remember that the grotesque world is
on the  limit  of  our  familiar  world,  as  its  shadow.  In  the  subjective  tradition,  the  comfortingly
familiar world is alienated, it is suddenly hostile, absurd, and dark, and the grotesque experience
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springs from this sense of alienation. In the carnival-grotesque tradition, on the other hand, turning
the world upside down signifies the reversal of hierarchical order, materialising and debasing the
high and lofty, and turning horrifying and alien into familiar and laughable. It  could perhaps be
argued that the world of Godot borrows from both: as we have seen, the concrete world represents
the inner world of the characters, it is a sort of movement inwards within a movement outwards.
Moreover, the absurd is founded on the experience of the familiar world turning suddenly inhuman
and strange.
As  was  argued  in  2.2  and  3.2,  the  world  and  thus  language  are  meaningless,  the
“ultimate void” in its “grotesque derision”, as Esslin puts it (1965, 14; 1985, 84-85.). Vladimir says
it is “indescribable. It’s like nothing. There’s nothing.”, but then, at the very end, he adds, “There’s a
tree.”  (Beckett  2006,  79).  The  world  is  first  strange  and  empty:  the  word  ‘like’ has  multiple
interpretations—it  resembles  nothingness,  it  has  no  parallel,  or  even  both.  But  there  is  also
something, a tree.  And, as noted in 3.2, there is also the country road and the stone.  However,
Kayser  argues  that  in  the  grotesque  world,  familiar  objects  become  malicious,  strange,  or
“possessed”, and, surely, the characters struggle with “non-human antagonists”, as Brater argues
(Brater 1975, 204; Kayser 1981, 111). The tree may actually be a bush, Estragon struggles with his
boots throughout the play, their trousers will not stay up, and their hats do not fit their heads. The
grotesque world, according to Kayser, is also “without heart” (1981, 119-120), meaning that it is
dream-like and its inhabitants seem bodiless, indifferent, and aggressive towards each other—all of
which we have argued to be characteristics of Godot. Truly, the world of the play seems inhuman,
nocturnal and abysmally hopeless, like the world of the subjective grotesque. (Kayser 1981, 58.)
However, the carnival-grotesque vision of world is not unknown to the play either. The power
dynamic between Vladimir and Estragon and Pozzo is turned upside down: in the first act, Pozzo is
or at least  claims to be the owner of the land (and he fits the image of  the modern individual
subject), and chastises Vladimir and Estragon for loitering around, but finally forgiving them with
“magnanimous gesture” (Beckett 2006, 16); in the second act, Pozzo is, as noted, inexplicably blind
and helpless, falls down, and begs for help and pity. Vladimir and Estragon consider kicking him in
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the crotch and asking for “tangible return” for helping him. (Beckett 2006, 69-75.) Kicking Pozzo in
the crotch,  lowering him to the lower bodily stratum (which does not eventually happen—then
again, what does?) is the finishing touch on the reversal of their hierarchical order. As was noted
earlier,  such  Bakhtinian  debasement  permeates  the  play  in  a  variety  of  forms:  Vladimir  and
Estragon call  each other  names,  Lucky kicks  Estragon and Vladimir  hits  Pozzo,  Vladimir  and
Estragon make references to masturbation, venereal disease, farting and vomiting. Vomiting is in a
considerable role in the play in the form of word-vomit in Lucky’s speech. There is even a funny
scene where all the characters fall down inexplicably unable to get  up again,  until  they simply
decide to with the comment: “Child’s play.” (Beckett 2006, 76). (Bakhtin considers tripping and
falling down a form of debasement also.) Through this type of debasing humour, we may argue, the
play turns the strange and hostile absurd world laughable, into a “gay monster”, to use Bakhtin’s
words.
 Thus the play makes a twofold move: it  simultaneously alienates the world and makes it
laughable; the gloomy, absurd inner world of the characters is materialised and made merry by
debasement and hierarchical upturning. It  is a concretised metaphor, speech made material. The
play thus quite elegantly combines the world view of the subjective and the carnival traditions. Here
we  return  to  the  prosthetic  grotesque  for  Kari  Matilainen  argues  that  it  carnivalises  the  basic
categories of the Bakthinian carnival-grotesque (and therefore the corporeality of the play seems
odd, reduced), because after the medieval carnivalesque body came under control, the carnival spirit
detached  from  exterior  rituals  and  became  internalised:  the  rejected  social  phenomena  of  the
carnival returned at the individual level as phobias, fantasies, fears and desires, and the grotesque
turned into a forbidden and dirty internal experience that destabilised the separation between the
subject and the object. (Matilainen 1996, 55-58; White 1993, 171.) But the characters, as reiterated
again and again, have no personality, no fantasies, fears or desires. They are fixtures of the world
like the tree is. The prosthetic grotesque erases the separation between the subject and the object—
perhaps: the play as the object and the viewer/reader as the subject. Following this, perhaps then the
world  of  the  play  is  a  concrete  projection  of  the  feelings  of  disgust  and  dejection  (but  also
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amusement, it is after all a part of the absurd) the reader/viewer feels about his or her own world in
a time when the great narratives that once held the world together are belied, in a world which in
itself is schizophrenically obsessed about discovering some ultimate truth while revealing it, too, as
mere illusion.
Turning to the grotesqueness of time in the play. We established that the essential difference
between carnival-grotesque and subjective grotesque traditions is twofold: firstly, the mood, which
in the former is merry, and the latter gloomy, and secondly, the emphasis on different aspects, as the
former  is  interested in  the cyclical  change from history to  future,  and the latter  in  the  present
moment. The figure of night combines the two traditions in the play, on one hand it encompasses
the awaited moment of nightfall, but it is also a symptom of the eternal recurrence of time, as it was
established in 3.2 that the time the characters are waiting is nightfall, for Godot is to arrive then, but
the circular, recurrent force of their waiting games prevents them from ever reaching that silent
moment of the balance of struggling contraries and time’s forward progression. Instead, the night
always falls with sudden force, and in a matter of seconds, the twilight of early evening is full night,
signalling the renewal of their wait.
Beginning with circularity and the time of the carnival-grotesque tradition, it was established
that it is the time of biological life, cyclical and self-renewing. It orients itself towards the future,
and it is seen in the play in the image of waiting. In Godot, waiting is concretely present in Vladimir
and Estragon’s games, such as competitive name-calling, playing at being Pozzo and Lucky, as they
always note how each distraction “passed the time”. Among the most notable instances of games is
the hat-changing episode: 
[ESTRAGON takes  VLADIMIR’s  hat.  VLADIMIR adjusts  LUCKY’s
hat on his head.  ESTRAGON puts on  VLADIMIR’s hat in place of his
own which he  hands to  VLADIMIR.  VLADIMIR takes  ESTRAGON’s
hat.  ESTRAGON adjusts  VLADIMIR’s  hat  on  his  head.  VLADIMIR
puts  on  ESTRAGON’s  hat  in  place  of  LUCKY’s  which  he  hands  to
ESTRAGON. . .] (Beckett 2006, 63-64)
Vladimir and Estragon go through a needlessly complicated routine of handing and trying on hats
back and forth with the only purpose of Vladimir changing his hat for Lucky’s. It is obvious that
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without a stated goal, the routine is a game. Indeed, Bakhtin argues games to be an essential part of
the  carnival,  as  they orient  the  players  towards  future,  and  also  to  carnivalise  and  materialise
“gloomy  eschatological  time”  (1984;  231-238).  Thus  they  are  also  part  of  destroying  the
dialecticality of time. In the hat game, which was also used as an example of the maliciousness of
objects, subjective grotesque spatiality and carnival-grotesque temporality are fused. Perhaps this is
why the hat game is not very merry: the superfluous hat is simply dropped to the ground, and the
new hat does not make a great difference compared to the old one, even though the old hat “irked”
or “itched” Vladimir (Beckett 2006, 64). Esslin argues that the games played in Beckett's works are
those of imagining the two extreme limits of human consciousness: the moment of being born, and
the moment of dying (1965, 9). Games (and waiting) thus do move their time forwards, but it does
orient  them towards  the  future,  but  towards  death  as the  future.  Games  also  become thus  co-
articulated with another central theme of circularity of the carnival-grotesque time, that of the merry
moment of death-birth, when life and death run parallel neither assuming the primary position.
The  confluence  of  death  and  birth  is  a  theme  in  Godot as  well:  it  was  argued  that  the
characters detest life and therefore yearn for death as a happier or reverse birth, and the movement
of death and birth is a “meaningless circle” from nothingness into nothingness, with life but a flash
between them. (Bruck 1982, 161; Cornwell 1973, 41-44; Metman 1965, 127-128.) As Pozzo says:
“Have you not done tormenting me with your accursed time! It's abominable! When! When! One
day, is that not enough for you, one day like any other . . . one day we were born, one day we shall
die, the same day,  the same second, is that not enough for you? [Calmer.] They give birth astride a
grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more.” (Beckett 2006, 82) We can see how the
moment of death-birth is essentially present in the play, but it is anything but merry; rather, it is
intolerable, a moment of utmost despair.
Bakhtin’s  image  of  death  bringing  forth  life,  the  senile  hag  giving  birth  is  fascinatingly
reversed in the play: “Astride of a grave and a difficult birth. Down in the hole, lingeringly, the
grave-digger puts on the forceps. We have time to grow old. The air is full of our cries.” (Beckett
2006, 83) Are the cries in the air the cries of a newborn child, or the cries of an old man in his
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death-throes? Or both? The grotesqueness of this image is noted in passing by some critics, it is
called a “macabre transubstantiation” (Miskinis 1996, 1047), but not much else is made of it (Tsur
1975,  183-184).  Yet  if  we consider  it  more  carefully,  does  the  image  of  the  hag  not  depict  a
transformation of substance that is macabre as well? The only real difference is the change of mood;
the grave-diggers forceps views the cycle of death and birth from the viewpoint of death instead of
birth.
Furthermore, in the absurd context, waiting—or living for the future—is actually living as a
slave for death. This may illuminate why the moment of death-birth is not merry for the characters,
but grim and hopeless. Yet they still do not commit suicide, perhaps in some way they are, after all,
renewed by death. Perhaps the loss of corporeality plays a part also: the shared corporeality of the
carnivalesque mass lends it a kind of immortality, and the characters of Godot may be argued to be
immortal in the circularity of their time. When nothing changes, no one dies. The absurd man, too,
draws strength from the inevitability of dying. It was speculated that the spirit of carnival becomes
the spirit of the absurd as the subject turns inwards; may this be the ultimate reason for the lack of
merriment of the carnival-grotesque figures? Waiting in the play is a time when death and birth are,
in fact, not separated.  As the spirit  of the absurd prevails,  the moment of death-birth is simply
afforded a negative mood by focusing on the pole of dying instead of being born.
Turning now to the subjective tradition and the night, it was argued that the play takes mostly
place in an eternal twilight between evening and night. The time of the subjective grotesque is one
of instantaneous process, in the present moment with the future and the past emptied of meaning. As
Bakhtin argues, life and death are strictly opposed, and death loses its renewing aspect (1984; 49,
150). It was previously argued that the characters of Godot have no future or past, firstly as absurd
characters they are deprived of those, and secondly because the eternally recurring now of their
waiting annihilates temporality. The games that are supposed to orient them towards the future only
orient them towards death, which has a gloomy renewing aspect in the play.
Furthermore, according to Kayser, the grotesque appears “in the vision of the dreamer . . . or
in the twilight of transitional moments” (1981, 186). Godot is characterised by dreams or dreaming
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and twilightt on many levels. It is argued that Beckett uses the “half-light of suggestion” rather than
“overt  symbolism” (Esslin 1985,  71),  and that  the world of  Godot is  a “twilight world” where
nothing is certain, and where the characters are not released into either the full consciousness that is
identity, or into the state of full unconsciousness that is death or madness, but instead they are kept
in the liminal stage of Dying within their inner world, in a “hellish” state of twilight or half-light.
(Cornwell 1973, 50; Metman 1965, 122-124; Postlewait 1978, 746.)
Esslin argues that the Theatre of the Absurd relies on dream realities (which he notes are
grotesque), and Beckett shows reflections of dreams and nightmares instead of real-life situations
(1985, 22-25). Certainly the reality of the play is more reminiscent of dreams with its closed-off
boundaries  and  self-contained  spatiality and  temporality than  of  the  real  world.  Dreaming is  a
recurring theme in  Godot. In both acts, Estragon sleeps and dreams, but Vladimir wakes him up,
refusing to hear what he dreamt about. In the first act,  Estragon asks: “This one is enough for you?”
while gesturing “towards the universe” (Beckett 2006, 8), clearly seeking what Clayborough called
a “deeper,  more enduring world” of  the imagination. In  the second act,  Estragon describes  his
dream as  falling  from the  top  of  something,  perhaps  recalling Vladimir’s  earlier  regret  of  not
committing a shared suicide with Estragon by jumping “hand in hand, from the top of the Eiffel
Tower” (Beckett 2006, 2). This vision of suicide in the process (in the dream he was not yet dead
but falling) came to Estragon in his sleep like the grotesque world occurs to the dreamer. Moreover,
once more we have interrupted dying, albeit this time a dreamed one.
The grotesque emerges from the twilight, but it pushes one into the night (or void), and the
subjective grotesque indeed is nocturnal in nature (Kayser 1981; 36, 58, 71, 79). We saw that the
Blanchotian literature is nocturnal as well, it opens a void between itself and the world, and the
boundaries between familiar objects disappear into nightly nothingness. In this void, the materiality
of language emerges. There is, indeed, is “no lack of void” (Beckett 2006, 57) in  Godot, where
language “echoes in a void” (Postlewait 1978, 483). The materiality of literature, which was argued
in 3.2 to permeate the whole play but appeared to be incongruous with the theory, becomes now
clear.
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The night, or in the case of  Godot, nightfall, emerges with the experience of the grotesque:
boundaries dissolve, a balance of contraries wherein they are not mitigated but the struggle ceases
momentarily, creating a grotesque hybrid whole, is reached, and time begins to flow again. Esslin in
fact  argues  that  time will  stop and  stable  identity  will  be  established  once  Godot  arrives,  but
actually the opposite of this happens, and Vladimir, mistaking Pozzo for Godot, says: “Time flows
again already” (Beckett  2006,  69;  Esslin 1965; 53,  90).  Naturally Godot  will  not  arrive,  but  a
“secret liberation” is attained: it mitigates the hopelessness of the absurd, and frees the reader and
the characters from the abysmal horror of existence. (It was already argued in 2.2 and 3.2 that the
hopelessness is mitigated in some way.) In the darkness of the nightfall, the characters are released
from the pressures of outside reality, and only uninterrupted, unformed consciousness stays awake
in the newly established temporality, as human consciousness is linked to the experience of time
(Cornwell 1973, 43; Krieger 1977, 991; Postlewait 1978, 473; Spanos 1971, 347). The half-light of
consciousness without individuality, the elusiveness of the self, is not a burden. It is a freedom.
Perhaps, then, even the reader (even only for the duration of the play) is released from the exigence
of monolithic reality and identity and into the delights of the playfulness of the grotesque. As a final
note, we may draw our attention to how in the play the polarities of the carnival-grotesque and
subjective  grotesque  aspects  of  the  temporality  of  the  play  are  flipped:  the  carnival-grotesque
elements  were  gloomy and  dark,  and  the  subjective  grotesque  aspects  were,  if  not  cautiously
positive, at least liberating. This leads us to last section on the grotesque self. The discussion is
divided to the reader, the writer and the characters.
The grotesque is born in the mind of the reader; what is experienced as incongruous with the
norm and what eludes understanding appears as grotesque. Perhaps similarly,  it was argued that
only  the  reader  or  viewer  can  force  Godot to  proceed:  the  act  of  reading  encompasses  the
oppositions found in Beckett, and the experience of the reader furnishes Beckett’s characters with
their corporeality. The reader invests the text with meaning and existence—the importance of the
reader was similar for Blanchot. Furthermore, the experience of Beckett’s actor (not often discussed
in conjunction with the grotesque) is noted by Brater; the experience of incongruity, a disconnected
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connection between speech and action, wholly different from other types of drama, could also be
read in terms of a kind of grotesque experience. (Brater 1975, 205-206; Fifield 2009, 71; Krieger
1977, 990-998.)
The appeal of Godot is difficult, if not impossible, to explain, as reading or watching it creates
an uneasy feeling. The characters are boring, the action is boring, the staging is boring. There is no
plot. There is something vaguely disgusting about it. Still it was among the most popular plays of its
time, and its favour continues. Like the grotesque, the reader or viewer may not be certain what has
been  seen  or  read,  and  thus  the  reading  process  is  turned  back  to  the  reader:  suddenly  the
interpretation tells more about the interpreter than the piece itself, the viewer or reader sees himself
in  the  characters,  and his  life  in  their  lives.  The way the play shifts  into  the reflection of  the
reader/viewer  is  a  grotesque  movement.  It  simultaneously evokes  laughter  and  horror,  like  the
grotesque, and holds a certain fascination in its gloomy absurdity. The grotesque, too, provokes
fascination alongside revulsion, which reduces the distance to the text, and may be explained by
“the  polarity  of  the  mind”  that  Clayborough  mentions  which  is  torn  between  the  need  for
explanations and the enjoyment of the incomprehensible. This recalls the writer, to which we shall
turn next.
The same ambivalence of mind characterises the writer as well:  the grotesque is a product of
a mind that rejoices in the inexplicable and the ambivalent. It is characterised by “dream thinking”,
that is, distortion, dream-like logic, and rejection of organization of thought, but still capable of
“organized  thinking”  (Clayborough  1965,  75).  Clayborough  adapts  this  theory  from Jung,  and
Metman’s  Jungian analysis of  Godot has shown us that  as  such, the Jungian framework is  not
completely applicable to Godot. Indeed, the writer is pushed out of his work, and he may not try to
grasp it again. Beckett’s text reverses the bond of dependency and thus beings to control its author
and attain a life of its own (Krieger 1977, 996). Furthermore, the grotesque writer was seen to
occupy two positions: that of an absurd character, and of a Blanchotian writer.
The parallels between the absurd man and the grotesque writer, as well as Esslin’s view of
Beckett and the absurd man were noted. The image of Beckett as a lone, courageous figure who
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stands proudly before the void of meaning in the world is paralleled in the grotesque writer, who
has an impassioned and rational  view of world,  and who rebels against being defined from the
outside.  The grotesque writer endeavours to show the absurdity of the world,  and according to
Hurley and Oliver the writers of the Theatre of the Absurd share this goal (Hurley 1965, 635-636;
Oliver 1963, 234-235). We may come to the conclusion that the public image of Beckett as an
author  of  the  absurd  (Esslin’s  view  of  him  is,  after  all,  very  influential  still)  bears  a  great
resemblance to the grotesque writer.
Turning next to the grotesque writer as a Blanchotian character, we read the Kayserian “Es”
previously as the Neutral  of literature invading the personality of the writer,  and the horrifying
nature  of  the  grotesque  transforms  the  experience  from  a  sublime  into  a  horrifying  one.
Furthermore, the grotesque and the Blanchotian literature share the tense ambivalence of meaning
and meaninglessness, indeed, the grotesque writer “not only makes; he unmakes” (Clayborough
1965, 58) the meaning in his works—as Beckett does (Krieger 1977, 996). This discussion on the
interconnections between the absurd, the meaningless, and the grotesque with Beckett and Godot as
a site of co-articulation shows us how the grotesque framework is capable of encompassing the
absurd and the meaningless—at least in the context of Beckett’s works.
Turning to our last topic, the grotesque character. Characters can be grotesque on three levels:
in their anomalous appearance, anomalous mental faculties (especially madness), and in monstrous
appearance and skills. The characters of  Godot do not appear monstrous and uncannily skilled in
any obvious way (though it was argued they may have some characteristics of the Kayserian non-
thing regarding their lack of identity and meaning) but generally might pass as normal, as Pozzo
says: “You are human beings none the less. [He puts on his glasses.] As far as one can see. [He
takes off his glasses.] Of the same species as myself. [He bursts into an enormous laugh.] Of the
same species as Pozzo! Made in God’s image!” (Beckett 2006, 15) The derogatory tone may be an
indication of Vladimir and Estragon’s unkempt appearance as they are apparently homeless. Lucky,
on  the  other  hand,  looks  perhaps  somewhat  unusual,  as  Vladimir  guesses  he  suffers  from
hypothyroidism, but still is “not bad looking” (Beckett 2006, 18). Though Lucky appears to have at
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least some degree of deformity, it hardly crosses to grotesqueness.
The  relatively  lacking  anomaly  of  the  characters’  physical  appearance  is,  however,
compensated for  by the anomaly of  their mental  faculties.  The characters seem abstracted,  like
people in a dream, the cores of their personalities elusive and mutable. Metman argues that they
have “an overplus of something” in them. (Esslin 1985, 90-91; Cavell 2002, 131; Metman 1965,
124.) Perhaps this “overplus” is madness: it was argued that the characters escape isolation through
madness, which can also be a way of transgressing the limitations of language, as Cornwell argues
that absurdity of consciousness is mitigated either by silence or by madness, and we have seen that
silence  is  fused  into  words  in  Beckett’s  grotesque,  leaving  only  madness  (Cornwell  2006,  8;
Cornwell  1973,  50).  Indeed,  it  was  argued  that  the  change from the  carnival-grotesque  to  the
subjective grotesque transformed the carnival spirit into an interior experientiality—by the name of
hysteria. In hysteria, the openings of the body do not function as a two-way permeable route for the
body to take in and go out into the world; in hysteria, the body escapes itself, its own grotesqueness,
through the openings. (Matilainen 1996, 55-56; White 1993; 160-168, 177.)
Madness takes two different meanings in the two traditions of the grotesque; in the carnival
tradition it is a parody of official truth, recalling perhaps the absurd logic of the characters which
seems like a parody of formal logic, and in the subjective tradition it is tragic and isolated, recalling
Cornwell’s  arguments.  Vladimir  implies  that  their  endless  chatter  is  a  way of  preventing  their
“reason from floundering” (Beckett 2006, 72), but if at first it worked, it has become a habit (“a
great deadener” [Beckett 2006, 83]) which only contributes to their predicament. He notes, “But has
[our reason] not long been straying in the night without end of the abyssal depths?” (Beckett 2006,
73) He denies having been born mad, which suggests that indeed the waiting has made them so.
Madness is also a form of meaninglessness: it permits of no name for the condition suffered, it
permits no sense to be made of world, life, or self. Thus in the image of madness (and especially
hysteria) the division between the subjective and the carnival-grotesque collapse.
Related to madness is its reverse image, the figure of the puppet: the puppet can be considered
a form of mental anomaly as well, as Kayser argues that the puppet (or marionette) can manifest in
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actual human beings who, lacking substance and nuanced inner motivation, appear to be guided
from the outside  (1981;  41,  92,  184).  Indeed,  it  has  been  put  forth  by Esslin  already that  the
characters  of  the  play  are  like  puppets:  It  was  argued  that  they  are  like  mechanical  puppets,
depersonalised and indifferent, whose restricted movements are manipulated from outside as if in an
abstraction of the puppet play. Robbe-Grillet argues that the whole play is as if Beckett is simply
manipulating  puppets;  even  the  actors  are  turned  into  Beckett’s  puppets.  (Esslin  1985,  22-24;
Figlerowicz  2011,  86; Musgrave 2003; Oliver  1963, 228;  Reid 1993;  Robbe-Grillet  1965,  116;
Spanos 1971, 349.) (Critchley argues that even the critic is turned into Beckett's  puppet [1997,
144].)
The  characters  move  about  apparently  without  motivation,  the  best  example  is  at  the
beginning of act II, Vladimir enters the stage “agitatedly”, moves about, for no reason breaks into
the  dog song,  after  which  “[he remains  a  moment  silent  and motionless,  then begins  to  move
feverishly about the stage. He halts before the tree, comes and goes, before the boots, comes and
goes, halts extreme right, gazes into distance, extreme left, gazes into distance.]” (Beckett 2006, 49)
This reminds us of the “ominous hustle and bustle” which Kayser described; he is not looking for
Estragon, he is not going anywhere, there seems to be no goal to this action, it is as if an outside
force moves him from left to right on the stage like a marionette or a puppet. Musgrave argues that
the puppet is the “aesthetic principle of the abstract grotesque” in its “immanent grace” (2003),
though  the  specific  nature  of  this  gracefulness  is  questionable,  as  Vladimir  and  Estragon  are
described as “grotesquely rigid” (Beckett 2006, 12), implying the very opposite of grace—in fact,
implying that the puppetry of the play is inherently grotesque.
Let us discuss next the central characteristic of the grotesque, the body. It was argued in 3.2
that tense ambivalence of the materialised mind takes the place of corporeality, and the contours of
the mind are continually transgressed by the ceaseless speaking. However, as Fifield argues, the
body is not completely absent from the play, as Beckett has an “irresponsible” attachment to the
human form as the crossroads of “embodiment and abstraction” (2009, 57-58). Again we may note
how the subjective and the carnival-grotesque views of the human body are combined in the play:
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the corporeality of the play is in constant fluctuating transgression of its own limits, collapsing the
boundary between the inner and outer worlds is reminiscent of the carnival-grotesque tradition; on
the other hand, reminiscent of the subjective tradition is that the body is not a physical entity in
itself but an outward projection of the interior infinite or the consciousness, and laughter is not
delighted and materialising but linked with annihilation of meaning: “VLADIMIR: One daren’t
even laugh anymore. ESTRAGON: Dreadful privation.” (Beckett 2006, 3) The relationship between
the characters and the modern subject was discussed in 3.2.
Furthermore, White argues that madness and fear turn the flesh of the body into a viscous
substance between the solid forms and liquid (1993, 164-169). The bodies of the characters thus can
be read as metaphorically viscous. However, even more viscous are their identities, which are in a
constant flux: it was argued that the characters shift the boundaries of their selves (mentally and
physically) by the power of their speech. Speech therefore constitutes a part of their bodies, indeed,
it could be read as an abstract prosthesis. White writes of the prosthesis that it parodies the proper
limb (or other body part), and it is defined by the very absence and deficiency it is intended to cover
(1993,  171-173).  The speech  of  the characters,  too,  has  been  noted  to  be an  amalgamation  of
different discourses, and constantly reminds the characters of what they are lacking—space and
movement.  Figlerowicz's  argument,  noted in  3.2,  that  the  character's  bodies  are  not  the mind's
prosthesis, could thus be modified and reversed: speech is the body's prosthesis.
Beckett’s characters were likened to abstracted Cubist paintings, but as Fifield notes, their
abstraction is not the geometrical fragmentation of Cubism, but the abstraction of corporeality in
general, the exaggeration of curves and protuberances, though their corporeality is “compulsively
placed in doubt” (Cavell 2002, 131; Fifield 2009; 58-59, 69-70). Furthermore, bodies in Beckett’s
works are mutilated, deformed and malfunctioning, and it was argued that the abused, dismembered
body is grotesque in its openness to the outside world (Bakhtin 1984; 26-27, 211; Fifield 2009, 59-
60;  Perttula  2011,  28-30).  Noteworthy is  perhaps  that  the grotesque body is  more  often  large,
excessive, rather than small. This is perhaps Bakhtin’s influence, but in Beckett’s works, the body is
often excessively ambivalent, constricted and expanded simultaneously.
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While Vladimir and Estragon are the self-evident examples of the viscous corporeality of the
prosthetic  speech,  Lucky  serves  this  purpose  as  well:  As  noted,  his  physical  strength  varied
according to his ability to speak. Furthermore, his speech negotiated the divisions between double
entendres  and  academic  discourse,  associative  lists  and  other  dichotomies,  and  physically  he
negotiates the liminal space between male and female, health and sickness, and life and death: he is
strong which implies masculinity and health, but also “a trifle effeminate” (Beckett 2006, 18) and
suffering from goitre and deformities—he also has a running sore on his throat. Furthermore, he
looks “at his last gasp” (Beckett 2006, 19), and his eyes bulge grotesquely out of his head. Lucky
demonstrates the collapse of the mind/body division, and the resulting ambivalence of the grotesque
body.
Two  grotesque  bodily  phenomena  require  special  attention:  laughter,  and  the  reversible
actions of eating and defecating. Starting with laughter,  in the carnival-grotesque its  function is
debasing and derision (and through them, renewal), and the laughter in Godot much resembles it; it
features debasement in the form of crude physical humour (such as falling down), parodies and
name-calling (Esslin 1985, 47; Suciu, 9-10). Debasement is closely linked with laughter as laughing
induces  a  pain  in  Vladimir’s  pubic  area:  “[VLADIMIR  breaks  into  a  hearty  laugh  which  he
immediately stifles, his hand pressed to his pubis, his face contorted.] . . . [Laugh of VLADIMIR,
stifled as before, less the smile.]” (Beckett 2006; 3, 11)
Vladimir’s  laughter  is  soon stifled,  and so the laughter in the play is  not  the merry,  free
laughter of the carnivalesque mass. The humour of the play is more in line with the black humour of
the subjective grotesque in that it is a “mask over an abyss”, as Cornwell says (Cornwell 2006; 43,
116; Schevill 1977, 236; Thomson 1971, 16). Indeed, the play turns the grim humour back on the
readers and viewers: while we laugh at the meaningless hustle and bustle and the meaningless word
games on the stage or on the page, we are in actuality laughing at our own predicament, our own
meaningless  lives—though  it  was  argued  that  the  play  illustrates  the  quintessentially  modern
conditio humana, its continued success indicates that the sense of the meaninglessness of life is not
solely a twentieth century phenomenon. Thus even though the humour is physical and debasing, it is
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not renewing.
Secondly, eating and defecating—or in the case of the play, vomiting, was already discussed
in 3.2, but let us have a closer look at it now. Oliver argues that the images of pained and obsessive
eating, vomiting, defecating, and general uncleanliness, of “man’s impotent degradation” as he calls
them, signify the failure to live with the absurd (1963, 233). However, in the carnival-grotesque
framework,  eating  and  excrement  are  closely  linked  with  laughter,  and  are  the  main  ways  of
debasing suffering and fear, as excrement combines the womb and the tomb “in the least terrifying
way” (Bakhtin 1984, 176). In the act of eating the body transgresses its own limits, and conquers
the  world.  (Bakhtin  1984;  147-151,  174-176,  281-283,  380.)  Moreover,  meat  is,  as  noted,  the
quintessential grotesque food, indicative of abundance and fullness of life, but in Godot, everything
that remains of the banquet of shared meat are the bones: Estragon “makes a dart at them”, greedily
“gnawing” them, until pocketing them with apparent satisfaction (Beckett 2006, 20-21). But earlier
on Estragon noted how “the more you eat, the worse it gets”, and Vladimir says that for him, “it’s
just the opposite” (Beckett 2006, 13). The characters of the play take an emaciated, starving version
of the world into their mouth and for their conquest, and fittingly so, for the world is noted to be
sparse.
However, conquering of the world in the mouth that is effected by eating is reversed in the act
of vomiting which is prevalent in the play. It is even more prominent than defecating, even though
Beckett’s works convey a “scatological impulse” (Moody 2011, 71). White argues that the body
expels  “phobic  monstrosities”  that  the  mind  cannot  acknowledge  through  vomit  (1193,  164).
Though literal vomiting is absent from the play, Lucky’s word-vomit was noted already in 3.2. It is
interesting to note that  the grotesque is  the art  of  disgus”,  and word-vomit is  the only way of
communication, the explosive expelling of stories. But it is not only words which are expelled from
the characters as vomit, as Estragon says: “I’ve puked my puke of a life away here, I tell you!”
(Beckett 2006, 53) Life and language are such “phobic monstrosities” that are to be ejected from the
bodies of the characters.
Thus there emerges from the play a central, and very grotesque, figure: the mouth. The mouth,
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as an opening of the body that both takes in the world and ejects it out, and as a “cave” where the
grotesque originates in the form of cave paintings, is perhaps the foundational grotesque body part.
It is argued to be a fixation in Beckett’s works, and, furthermore, that it is the point of intersection
between the non-material and the material world (Esslin 1985, 89; Fifield 2009, 63-66; Harpham
1982, 59). The mouth is foundational, if not essential, for the play as well, for it, far more than any
other part, moves the characters, moves the time of the play, moves whatever lingers there of the
plot. It also conjures, through speech and as the verbalisation of imagination, into existence most of
the phenomena of the bare, inhuman world of the play. It is also the birthplace of the literary realm
as the voice that murmurs incessantly. The mouth is where the foundational dichotomies of the play,
vomiting and speaking, body and mind, world and human, and the inner and the outer worlds, meet
and become co-articulated. And most of all, it is the place where the absurd, the meaningless, and
the grotesque intersect.
5. Conclusions, Last Words
The  hope  that  the  method  employed  in  this  thesis  would  prove  itself  was  expressed  in  the
Introduction  of  this  thesis.  As  we  have  now  reached  the  end,  we  may reflect  on  how  it  has
succeeded.
It is in the nature of this “filtration method” as it was called that through each strata of theory
and analysis we refine our understanding of the key concepts (world, time, and self), and through
those, there emerges a refined image of the work as a whole. The extent to which the very different
theories supported each other was not expected: this will be apparent as we summarise the main
discoveries of each framework shortly. The method worked in such a way that the concepts grew
organically firstly from the theories themselves, and secondly from the previous sections. However,
the  method requires  a  process  of  writing  which  is  very time-intensive,  for  though the  general
outlines drew themselves relatively quickly, the process of including and excluding minor key terms
was almost cyclical: if a term in a later framework suggested itself very powerfully, analysis had to
revert to an earlier phase to compare what had been written of it before.
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Yet the purpose of this method is not only to study the strata of meaning of a single play, but
to  study the  strata  of  meaning  of  (a  limited  set)  of  critical  discussions  as  well.  Thus  we saw
emerging a kind of historical aspect of progression to the analysis of different frameworks: looking
at the years of publication of the bulk of criticism in this thesis, it is surprising to notice that the
majority  of  the  absurdist  criticism  is  from  the  1950  to  1970's,  whereas  the  criticism  of
meaninglessness  is  from 1980 to  2010's,  and  lastly the  commentators  on  the  grotesqueness  of
Beckett's works from the 2000's. This lends some further credibility to the structure of this thesis,
which is, after all, constructed so as to give an impression of movement through ever more refined
strata of analyses. Of course this is to some extent artificial; the selection of works and themes for
discussion under each topic is not accidental, but it must be emphasised that the “historical” aspect
has not been a consciously sought outcome. It is purely incidental—and therefore perhaps all the
more meaningful?
As a summary, the absurdist tradition viewed  Waiting for Godot as an essentially finished
piece—a fairytale, an allegory, Beckett's personal nightmare; it also read it in terms of Beckett's
personal  experiences  and  personality,  even  though  this  was  explicitly  stated  to  be  reductive.
However, the fundamentals of what constitute the central themes of the play were discovered, and
the division to world, time, and self emerged. The main conclusions that we came to were that the
play refuses meaning and narrative; its world is reduced to uncertainty, if not nothingness; its time
is circular, and has the form of the placeholder action of waiting, which was waiting for nothing;
and the characters had no genuine selves, they were likened to puppets or archetypes.
Moving  to  the  tradition  of  the  meaningless,  it  viewed  Waiting  for  Godot as  something
unfinished or downright unfinishable—eternally recurrent, or eternally disrupted in the process of
becoming something. It also read the play in terms of a more general, open-ended framework than
Beckett's personal history and personality. In fact, it was explicitly argued that the writer cannot be
used as a framework for the work at all, and that the relationship between the writer and the work is
characterised by distance and indifference. We also developed the key concepts discovered in the
section on absurdist criticism: Beckett’s language attempts to defer signification by the method of
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excess and atrophy, but meaning cannot be avoided; the world of the play is the concrete projection
of  the  inner  world  of  the  characters,  and  it  is  characterised  by  simultaneous  expansion  and
constriction; the time of the play has two aspects: the time of the artwork which was the time of
waiting,  which actually deferred Godot’s awaited arrival, and the time of Dying which was the
absent centre of waiting as the nightfall; and lastly the selves of the characters are characterised by
the  collapsed  mind/body  dichotomy  which  happens  through  the  materialised  mind  and  the
emaciated body pushing the polarities of the dichotomy towards each other. It became clear that the
two traditions,  absurd and meaningless,  were in opposition on many aspects, though they were
essentially derivative of each other.
Lastly,  it  was  seen  that  the  tradition  of  grotesque  reconciles  the  apparent  or  superficial
differences between the absurd and meaningless traditions by using this very clash as its starting
point.  The tradition of  the  grotesque itself  was seen to  be fundamentally divided into two,  the
subjective and the carnival-grotesque traditions.  The main discovery was that  in all  three main
aspects of the study, the play combines the traditions of the subjective and the carnival-grotesque,
creating a composite, if not new, grotesque. The effect of the grotesque, as a whole, was that of
reflecting the studied phenomena back to the reader/viewer, in a movement which relocated the
locus of meaning onto the reader/viewer, thus truly legitimising simultaneous meaningfulness and
meaninglessness.
The  discoveries  of  the  individual  aspects  could  be  summarised  as  following:  Beckett’s
language is a hybrid of speech and silence which pushes the poles of dichotomic opposites towards
one another; the world of the play is a concrete projection of the emotions, the fear, disgust, and
amusement, the reader/viewer experiences in an unstable world of searching for and jeopardizing
any ultimate truth; the time of the play was again divided into two: into the time of waiting and
games which was the gloomy yet renewing moment of death-birth in the spirit of the absurd, and
into the time of the nightfall into which the grotesque finally pushes the play and the reader/viewer,
releasing both from the pressure of outside reality and identity;  and lastly the self in  the play:
discovering the intersection of all three frameworks in the image of writer, but more importantly in
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the image of the mouth where the  foundational dichotomies of the play, vomiting and speaking,
body and  mind,  world  and  human,  and  the  inner  and  the  outer  worlds,  meet  and  become co-
articulated. And most of all, it is the image where the absurd, the meaningless, and the grotesque
intersect.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how  the  carnival-grotesque  tradition  corresponded  with  the
absurdist  tradition  in  its  themes  and  assumptions,  whereas  the  subjective  grotesque  tradition
corresponded more closely with the tradition of the meaningless. The grotesque was thus discovered
“buried” into the  earlier  established  criticism itself  as  a  palimpsest  tradition,  oblique and  only
occasionally glimpsed at.
Indeed, the grotesque forms and meanings that emerge from the margins of Waiting for Godot
are analogous to how the grotesque emerges from the margins of the criticism: “between the lines”
and “buried” beneath the other strata of meanings, only hinted or suggested at on the explicit level,
but as we begin our filtration work, it opens new possibilities of mitigating, but importantly not
negating, the clash of the incommensurate elements of the play. The grotesque has travelled as a
shadow passenger all along the history of Theatre of Absurd, all the way from Esslin and his notes
on the mouth; Thomson argues that the grotesque acts as “potting soil” for the absurd: grotesque
“on a grand scale leads” to a “notion of universal absurdity” (1971, 31). Though Waiting for Godot
seems not to invite grotesque meanings, they grow out of it, so much like strange, disgusting and
beautiful, flowers, given the opportunity.
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